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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This is an application of existentialist and phenomenological philosophy to the 
psychology and ethical concerns of memory, suffering, and violence. The primary goal 
is to take up the recent resurgence of existentialist/phenomenological thought and 
apply it to the fields of memory studies and trauma studies, broadly conceived. The 
methodology blends those of literary studies and philosophy, given that the subjects of 
the current investigation themselves blur the lines between literature and philosophical 
production. This work likewise explores the role of violence and counter-violence as 
formative of identity among marginalized groups and asks what the psychological and 
ethical consequences of such violence are. Finally, via a theorizing of limit-experiences, 
a sketch for a kind of existentialist ethics is sought. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
i. A New Direction for Existentialism 
The recent resurgence of interest in existentialism has already taken several paths 
in various fields, and I predict it will take many more before this wave completes its 
journey from trough to crest. My own project here is an analysis of existentialism’s roles 
in the way we might theorize memory, suffering, and violence. I describe what 
existentialist philosophy and literature offers us when theorizing individual and 
collective experiences of suffering and the attendant issues of memory, collective and 
personal. The question of how suffering, transgression, and violence form, deform, and 
reform the very self that experiences and enacts violence is likewise central to my 
investigations here. And, finally, the scope of my inquiry includes the problem of 
constructing an existentialist ethics in the face of suffering and violence. 
The aforementioned resurgence in interest in existentialism is evidenced by the 
recent translations  or re-releases of Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason (Verso, 2004), 
The Imaginary (Routledge, 2010),  Existentialism is a Humanism (Yale, 2011), Saint Genet 
(Minnesota, 2012), The Freud Scenario (Verso, 2013); of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second 
Sex (Vintage, 2012), and several new works on Beauvoir such as The Philosophy of Simone 
de Beauvoir: Critical Essays (Routledge, 2011); of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time 
(SUNY 2010), and Indiana University Press has undertaken a massive translation and 
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scholarly project concerning Heidegger’s work, with over thirty new translations of his 
works having appeared in this series, as well as several scholarly monographs on his 
work. Likewise, between 2012 and 2015, nearly all of Norman Mailer’s books will have 
been re-released, and a new major biography of Mailer was published in 2013, as were 
his Selected Letters in late 2014. And the list goes on. 
This pronounced renewal of interest in existentialism does not have a singly 
defined direction, but the appearance of these books promises a wave of scholarly 
responses in the coming years. It is my hope that my intervention here will offer some 
of the directions this research might take. Already, there have been several studies on 
the nature of violence in the Sartre’s work. Just to mention a few: James Dodd’s Violence 
and Phenomenology (2009) explores Sartre’s Notebooks for an Ethics and Critique of 
Dialectical Reason in fruitful juxtaposition with Hannah Arendt’s On Violence; Ronald E. 
Santoni’s Sartre on Violence: Curiously Ambivalent (2004) compares Sartre’s and Camus’s 
differing views on the uses of violence. Likewise, Sara Heinämaa’s Toward a 
Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir has begun a fruitful 
discussion of existentialist-phenomenology in the field of Body Studies. And the 
intersections of existentialism and postcolonialism are likewise garnering renewed 
interest—e.g., the work of Yoav Di-Capua, concerning the Arab world, and that of 
Jonathan Judaken concerning race and postcolonialism vis-à-vis Sartre. Given that 
much of the work in Memory Studies and in discussions of violence overlap with the 
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postcolonial world, there are already others beginning to channel this surge in 
existentialist thought in similar directions to those I propose to take it. 
 
ii. Why Existentialism? 
Existentialism was born from the triple violence of the First World War, the 
Second World War, and the more diffuse violence of modern alienation. Due to this 
gestation in suffering, I argue, existentialism is the philosophy of suffering and violence 
par excellence. It should also be noted that Arthur Schopenhauer is frequently cited as 
one of the progenitors of modern existentialism—in fact, philosopher Richard Schacht 
names him the primary forefather of existentialism, not Kierkegaard as many claim. 
Given that suffering serves as the bedrock of Schopenhauer’s philosophy, we can say 
that even before 20th-century existentialism emerged from the above-mentioned triple 
violence, its roots were already firmly planted in a philosophical consideration of 
suffering. 
In my dissertation, I attempt to rejuvenate discussion on some of the twentieth 
and twenty-first century’s greatest thinkers and writers—Franz Fanon, Martin 
Heidegger, Norman Mailer, Joyce Carol Oates, Jean-Paul Sartre, and William T. 
Vollmann. Most of the authors I cover lived through the Second World War. I therefore 
place them within this historical context. The traumatic effects of the war are 
particularly salient for Beauvoir, Camus, and Sartre, who lived in occupied France and 
engaged in varying degrees of resistance, including Sartre’s time as a soldier and as a 
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prisoner of war. Emmanuel Levinas was likewise a POW when he drafted his first 
notable existentialist work, Existents and Existence (1947). And regarding American 
existentialists covered here, Norman Mailer fought in the Second World War, on the 
Pacific Front, and wrote The Naked and the Dead (1948) about his experiences there. He 
also wrote several other books on various forms of violence—ranging from boxing 
matches to the Vietnam Conflict—from an existentialist viewpoint. The details of these 
authors’ individual traumas and how the overall trauma of the Second World War 
affected them will be enumerated later, but I would briefly add here that their thinking 
was forged in the suffering and violence of these world events, and they each placed 
these events at the center of their literary and philosophical efforts. Joyce Carol Oates 
and William T. Vollmann did not experience the Second World War, but they have 
made it either the central or peripheral subject for several of their works, and Vollmann 
has worked as a war journalist during recent conflicts around the globe, thus making 
the experience of suffering and violence key to his writerly output. 
Another salient similarity between all of these authors is that they blur the 
distinctions between literature and philosophy. My efforts here will therefore likewise 
blur the distinctions between philosophy and literary studies. As Sara Heinämaa writes, 
[The philosopher’s] inquiry may be advanced more by a close inspection 
of a fictitious case than by a survey of actual instances […] Beauvoir’s 
rejection of systematic philosophy is inspired by Kierkegaard’s mockery 
of the Hegelian system. But Beauvoir was also influenced by Husserl’s 
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idea of philosophy as a radical inquiry that proceeds with the help of the 
imagination and fiction. Both these sources give literature a philosophical 
task and encouraged Beauvoir to experiment with her own writing. 
(Heinämaa 13-15) 
And a similar claim can be made about all of the authors I investigate in this project. For 
existentialist writers, literature is often the linguistic laboratory where philosophical 
notions are dramatized and tested, explored and expanded; and literary language holds 
a particularly important place in the philosophy of Heidegger and Mailer. 
 
iii. Chapter Two: Authenticity and Suffering 
This chapter focuses on the relationship between authenticity and suffering in 
the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, with occasional references to Heidegger, Lacan, and 
Levinas. 
An aspect of Jean-Paul Sartre’s thinking on authenticity that has been left largely 
untheorized is the question of how the experience of suffering can be a path to Sartrean 
authenticity. My contention is that the suffering of the subject brings together the 
requisite elements of transcendence and facticity needed for Sartrean authenticity. This 
is not to say that this is the only or the most desirable path to Sartrean authenticity, but 
merely that it is a path, and one Sartre repeatedly depicts in his literary works and 
explicates in his philosophical works. I also want to clarify at the outset that while 
authenticity sounds like a positive state of being, though suffering is clearly not, in 
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Being and Nothingness Sartre claims that the emotional state that most frequently 
accompanies authenticity is angoisse (anguish)—that is, the achievement of authenticity 
is not necessarily pleasant and is often accompanied by suffering of one sort or another. 
As he writes in his war diaries: “Authenticity requires one to accept suffering” (The War 
Diaries 51).1 
Being and Nothingness is a philosophical touchstone throughout this chapter, but I 
focus more on Sartre’s short story “The Wall” (1937), his novels The Age of Reason (1945) 
and Troubled Sleep (1949), and his memoirs and essays written in the years just after the 
Second World War which were published in Situations III. I have selected these works 
not only because they include depictions of suffering leading to a state of authenticity, 
but also because they span many years and multiple genres, thus offering a wealth of 
material on the topic and allowing us to identify a consistent thread throughout Sartre’s 
thought. 
 
iv. Chapter Three: A Practical Ethics of Violence  
 In Chapter Two, I explore how Frantz Fanon by turns takes up, alters, refutes 
and furthers Sartrean existentialist thought, particularly vis-à-vis suffering, violence, 
and the notion of lived-experience. This chapter takes violence and counter-violence as 
constitutive of identity and, using William T. Vollmann’s Rising Up and Rising Down, 
attempts to find those areas in Fanon’s work on violence that find him justified or 
                                                          
1 “L’authenticité exige qu’on accepte de souffrir” (Carnets de la drôle guerre 241). 
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unjustified in his promotion of counter-violence as a legitimate political tool for 
struggling against oppression. 
 I take Fanon’s position vis-à-vis violence to be tripartite. One part of his position 
is about the ways in which violence creates the identities of the oppressor and the 
oppressed alike. The second part is about the efficacy of violence—or, to be more 
precise, counter-violence—as a means of resistance against oppression. And, finally, the 
third part of his position is about the ethics of enacting this counter-violence. I 
ultimately endorse Fanon’s reworking of Sartrean philosophy to include the lived 
experience of non-whites as a special case of the violence of the gaze. I likewise endorse 
his and Sartre’s theorizing of identity formation via systemic violence. I diverge from 
his thinking in certain regards vis-à-vis his promotion of violence, without outright 
eschewing violence as a legitimate political tool. Here again Vollmann proves valuable, 
particularly the Moral Calculus he develops in Rising Up and Rising Down. 
 Given the recent protests in Ferguson, MO, and Baltimore, MD, as well as recent 
uprisings throughout the world, the question of oppression and attempts to combat it—
both violently and nonviolently—these questions are as salient as they were in Fanon’s 
lifetime. I therefore bring the thought of Fanon, Sartre, and Vollmann to bear on these 
current issues to show the continued importance of their thought and to work toward a 
coherent understanding of violence in the contemporary world, especially an 
understanding of which sorts of violence in which situations are effective means of 
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combating inequality and oppression, as well as when these tactics are ethically 
permissible. 
 
v. Chapter Four: An Existentialist Analysis of Knots of Memory 
As mentioned above, we have seen an explosion of renewed interest in 
existentialism in recent years—ranging from dozens of new translations or re-releases 
of works by Beauvoir, Heidegger, Levinas, Mailer, and Sartre to a spate of scholarly 
monographs and articles on existentialist philosophy and literature. Likewise, we have 
seen a prodigious amount of work done in the field of Memory Studies. I propose to 
find a common ground between these two trends and, more specifically, to undertake 
an existentialist analysis of les noeuds de mémoire (knots of memory), a concept 
inaugurated as a major new point of inquiry in a 2011 special issue of Yale French Studies 
dedicated to the topic. My primary goal is to establish a philosophical-theoretical 
foundation for understanding how these knots of memory emerge. I also argue for 
existentialism’s privileged position in the theorization of knots of memory. 
I employ Badiou’s notion of the Event as described in Being and Event, 
Heidegger’s investigations, from “Origin of the Work of Art,” into how Being is 
gathered around public structures, and Sartre’s concept of le groupe en fusion (the fused 
group), from his Critique of Dialectical Reason, to explicate how these knots of memory 
form. Fused groups are, Sartre claims, formed almost exclusively under duress from a 
third party. In the dialectics of sociality and individuals who are thrown into and co-
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constitutive with sociality, we will find part of the answer to our question of how these 
knots of memory form, since these knots at once belong to the realm of the social-
historical and gather individuals as groups (fused or otherwise) together against a 
horizon of sociality. 
I analyze Sartre’s under-discussed play, The Condemned of Althona (1959), and 
John Edgar Wideman’s Fanon (2008), a novel that at once exemplifies a knot of memory 
and presages the theoretical concept itself. These works will therefore serve as examples 
of knots of memory and will aid me in establishing the philosophical-theoretical 
foundations that allow for an emergence of knots of memory. In situating these works 
in relation to the concept of knots of memory, we will thread through multiple Events, 
displaying how these various Events and literary testimony and allegory build on and 
entangle with each other, thereby forming knots of memory and aiding in the creation 
of the conditions of possibility for their emergence. 
 
vii. Chapter Five: Joyce Carol Oates, Violence, and Identity 
 Unlike Vollmann, Oates is in fact an existentialist in many ways, a fact I establish 
via her journals, her various literary works over the decades, and other evidence. But 
like Norman Mailer, Oates is not an existentialist in the sense that she has adopted 
wholesale any previous existentialist’s system. Following philosopher Richard Schacht’s 
genealogy of existentialism, I consider Arthur Schopenhauer (as opposed to Friedrich 
Nietzsche or Søren Kierkegaard) the progenitor of modern existentialism. The only 
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philosopher mentioned more often than Sartre in Oates’s work is Schopenhauer—and, 
here again, references to him span her entire career, from her earliest journal entries to 
her 2007 novel The Gravedigger’s Daughter. This is entirely fitting, given Schopenhauer’s 
preoccupation with pain and suffering. 
 This chapter explores violence as an identity-forming force, both for the 
individual and for the collective, keeping in mind an existentialist dialectic between the 
two. In Oates’s work, personal violence is often the response to systemic violence and is 
often the only recourse left to her characters. Here, as stated above, she shares common 
cause with Sartre. Additionally, memory’s relationship with suffering and violence is 
explored, as these are central themes for Oates across her entire career. Chapter One 
focuses on public or collective notions of memory in my attempt to philosophically 
ground the knots of memory concept; here, through Oates’s work, a more personal 
version of memory vis-à-vis suffering and violence takes center stage. 
 Oates is also specifically interested in those forms of violence peculiar to gender 
relations. She consistently depicts both personal and systemic violence in terms of 
gender relations. This chapter therefore echoes in many ways Chapter Two, which 
focuses on Beauvoir’s feminist-existentialist project and Body Studies.  
 
vii. Chapter Six: Limit Experiences and Ethics in the American Existentialism of 
Norman Mailer 
 11 
 
Existentialism, with its grounding in the phenomenology of Husserl and 
Heidegger, places experience as one of its central concerns. The way human experience 
is treated, however, changes notably between various authors of the loosely defined 
existentialist movement. This is doubly so in regard to pain, suffering, and violence. 
Sartre largely focuses on the experience of suffering and its connections to 
authenticity—particularly in his novel trilogy The Roads to Freedom—while, famously, 
Camus’s character Mersault, in The Stranger, shoots a man for seemingly no reason, 
giving us at least one sort of existentialist murder, l’acte gratuit (the gratuitous act). 
Camus is also concerned with the issue of suicide in various essays. Sartre’s focus on 
the immediate phenomenological experience and Camus’s focus on the absurd barrier 
of death (one’s own or another’s) perhaps the two key modes of existentialist literary 
writing. Mailer’s greater affinity for Sartrean literary tactics comes as no surprise when 
one notices how frequently Mailer references Sartre in his nonfiction writings—from as 
early as 1957 with Advertisements for Myself to his 2001 collection of essays and 
interviews, The Big Empty. That said, Mailer is no mere acolyte of Sartre. Hazel E. 
Barnes, in her Existentialist Ethics, includes Mailer in her category of “existentialist 
rebels,” a direct reference to Camus’s The Rebel. 
For Mailer, it is the limit-experience that leads to authenticity, not pain or 
suffering per se (though, since these are often parts of limit-experiences, they also fit 
this schema). This is why we see extremity of drug use, sexual intensities, violent 
transgression, and physical exertion as paths to authenticity in Mailer’s writings. Credit 
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for the notion of the limit-experience is often given to Foucault or Bataille, but it is 
worth noting that Karl Jaspers, one of the great philosophers of existentialism, first 
coined the term Grenzerlebnis (limit-experience) to describe such experiences. The notion 
of the limit-experience is therefore originally an existentialist idea and thus fitting for an 
existentialist project such as Mailer’s. 
There is another way in which Mailer fits into the world of existentialist thought. 
As mentioned earlier, existentialism was born out of the triple violence of the First 
World War, the Second World War, and a more generalized modern alienation. Mailer 
fought in the Second World War and took aim at modern alienation in nearly all of his 
works. It is worth noting that all of the authors I discuss use the very philosophy that 
emerged from these world calamities to theorize violence and suffering. This is a sizable 
portion of my overall argument for reintroducing existentialist thought into current 
discussions on suffering and violence. The philosophy that emerged from these events 
enjoys a unique position to theorize them. 
In summary, Mailer’s work fits into the existentialist movement in the ways it 
depicts and deals with violence and suffering. Mailer is interested in a Sartrean style of 
phenomenological depiction of these subjects, and he brings existentialist literature 
forward by focusing on a wider range of limit-experiences as possible alternatives for 
violence, even as he includes violence and suffering among the possible paths to 
existential authenticity. He also brings the existentialist problematic into the American 
sphere, which means applying it to the hyper-consumerist society that is the United 
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States. And, even though existentialism was always connected with counter-culture and 
alternative lifestyles, Mailer introduced it to the particular counter-cultures of the 
American 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. 
This chapter shows how Mailer fits into the existentialist movement, given his 
affinities with Camus, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre. I also argue that he brings 
existentialist literature and thought forward by further embedding it in counter-cultural 
movements and by further theorizing and making use of the notion of the limit-
experience. Mailer’s work is distinctly American, arising from post-war counter cultures 
and reactions to the social conservatism of the 1950s, as well as the American fixation on 
the rugged individual standing out against the masses. 
 
vi. Chapter Six: The New Universalism, Finitude, and William T. Vollmann  
In recent years, there has been, in the words of Malini Johar Schueller, “a major 
intellectual impetus in Europe and the US: to produce paradigms of […] global theory, 
based on the assumption that the contemporary moment calls for a resurgence of some 
form of universal theorizing.” Schueller includes Giorgio Agamben, Judith Butler, 
Antonio Negri, and Slavoj Žižek among those thinkers who have aimed at a new 
universalism. There are others as well, such as Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Ernesto 
Laclau—and the subject of my inquiry, William T. Vollmann. Despite having gone 
largely unnoticed by major theorists, Rising Up and Rising Down fairly begs to be 
situated among recent discussions on universalism and ethics. It was a finalist for The 
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National Book Critics Circle Award, and a 750-page abridgement of the 3,200-page 
original was published by Ecco in 2004. Steven Moore, writing in Washington Post Book 
World, praises the book as 
a monumental achievement on several levels: as hair-raising survey of mankind’s 
propensity for violence, as a one-man attempt to construct a system of ethics, as a 
successful exercise in objective analysis (almost non-existent in today’s partisan, 
ideological, politicized, spin-doctored, theory-muddled public discourse), and a 
demonstration of the importance of empathy […] beyond the realm of mere 
mortals. 
But, despite accolades in the popular press and Vollmann’s nearly fanatical followers 
who have made him into something of a cult literary figure, his work has not been 
taken up by many scholars. I argue that he makes a significant contribution to one of the 
most important theoretical debates of the past decade, and that his contribution is best 
understood via an existentialist problematic. 
Rising Up and Rising Down is at once an example of anthropological field 
research, cultural criticism, literary theory, memoir, political science, travel writing, war 
reportage, and, finally, ethical philosophy. But despite this nearly exhaustive 
methodology, Vollmann admits the finitude of anyone attempting to create a 
universalist ethics. He attempts a proverbial third way between strict relativism and 
dogmatic universalism by insisting on such a multitude of information and 
methodological approaches, and then deriving his universalist Moral Calculus from 
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that pluralistic approach. In doing so, he has offered a new approach to solving one of 
the longest running ethical debates in modern philosophy. 
Heidegger’s notion of finitude and Sartre’s attempts at formulating a universalist 
ethics in Critique of Dialectical Reason are key to understanding Vollmann’s project. In 
this one instance, the subject of my inquiry is not, I would argue, an existentialist; 
rather, it is the injection of existentialist philosophy into his system for understanding 
violence that helps clarify his efforts, and it is existentialist philosophy that can best 
explain the situation-bound universalist ethics he aims to develop. In effect, here I argue 
that even when the author does not identify as an existentialist, it is still existentialism 
that best supports and furthers his project. 
 
viii. Intersections 
 Being and Suffering investigates several fruitful intersections of memory studies 
and the ethics of suffering and violence by using an existentialist-phenomenological 
problematic to stage its intervention. The project itself rests at the intersection of 
literature and philosophy, much like the work of the authors discussed here. I have 
therefore made use of philosophical and literary texts in equal measure, and my own 
methodology blends those of philosophy and literary studies. By probing these 
intersections, I hope to offer a direction to take the study of existentialist thought in the 
twenty-first century. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SUFFERING AND AUTHENTICITY IN THE WORK OF JEAN-PAUL SARTRE 
 
i. Introduction 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s notions of authenticity and bad faith are well known, but an 
aspect of his thinking on authenticity that has been left largely untheorized is the 
question of how the experience of suffering can be a path to Sartrean authenticity. I 
argue that the experience of suffering brings together the requisite elements of 
transcendence and facticity needed for Sartrean authenticity. This is not the most 
desirable path to authenticity, but it is a path, and one Sartre repeatedly depicts 
throughout his work. Also, while authenticity sounds like a positive state of being, 
though suffering clearly is not, in Being and Nothingness Sartre claims that the emotional 
state that most frequently accompanies authenticity is angoisse (anguish)—that is, the 
achievement of authenticity is not necessarily pleasant and is often accompanied by 
suffering of one sort or another. As he writes in his war diaries: “Authenticity requires 
one to accept suffering” (The War Diaries 51). [“L’authenticité exige qu’on accepte de 
souffrir” (Carnets de la drôle guerre 241).] 
Sartre occasionally discusses this path to authenticity in his philosophical texts, 
and it constantly returns in his literary works. Indeed, Sartre uses his work in different 
genres to reinforce the others—at times to cover the same territory in another way, but 
also to cover territory better suited to one genre than another. As American philosopher 
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Richard Rorty phrases it, “No other philosopher [than Sartre] has had such success in 
using stories, plays, novels, critical essays, and philosophical treatises to complement 
and reinforce each other” (Detmer 4). 
I will isolate Sartre’s thought on suffering and authenticity as discussed in his 
philosophical treatises Being and Nothingness (1943) and Critique of Dialectical Reason 
(1961), as well as his short story “The Wall” (1937), his novels The Age of Reason (1945) 
and Troubled Sleep (1949), and his memoirs and literary essays written during and just 
after the Second World War, particularly those found in Aftermath of War (Situations III, 
1946). I have selected these works not only because they include depictions of suffering 
leading to authenticity, but also because they span nearly three decades and multiple 
genres, thus offering a wealth of material on the topic and allowing us to identify a 
consistent thread in Sartre’s thought. 
 
ii. Authenticity and Suffering in “The Wall” 
 Appearing in 1937, “The Wall” was Sartre’s first published short story and one of 
his earliest publications of any sort. Sartre’s preoccupations with the Spanish Civil War 
and with the effects of suffering on the psychology of his characters—themes which 
return in his largest fictional effort, the novel tetralogy Roads to Freedom—are already 
present in his first published work of short fiction. The protagonist of “The Wall” is 
Pablo Ibbieta, a fighter in the Spanish Civil War who has been taken prisoner. He does 
not experience physical torture—that is, he does not experience pain as I am using the 
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word for the purposes of this essay—but his experience is nonetheless one of suffering. 
Already at the story’s opening, he and his compatriots are left to suffer the elements. 
We are told: “For the past 24 hours we hadn’t stopped shivering” (The Wall 1). 
[“…depuis vingt-quatre heures, nous n’avions pas cessé de grelotter” (Le Mur, 3).] They 
are also able to hear the gunshots that kill their comrades in the executions taking place 
just outside their prison cell, thus forcing them to contemplate their impending death. 
The suffering is therefore less pronounced in physical terms, but of a tremendous 
magnitude psychologically speaking. Sartre depicts the effect through rich detail. 
“Doesn’t it seem cold to you here?” He looked cold, he was blue. 
“I’m not cold,” I told him. 
He never took his hard eyes off me. Suddenly I understood and my 
hands went to my face: I was drenched in sweat. In this cellar, in the midst 
of winter, in the midst of drafts, I was sweating. I ran my hands through 
my hair, gummed together with perspiration; at the same time I saw my 
shirt was damp and sticking to my skin. (6) 
« Vous ne trouvez pas qu’on grelotte ici? » 
Il avait l’air d’avoir froid ; il était violet. 
«Je n’ai pas froid » lui répondis-je. 
Il ne cessait pas de me regarder, d’un œil dur. Brusquement je compris et 
je portai mes mains á ma figure : j’étais trempé de sueur. Dans cette cave, au gros 
de l’hiver, en plein courant d’air, je suais. Je passai les doigts dans mes cheveux 
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qui étaient feutrés par la transpiration ; en même temps je m’aperçus que ma 
chemise était humide et collait à ma peau. (Le Mur, 8) 
Hearing his comrades shot, believing he himself will soon be shot, being confined in 
this room with the other prisoners, and so forth—all of this makes Ibbieta sweat 
profusely despite the cold. As Elaine Scarry writes in The Body in Pain: 
Pablo Ibbieta’s experience in “The Wall” is close to if not identical with 
that of a person subjected to great pain […] But he is sentenced to be 
executed, and is then suddenly released, and so in fact undergoes what 
has been in the recent past a form of torture common in places like Chile, 
Brazil, Greece, and the Philippines—the “mock execution” or, as it was 
called in the Philippines, “the process of dying.” Of course, no particular 
form of torture is required to make visible the kinship between pain and 
death, both of which are radical and absolute, found only at the 
boundaries they themselves create. (Scarry 30-31) 
 Scarry is right to emphasize the mental suffering over the physical suffering; however 
even though the physical aspect is present, it does not quite reach what we might dub 
pain. Ibbieta’s physical situation is one not only of discomfort but utter powerlessness 
and terror in the face of his captors, and this physical/psychological situation reveals 
the facticity into which he is thrown—the historical conditions as well as his personal, 
psychological, and even biological conditions. This physical discomfort and this mental 
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suffering, which lead to a revelation of the narrator’s facticity, likewise lead to Sartrean 
authenticity. 
In the state I was in, if someone had come and told me I could go home 
quietly, that they would leave me my little life whole, it would have left 
me cold: several hours or several years of waiting is the same when you 
have lost the illusion of being eternal. (12) 
 
Dans l’état où j’étais, si l’on était venu m’annoncer que je pouvais rentrer 
tranquillement chez moi, qu’on me laissait la vie sauve, ça m’aurait laissé froid : 
quelques heures ou quelques années d’attente c’est tout pareil, quand on a perdu 
l’illusion d’être éternel. (14) 
Ibbieta accepts the facticity into which he is thrown and acknowledges his situation by 
realizing both his facticity and his ontological freedom—and all this as a result of his 
suffering and imprisonment. As Jacques Lacan says in his 1949 lecture “The Mirror 
Stage as Formative of the I Function” when discussing Sartre’s work: “[E]xistentialism 
can be judged on the basis of…a freedom that is never so authentically affirmed as 
when it is within the walls of a prison” (Lacan 8). [“{L}’existentialisme se juge…en effet: 
une liberté qui ne s’affirme jamais si authentique que dans les murs d’une prison” (96).] 
 Even though Lacan’s statement is meant dismissively, the fact that he sees this as 
an aspect of Sartrean thought is still pertinent, since his judgment on this is less 
important to our current investigation than the fact that he also sees its presence in 
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Sartrean thought. Sartre, having spent time as a POW, likely has a different perspective 
on imprisonment than Lacan, who never had such an experience. That said, using Sartre 
to support Sartre’s position has something of a tautological character to it; turning 
briefly to an author who is generally not associated with the existentialist movement 
can help us to corroborate the Sartrean position further. Ruth Klüger, author of the well-
known memoir about her childhood experience in Nazi concentration camps, Still Alive 
(1993), takes a position nearly identical to Sartre’s, thus suggesting that this notion of 
one’s ontological freedom being cast in stark relief during imprisonment, is not unique 
to Sartre, but rather has documented analogues in the phenomelogical experience of 
others. 
I think it makes sense that the closest approach to freedom takes place in 
the most desolate imprisonment under the threat of violent death, where 
the chance to make decisions has been reduced to almost zero […] In a rat 
hole, where charity is the least likely virtue, where humans bare their 
teeth, and where all signs point in the direction of self-preservation, and 
there is yet a tiny gap—that is where freedom may appear like the 
uninvited angel. (109) 
 
Und deshalb meine ich, es kann die äuβerste Annäherung an die Freiheit nur in 
der ödesten Gefangenheit und in der Todesnähe stattfinden, also dort, wo die 
Entscheidungmöglichkeiten auf fast Null reduziert sind. In dem winzigen 
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Spielraum, der dann noch bleibt, dort, kurz vor Null, ist die Freiheit […] In 
einem Rattenloch, wo die Menschenliebe das Unwahrscheinlichste ist, wo die 
Leute die Zähne blicken und wo dennoch ein kleines Vakuum bleibt, kann die 
Freiheit als das Verblüffende eintreten. (135) 
The event which evokes these thoughts on the nature of freedom in imprisonment is 
that of a woman risking her life to save Klüger’s own. Klüger is in a Selektion line; a 
Nazi soldier is picking those who will go on to perform labor duty and those who will 
go to their deaths; another inmate is performing secretarial duty for this soldier, helping 
with the Selektion process; at risk to her own life, she argues that Klüger, who is three 
years too young to be selected for labor, is fit to work, thereby saving Klüger’s life (108). 
As it turns out, the soldier accepts the woman’s arguments and Klüger is sent to labor, 
not to her death. Klüger depicts this woman as having freely chosen, unlike the soldier 
who had all the power in the situation: “I think his action was arbitrary, hers voluntary. 
It must have been freely chosen, because anyone knowing the circumstances would 
have predicted the opposite” (108). [“Ich meine, seine Tat war willkürlich, ihre frei. Frei, 
weil man bei aller Kenntnis der Umstände das Gegenteil vorausgesagt hätte. (134)] 
 This focus on the notion of freedom is essential to understanding authenticity, 
since freedom is the condition of possibility for authenticity. We are constantly in a state 
of abyssal freedom, Sartre tells us, but under certain circumstances, this fact is thrown 
into powerfully stark relief. Under such circumstances, when our innate freedom is so 
clearly shown to us, the possibility of authenticity is greatly heightened (though by no 
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means guaranteed). What’s more, Klüger’s description of her experience aligns with 
Sartre’s thinking on the subject. Thus far, I have pointed out a pattern in Sartre’s work, 
but Klüger’s corroboration suggests that, at least for some portion of people who have 
suffered, the Sartrean model obtains. 
Likewise, when Scarry discusses suffering, she uses theoretical language heavily 
indebted to Sartre, which further supports his point that suffering can lead to 
authenticity. 
The two [pain and death] are the most intense forms of negation [and] of 
annihilation […] though one is an absence and the other a felt presence, 
one occurring in the cessation of sentience, the other expressing itself in 
grotesque overload. (Scarry 31) 
Her language of “negation” and “annihilation” here could be Sartre’s own. And isn’t 
the “grotesque overload” of suffering precisely an overload of facticity, an inescapable 
encounter with facticity? Or as Sartre himself phrases it in Being and Nothingness: “In 
pain facticity invades consciousness” (518). [“Dans la douleur, en effet, la facticité envahit la 
conscience” (470).] It is through this forced encounter with facticity, through this 
invasion of facticity into consciousness, that suffering can lead to Sartrean authenticity. 
Klüger’s and Scarry’s corroborations do not unqualifiedly prove the correctness of 
Sartre’s position, but it does suggest that his thought is portable into others’ thinking on 
the subject of suffering and violence. 
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iii. Sartre’s Experience of Suffering 
To understand how Sartre developed his thinking on the relationship between 
authenticity and suffering, it is illuminating to look at the history of the development of 
his existentialist philosophy and his own experience of suffering as a prisoner of war 
during the Second World War. While it would be inaccurate to depict Sartre’s 
imprisonment as suffering on the scale of other instances of imprisonment under the 
Nazis, it would likewise be misguided to dismiss it as trivial. Jonathan Judaken tells us 
that on the day of Sartre’s capture, “there were at least 92,000 French soldiers killed and 
approximately 200,000 wounded. Sartre was one of about 1.8 million soldiers taken 
prisoner in June 1940” (Judaken 59-60). And after their capture, these soldiers were 
transported to various nearby Stalags. The conditions were anything but pleasant. 
For many of the soldiers it was the transfer from Rambervillers in France 
to Trier in Germany that made the defeat concrete. They were transported 
in cattle cars into a camp surrounded with Nazi flags, and Sartre’s “home” 
there for almost a year was Stalag XII D, named after the military division 
of the territory of Trier-Petriberg. (Judaken 67) 
Sartre himself downplayed his experience in the Stalag, and, famously, he even wrote 
and staged his first play while a prisoner of war. But this gives an overly rosy picture of 
the situation in which he found himself. As Judaken writes: 
The U.S. Ambassador’s report in August 1940 described the conditions of 
the prisoners […] With over 15,000 prisoners, “the camp…exceeded its 
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capacity.” The crude wooden barracks were divided into small rooms 
with double- or triple-deck wooden cots, with some men forced to sleep 
on concrete floors. There were washrooms in each barrack and open pit 
toilets, and the “kitchen was extremely dirty and full of flies,” as was the 
infirmary […] After describing the camp’s inadequate provisions and 
overcrowding, the report concluded that “the general impression of this 
camp was rather unfavorable in comparison to most other camps visited 
heretofore.” (68) 
Sartre was eventually moved to better quarters in part due to his ability to speak 
German and therefore to act as an interpreter, and in part due to his captors having 
learned he had published a novel (Nausea). It would, however, be wrong to shrink the 
suffering caused by his imprisonment, especially in the early months when he was 
housed in a Stalag deemed worse than others inspected by the US Ambassador’s offices. 
While Sartre did have access to books (e.g., Heidegger’s Being and Time) and was 
usually allowed to write and receive letters, these privileges exist in many prisons with 
deplorable conditions. 
My point is not to compare his experience with others who suffered more or less 
than he did, but rather to establish that he did experience suffering as a prisoner of war 
and that, by his own accounts, it profoundly changed him. I also want to connect this 
experience to his thinking on existentialism and authenticity. As I mentioned before, 
Sartre read Heidegger’s Being and Time while he was in the Stalag. He had encountered 
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Heideggerian philosophy before, but it was only after his experience as a POW and 
reading Being and Time under those conditions that he began making heavy use of the 
Heideggerian philosophical idiom (most notably, of course, in Being and Nothingness, 
which was published just two years after his release). I don’t want to make too much of 
the fact that he read Being and Time as a POW, but it seems like more than a coincidence 
that he developed many of his philosophical notions of authenticity from his reading of 
Heidegger under such conditions and later developed these ideas more fully under the 
conditions of the Occupation. In effect, Sartre’s experience of imprisonment and his 
revisiting of Heidegger’s philosophy led to his own philosophical treatise including his 
most developed thought on authenticity. The influence of this time spent in the Stalag 
on Sartre’s work was substantial. 
“Although I had wanted to dramatize certain aspects of existentialism,” 
Sartre later said of the play [No Exit], “I was not forgetting the feeling of 
the Stalag of living constantly and totally beneath the eyes of others, and 
the Hell which naturally set in under such circumstances.” (Judaken 95) 
 He was therefore thinking not only of a general existentialist position but also of the 
sort of suffering that comes from living day-in and day-out in what amounts to an 
overcrowded sewage tank, which must be classified as suffering if the word is to have 
any meaning. 
 Interestingly, Sartre rarely discussed his experiences in the Stalag, and so his 
most notable depiction of the suffering of imprisonment is still his first published 
 27 
 
fictional work, “The Wall,” which was written before he himself experienced 
imprisonment during wartime. This story depicts the felt experience of suffering, but 
Sartre, who was interested in equal measure by absence as by presence, also wrote at 
length about the absence of suffering and how that absence can be a contributing factor 
to the lack of authenticity. 
His novels The Age of Reason and Troubled Sleep, as well as his literary nonfiction 
written in the aftermath of the Second World War, where he discusses the lack of 
authenticity which can be facilitated by bourgeois comforts and the various side-effects 
thereof, are perhaps most useful in discussing this absence of suffering and its potential 
for the creation of bad faith, the opposite of authenticity in the Sartrean philosophical 
system. 
 
iv. The Place of Suffering in Sartre’s Post-War Fiction and Literary Nonfiction 
The protagonist in Sartre’s The Age of Reason, Mathieu, longs for the realness of 
war, the authenticity of suffering. His middle-class life, his unimportant daily activities, 
the flimsiness of his convictions—all of this and more conspire to make him detest the 
quotidian routines and the bloodless symbolic order in which he conducts his affairs. 
But he occasionally gets a clear sense of what he seeks vis-à-vis suffering and 
authenticity: 
Something of the threshold of existence, a timorous dawn of anger. At 
last! But it dwindled and collapsed, he was left in solitude, walking with 
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the measured and decorous gait of a man in a funeral procession in Paris, 
not Valencia, Paris, haunted by a phantom wrath. The windows were 
ablaze, the cars sped down the street, he was walking among little men 
dressed in light suits, Frenchmen, who did not look up at the sky and 
were not afraid of the sky. And yet it’s all real [emphasis in original] down 
yonder, somewhere beneath the same sun, it’s real, the cars have stopped, 
the windows have been smashed, poor dumb women sit huddled like 
dead chickens beside actual corpses. (The Age of Reason 145) 
 
Quelque chose s’apprêtait à naître, une timide aurore de colère. Ça y est! Mais ça 
se déglonfa, ça se raplatit, il était désert, il marchait à pas comptés avec la décence 
d’un type qui suit un enterrement, à Paris, pas à Valence, à Paris, hanté par un 
fantôme de colère. Les vitres flamboyaient, les autos filaient sur la chaussée, il 
marchait au milieu de petits hommes vêtus d’étoffes claires, de Français, qui ne 
regardaient pas le ciel, qui n’avaient pas peur du ciel. Et pourtant c’est réel, là-
bas, quelque art sous le même soleil, c’est réel, les autos se sont arrêtées, les vitres 
ont éclaté, des bonnes femmes stupides et muettes sont accroupies avec des airs de 
poules mortes auprès de vrais cadavres. (L’âge de la raison 139) 
The accumulation of the adjectives “real” and “actual” (or more literally translated, 
“real” and “true”) almost overwhelms the passage, and their effect couldn’t be clearer. 
Mathieu is fairly obsessed with the realness and actuality of the suffering in the war in 
Spain. They are real in a way that his life and the safe goings-on of Paris are not. 
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Mathieu sees those people who live amidst the violence in Spain as real, and he sees his 
friend Brunet—who has joined the Communists and has fought at the front in Spain—
as real. Brunet has an aura of authenticity about him; he has seen death and engaged in 
potentially fatal battle in a way reminiscent of Hegel (and Sartre’s use of Hegel in Being 
and Nothingness); and Mathieu is envious of Brunet’s authenticity. 
There he was, extremely real, with an actual savor of tobacco in his mouth, 
the colors actual, more intense, than those which Mathieu could see, and 
yet, at the same moment, he reached across the whole earth, suffering and 
struggling with the proletarians of all countries. (155) 
 
Il était là, bien et réel, avec un vrai goût de tabac dans la bouche, les couleurs et 
les formes dont il s’emplissait les yeux étaient plus vraies, plus denses que celles 
que Mathieu pouvait voir, et cependant, au même instant, il s’étendait à travers 
toute les pays, souffrant et luttant avec les prolétaires de tous les pays. (148) 
Notice that here again the words “real” and “actual” (or “true”) show up. Here, Sartre 
uses precisely the same words to describe yet another instance of suffering and 
struggling in battle. Part of Mathieu’s admiration for Brunet is his committed struggle 
against oppression, but there is something additional here. Brunet has suffered, seen 
suffering, been immersed in a world of violence and death. Sartre therefore offers us a 
window into part of his thinking on how authenticity can be achieved via the 
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experience of suffering. And this thinking is not isolated to the characters from this 1945 
novel. 
Here is Gomez, a character from Troubled Sleep, who fought in the Spanish Civil 
War and is now living in New York City on the day after the 1940 invasion of Paris: 
Do these people [the Americans of New York City] even realize that Paris 
has fallen? […] They are not real at all, he thought […] Well then, where 
are the real people? he wondered, and, answering himself, mused: 
Certainly not here. And I am no more genuine and real than the rest of 
them. A make-believe Gomez took the bus, read the paper, smiled at 
Ramon, talked of Picasso. (Troubled Sleep 33) 
 
Est-ce qu’il savent que Paris est pris? […] Ce ne sont pas les vrais, pensa-t-il, ce 
sont les sosies. Où sont les vrais? N’importe où, mais pas ici. Personne n’est ici 
pour de vrai; pas plus moi que les autres. Le sosie de Gomez avait pris l’autobus, 
lu le journal, souri à Ramon, parlé de Picasso. (La Mort dans l’âme 31) 
Gomez goes on to imagine where he might be instead of in New York City: “and 
Gomez walked alone through the streets of Paris. Through Paris, through the truth, the 
only Truth, through blood” (34). [Gomez marchait seul dans Paris. Dans Paris, dans la vérité, 
la seule Vérité; dans le sang” (31).]  These two novels were published four years apart, 
and the characters in question are quite different in terms of background and 
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education—yet both see the violence and suffering of the war zone as “genuine,” “real,” 
and “true.” 
Sartre himself, writing in his war diaries, speculates on the possible effects war 
might have on an inauthentic bourgeois (which we are given to understand Mathieu 
ultimately is): 
For example, I can imagine someone being called up who was a highly 
inauthentic bourgeois, who used to live inauthentically in all the various 
social situations into which he was thrown—family, job, etc…the shock of 
war may suddenly have induced him to a conversion towards the 
authentic, which leads him to be authentically in situation [italics in the 
original]. (220) 
 
J’imagine, par exemple, un mobilize quit fut un bourgeois fort inauthentique, qui 
vivait inauthentiquement dans les nombreuses situations sociales où il était jeté, 
famille, métier, etc…le choc de la querre l’ait soudain déterminé à une conversion 
vers l’authentique, ce qui l’amène à être authentiquement en situation. (Carnets 
448-449) 
Mathieu, in The Age of Reason, is depicted as a bourgeois through and through, even as 
he hopes not to be one. Here Mathieu is talking with Ivich, with whom he is 
romantically infatuated and with whom he desires a “real” connection. She has just cut 
her hand deeply (no mere scrape, but a real wound). 
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And she added with a savage laugh: “I ought to have guessed that you 
would find that too much for you. You are shocked that anyone should 
enjoy the sight of his own blood.” 
 Mathieu felt himself growing pale with rage. He sat down again, 
laid his left hand flat on the table, and said suavely: 
 “Too much for me? Certainly not, Ivich, I find it charming […]” 
 He jabbed the knife into his palm […] the knife remained 
embedded in his flesh, straight up, with its shaft in the air. (255) 
 
Elle ajouta avec un rire insultant: J’aurais dû me douter que vous trouveriez ça 
excessif. Ça vous scandalize qu’on puisse s’amuser avec son sang. 
 Mathieu sentit qu’il blêmissait de fureur. Il se rassit, étala sa main gauche 
à plat sur la table et dit suavement: 
—Excessif? Mais non, Ivich, je trouve ça charmant […] 
Il planta le couteau d’un seul coup dans sa paume […] le couteau resta 
fiche dans sa chair, tout droit, le manche en l’air. (240) 
This is of course, in part, mere showiness on Mathieu’s part, but I want to bracket 
Mathieu’s showy self-importance as well as his ulterior romantic motives vis-à-vis 
Ivich. Mathieu’s desire for the realness of suffering is a desire for existential 
authenticity. Sartre goes on to write, quite incisively, that: 
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It was not only to defy Ivich that he had stuck the knife into his hand, it 
was as a challenge to Jacques, and Brunet, and Daniel, and to his whole 
life. “I’m a ghastly kind of fool,” he thought […] But he couldn’t help 
being pleased. Ivich looked at Mathieu’s hand, nailed to the table, and the 
blood gathering around the blade. Then she looked at Mathieu; her 
expression had entirely changed. (256) 
 
Ce n’etais pas seulement pour braver Ivich, qu’il s’était envoyé ce bon coup de 
couteau, c’est aussi un défi à Jacques, à Brunet, à Daniel, à sa vie.: “Je suis un 
con, pensa-t-il […] mais il ne pouvait pas s’empêcher d’être content. Ivich 
regardait la main de Mathieu qui paraissait clouée sur la table et le sang qui fusait 
autour de la lame. Et puis elle regarda Mathieu, elle avait un viasage tout changé. 
(240-241) 
Notice how Mathieu thinks of his act of self-wounding in relation to Brunet and others 
who have experienced “real” events and suffering. At least in part, he is trying to 
recreate their experience so as to live up to their degree of realness. It might seem that 
Mathieu (and Sartre) are conflating quite different types of pain—that inflicted upon us 
by others and that which we inflict upon ourselves—but to return to an earlier quote 
from Being and Nothingness, pain causes facticity to invade consciousness. Sartre does 
not distinguish between sources of pain. Clearly, the ethical aspect changes drastically 
depending on who administers the pain, but the effects on one’s authenticity are much 
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the same. Whether Mathieu stabs himself, or whether Ivich had stabbed him in exactly 
the same way, facticity equally invades his consciousness, thus putting him equally in 
situation and thus allowing for the factors necessary for Sartrean authenticity. Mathieu 
therefore experiences his first moment of authenticity in The Age of Reason. 
But why should the blunt fact of bodily pain be able to lead to authenticity? First, 
we must recall that recognition of one’s facticity is a condition of possibility for 
authenticity. And, as Dermot Moran rightly notes, 
For Sartre, paradoxically, while the body is that which necessarily 
introduces the notion of perspective and point of view, at the same time 
the body is a contingent viewpoint on the world. Our body is the very 
contingency of our being: our facticity. (Sartre on the Body 53) [All italics in 
the original.] 
Bodily pain, therefore, brings one’s necessary embodiment and the contingency of one’s 
particular embodiment to the fore, thus bringing one’s facticity to the fore. Facticity 
certainly concerns more than the body—including one’s historical situation and all the 
facts of the world one is thrown into—but as Moran points out, the body is the 
perspective and point of view from which and through which all aspects of facticity 
must flow. This is precisely why, as quoted above, Sartre argues in Being and  
Nothingness that in the state of pain, facticity invades consciousness. 
But that is not all we should take away from this scene of mutual self-wounding. 
Until this point in the novel, Ivich has endured Mathieu’s affections (and at times his 
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very presence) with grudging forbearance, but now things change and the two have 
their first and only intimate moment. They have achieved mutual recognition via their 
simultaneous achievement of (fleeting) authenticity here.2 
 This desire to escape the banality of daily life and to experience authenticity via 
suffering makes further appearances in Sartre’s literary writings. Here he is, writing 
about his own and other Parisians’ experience under the Occupation. His discussion of 
the artificiality of symbolic events versus the realness of fighting or forced manual labor 
is insightful: 
It was the purpose of the artificial existence the Germans maintained 
there—the theatrical performances, the horse-races, the miserable, 
lugubrious festivals—to show the world that France was intact because 
Paris was still alive. A strange consequence of centralization. The British, 
for their part, while flattening Lorient, Rouen or Nantes with their bombs, 
had decided to respect Paris. Thus, in this dying city, we enjoyed a 
symbolic, funereal calm. Around this islet of peace, iron and fire rained 
down; but, just as we were not permitted to share the labour of our 
provinces, we were no longer entitled to share their suffering. (Aftermath of 
War 22-23) 
 
                                                          
2 This is not the place to develop the idea, but since bad faith is so often the cause of the failure to recognize each 
other (in the Hegelian sense) as fully human, the clearing away of bad faith—that is, the attainment of existential 
authenticity—is necessary to achieve recognition. 
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L’existence artificielle que les Allemands y entretenaient encore, les 
représentations théâtrale, les courses, les fêtes misérables et lugubres se 
proposaient seulement de montrer à l’univers que la France était sauve puisque 
Paris vivait encore. Les Anglais, de leur côté, tout en écrasant Lorient, Rouen ou 
Nantes sous leurs bombes, avaient décidé de respecter Paris. Ainsi jouissions-
nous, dans cette cité agonisante, d’un calme mortuaire et symbolique. Autour de 
cet îlot, le fer and le feu pleuvaient ; mais, de même que nous n’étions pas admis à 
partager le labeur do nos provinces, nous n’avions plus le droit de partager leurs 
souffrances. (Situations III 27-28) 
By juxtaposing the descriptors “artificial” and “symbolic” with his later phrasing “not 
permitted to share the labour…no longer entitled to share their suffering,” Sartre speaks 
to my point about the authenticity of the experience of suffering. Somehow the lives led 
by Parisians were merely symbolic and artificial, not authentic and real as were those of 
people suffering directly and physically. This symbolic or artificial aspect of life is 
present under regular circumstances, but having the authenticity of suffering so near 
brings to light what normally remains hidden behind the multi-folded curtains of the 
symbolic order. 
 In the above passage, Sartre also speaks to a shared humanity or a true bond 
formed during shared suffering, a solidarity that forms among those who suffer 
extreme experiences together such as war, torture, imprisonment, etc—much as 
Mathieu and Ivich achieve a bond via their self-inflicted wounds, coupled of course, in 
their case, with debaucherous activities. An entire study could be done on the bonds 
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between those who have experienced extremes of pleasure (drug use, sex acts, etc), and 
I suspect the results would show striking similarities to those who have experienced 
comparable extremes of displeasure. The primary difference being that pain seems to 
allow a greater extreme than pleasure does, perhaps because, as Arthur Schopenhauer 
suggests in his famed essay, “On the Sufferings of the World,” pleasure is rarely as 
pleasurable as we anticipate, and pain considerably more painful (Schopenhauer 215). 
But as with Mathieu in The Age of Reason, the life of the Parisians still lacks full-
out battle, though there is suffering—occasionally of an individual and acute nature, 
but more often of a collective and generalized sort. 
Everyone knows those sick individuals who are termed ‘depersonalized’, 
and who suddenly come to believe that all human beings are dead 
because they have stopped projecting their own futures forward and have, 
as a result, lost any sense of other peoples’. Perhaps the most painful thing 
was that all Parisians were depersonalized. Before the war, if we 
happened to look sympathetically on a child or young person, we did so 
because we sensed their future, because we obscurely divined it from their 
gestures and the lines on their faces. (The Aftermath of War 24) 
 
Tout le monde connaît ces maladies qu’on nomme «dépersonnalisés» et qui 
s’avisent soudain que «tous les hommes sont morts» parce qu’ils ont cessé de 
projeter leur avenir au delà d’eux-mêmes et parce que, du même coup, ils ont cessé 
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de sentir l’avenir des autres. Ce qu’il y avait peut-être de plus pénible, c’est que 
tous les Parisiens étaient dépersonnalisés. Avant la guerre, s’il nous arrivait de 
regarder avec sympathie un enfant, un jeune homme, une jeune femme, c’est que 
nous pressentions leur avenir, c’est que nous le devinions obscurément dans leurs 
gestes, dans les plis de leurs visages. (Situations III 28-29) 
During these same war years, Sartre wrote The Age of Reason, wherein the main 
character longs for the realness of war; Sartre was working through his notions of 
suffering and authenticity in two different literary genres, fiction and creative 
nonfiction amid the suffering of war. Many have tried to find insights into the inner life 
of Sartre himself by reading Mathieu as a stand-in for Sartre, and I don’t doubt some 
insights of that nature could be found, but for my current investigation, I am more 
interested in how Sartre developed the relationship between suffering and authenticity. 
 In order to understand this relationship, we need to explore a third notion—bad 
faith—and look at how it functions, its patterns, and see how suffering renders bad faith 
considerably more difficult. Bad faith is, in effect, a sort of semi-conscious half-lie to 
oneself about one’s facticity and situation; one glances with a degree of clear 
recognition at the state of affairs and then just as quickly turns away, refusing to see the 
facts at hand. Sartre himself gives a wonderfully quotidian example of one of the 
primary patterns of bad faith: 
Take the example of a woman who has consented to go out with a 
particular man for the first time. She knows very well the intentions which 
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the man who is speaking to her cherishes regarding her. She knows also 
that it will be necessary sooner or later for her to make a decision. But she 
does not want to realize the urgency; she concerns herself only with what 
is respectful and discreet in the attitude of her companion…If he says to 
her, “I find you so attractive!” she disarms this phrase of its sexual 
background…This is because she does not quite know precisely what she 
wants. She is profoundly aware of the desire which she inspires, but the 
desire cruel and naked would humiliate and horrify her. (Being and 
Nothingness 96-97) 
 
Voici, par exemple, une femme qui s’est rendue à un premier rendez-vous. Elle 
sait fort bien les intentions que l’homme qui lui parle nourrit à son égard. Elle 
sait aussi qu’il lui faudra prendre tôt ou tard une décision. Mais elle n’en veut pas 
sentir l’urgence : elle s’attache seulement à ce qu’offre de respectueux et de discret 
l’attitude de son partenaire […] elle ne veux pas lire dans les phrases qu’on lui 
adresse autre chose que leur sens explicite, si on lui dit : « Je vous admire tant », 
elle désarme cette phrase de son arrière-fond sexuel […] C’est qu’elle n’est pas au 
fait de ce qu’elle souhaite : elle est profondément sensible ai désir qu’elle inspire, 
mais le désir cru et nu l’humilierait et lui ferait horreur. (L’Être et le néant 94) 
The choice of what, in the face of human suffering, might seem like an unserious 
example of quotidian life is in fact the best example. The luxury of this kind of self-
deception is simply not available to us in the midst of suffering—such as in the above-
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cited scene where Mathieu is imagining the bombing in Spain and the people there 
crying mutely in horror. The social and symbolic orders wherein discretion and 
respectability exist are no longer present, and there is no room for deceiving ourselves 
about what is happening—that is, we cannot deny the facticity of ourselves and the 
world around us during a bombing in the way we can during a casual date in a Parisian 
café (to contrast Sartre’s examples). The literary works discussed here suggest that bad 
faith of the sort Sartre depicts in this example from Being and Nothingness is rendered 
nearly impossible in the face of suffering. His exploration of authenticity via suffering 
began before the creation of his philosophical system, and the dual theme of suffering 
and authenticity continued in his literary output after writing Being and Nothingness. In 
all of these works, however, we find his interest in the question of how one might 
partake of a mode of being that is authentic, and we find over and over again that 
suffering can be a means to that authenticity. 
 Let’s look once more at the above example from The Age of Reason. Mathieu’s and 
Ivich’s wounds are not severe, but neither are they entirely superficial. And directly 
following their self-inflicted injuries, they are more authentically present and achieve 
mutual recognition for the only time in the novel. This is also the moment of greatest 
clarity for Mathieu, whom Sartre has set up as a glowing example of bad faith for the 
rest of the novel. I want to be clear that I do not think these wounds are somehow grand 
or hugely meaningful; they are more closely related to a cheap Romantic gesture than 
anything truly grand. That said, I still argue that the wound focuses Mathieu’s mind on 
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the facticity of his situation in a way congruent with Sartrean authenticity. It also brings 
into focus his transcendence in a way congruent with Sartrean authenticity. As it always 
is in Sartre’s thinking, this authenticity is fleeting and is gone shortly after Mathieu 
achieves it, but he does achieve it and precisely due to the self-inflicted wound. 
And even more so than this act of self-wounding, the facticity revealed to 
someone by being bombarded in a war zone or the “sheer facticity of dead bodies” 
(Scarry 134), as depicted both in The Age of Reason and Troubled Sleep, force one to 
recognize one’s facticity and one’s freedom, thus creating the necessary conditions for 
Sartrean authenticity. 
 
v. Individual Authenticity in Being and Nothingness and the Fused Group in Critique of 
Dialectical Reason 
 There has been much debate about how much of the early Sartre of Being and 
Nothingness remains in the later Sartre of Critique of Dialectical Reason, with some 
claiming that Sartre made a clean and total break from his earlier work, while others 
claim that even though there is certainly a development in his thought, a contiguity and 
continuity obtain whereby we can see influences of the earlier work on the later. This 
debate has played out in many publications over the years, so I will not recreate it here. 
I will simply admit that I find the latter argument considerably more convincing, and I 
hope to add to the reservoir of data supporting this position by delineating a structural 
similarity between Sartre’s connection of suffering and authenticity in his early work 
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and his connection of adversity and the fused group in his later thought. I will, 
however, limit my brief discussion here to this single overlapping aspect, since it is the 
only part of his Critique that serves the purposes of my current investigation. 
 What do I mean by a structural similarity between these two ideas? The early 
Sartre conceives us as predominantly existing in a state of bad faith/inauthenticity from 
which we emerge into authenticity only rarely and only with the most painstaking 
effort—or, as I have suggested in this essay, via suffering itself. And we only experience 
this authenticity for a brief period before returning to—or to use Heideggerian 
language, falling into—our more common state of bad faith or inauthenticity. I propose 
that seriality and the fused group structurally mirror the relationship between bad 
faith/inauthenticity and authenticity. 
 Seriality is, Sartre tells us, an “attitude of semi-unawareness” which requires that 
one “turns his back on his neighbor” (256). [“cette attitude de demi-ignorance”; “il 
tourne le dos à son voisin” (309)]. This is an echo of bad faith’s semi-unawareness and 
one’s turning away from the situational facts. The choice of the word “semi-
unawareness” is particularly apt here. Unlike Heidegger who conceives of falling into 
the They as a largely unconscious act, Sartre, who is much more interested in individual 
choices, conceives of bad faith as acknowledging (however briefly) the facts at hand and 
then quickly turning away from them in an act of semi-aware self-deception. This is 
mirrored by the semi-unawareness of seriality and the turning away from one’s 
neighbor. 
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 And what extricates us from this state of seriality? In nearly every example Sartre 
gives in his Critique, it is an external adversity, scarcity, or violence—in effect, it is 
suffering in the broad sense I have been using it. Sartre tells us that a fused group forms 
under adversity at the hands of a third party (361-363). This adversity has the potential 
to change a series of subjects into a fused group. Our most common state in society, 
Sartre tells us, is that of seriality—an undifferentiated series of subjects treading socially 
pre-ordained paths. But when a third party threatens such an amorphous group, it 
becomes a fused group in response to the threat or violence, thus creating a group 
identity and perhaps going so far as to form a fraternity or pledged group (419). 
One deviation from this structural mirroring, a deviation particularly salient for 
my current investigation, is that Sartre conceives of the fused group forming due to an 
external duress or violence exclusively. Unlike his earlier work, where he is more 
focused on the individual, self-inflicted suffering cannot lead to the formation of a fused 
group. This does not ultimately change the point that there is a continuity in his 
thought, but rather merely points to the fact that his thinking became more social as his 
rapprochement with Marxism became more complete, thus causing his later 
philosophical system to focus less on the individual.   
 
vi. Conclusion(s) 
We have looked at several works spanning Sartre’s career, each dealing in its 
own way with the connection between suffering and authenticity. In “The Wall,” we see 
 44 
 
psychological suffering lead to a state of Sartrean authenticity. In The Age of Reason, 
Mathieu desires the suffering others have experienced in order to achieve the 
authenticity he attributes to them, and we have seen how this desire for authenticity via 
suffering leads him to inflict pain on himself. In Troubled Sleep, a veteran of the Spanish 
Civil War longs for the realness of that conflict while surrounded by the flimsiness of 
his safe life far from the fields of battle. We have seen Sartre write about his own 
wartime experience in his literary nonfiction, describing how he and those around him 
felt left out from the real suffering that might give them a sense of authenticity. And, 
finally, this connection obtains in his first major philosophical treatise, Being and 
Nothingness, as well as in his later magnum opus, Critique of Dialectical Reason, albeit in 
somewhat different forms. It is perhaps most significant that this connection between 
suffering and authenticity appears repeatedly over the course of Sartre’s writing life, 
making it a central and constant theme in his work—a theme that has been largely 
overlooked to date in Sartre studies. 
 I have attempted to identify a thread in Sartre’s work that has gone largely 
undiscussed, a thread which ties together one of Sartre’s most central philosophical 
ideas—existential authenticity—with investigations into the nature of suffering. And 
here my secondary goal is revealed. My project here and elsewhere is to investigate 
how Sartre’s work relates to more recent discussions of suffering and violence. Sartre 
was the most discussed and revered thinker of his time. We are seeing a renewed 
interest in Sartre’s work and existentialism in general, as is evidenced by recent 
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anthologies, monographs, new translations, and re-releases such as Sartre’s Critique of 
Dialectical Reason (Verso 2004), The Imagination (Routledge 2011), and the 
aforementioned Aftermath of War (Continuum 2008), along with several new studies of 
Sartre and existentialism such as Jonathan Judaken’s Race after Sartre: Antiracism, 
Africana Existentialism, and Postcolonialism (2008) and Situating Existentialism: Key Texts in 
Context (2012). There have likewise been several studies on the nature of violence in 
Sartre’s work. James Dodd’s Violence and Phenomenology (2009) explores Sartre’s 
Notebooks for an Ethics and Critique of Dialectical Reason in fruitful juxtaposition with 
Hannah Arendt’s On Violence; Ronald E. Santoni’s Sartre on Violence: Curiously 
Ambivalent (2004) compares Sartre’s and Camus’s differing views on the uses of violence 
while working through the relationship of violence and freedom across Sartre’s career; 
and there are dozens of articles concerning the perpetration of violence, generally 
inspired by Sartre’s controversial and well-known statements justifying violence as a 
means of resistance (most famously in his introduction to Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of 
the Earth). I could go on listing, but suffice it to say that there is a clear trend of 
increased interest in existentialism in general and Sartre in particular, and one thread of 
this interest is the intersection of Sartrean thought and violence. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EFFECTS AND ETHICS OF VIOLENCE: A PRACTICAL INVESTIGATION 
 
“We revolt simply because, for many reasons, 
we can no longer breathe.” 
—Frantz Fanon 
 
“I can’t breathe.” 
—Eric Garner 
 
“We must immediately take the war to the 
enemy, leave him no rest, harass him. Cut off 
his breath.” 
        —Frantz Fanon  
 
i. Introduction 
 Franz Fanon announces in the opening sentence to The Wretched of the Earth 
(1961) that no matter what terminology we might choose to describe it or what new 
formulas we might concoct to explain it, “decolonization is always a violent 
phenomenon” (The Wretched of the Earth 35). Decolonization, he tells us, cannot come 
about via “a gentleman’s agreement” because it is the meeting of two intrinsically 
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opposing forces whose “first encounter was marked by violence” (The Wretched of the 
Earth 36).3 
Fanon ultimately makes three interconnected points about violence—one about 
its function in the formation/deformation of identity (individual and group), one about 
its efficacy as a liberating force in the struggle against oppression, and one about its 
ethical permissibility as a tool against oppression. In this chapter, I show how Fanon’s 
thinking both takes up and expands upon that of Jean-Paul Sartre’s on the subject of 
relations with others in general and violence against others in particular; I show the 
pitfalls of relying overmuch on violence as well as those of eschewing its efficacy 
entirely; I then use William T. Vollmann’s Moral Calculus from Rising Up and Rising 
Down (2003) to discuss when Fanon’s positions meet ethical standards; and, finally, I 
synthesize all of this analysis and focus it on issues facing us today in the United States 
and around the world. 
William T. Vollmann’s 3,200-page treatise on human violence, Rising Up and 
Rising Down, has as its ultimate aim the creation of a Moral Calculus that would allow 
us to determine on a case-by-case basis when violence is ethically permissible and when 
it is not—when violence would mean rising up and when it would mean rising down, to 
make use of Vollmann’s terminology—the former term denoting a legitimate use of 
violence for the improvement of one’s situation and the latter meaning an illegitimate 
                                                          
3 It is not central to my argument, but it is worth noting that Fanon makes what is known as the genetic 
fallacy here, which states that it is erroneous to assume that a concept or action necessarily retains the 
attributes of a preceding concept or action from which it arose.   
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use of violence, even in cases where oppression is clearly present. Or, as Vollmann 
himself defines the terms: “Rising up: A just act of violence. Both means and ends are 
legitimate. Rising down: An unjust act of violence. Means, ends, or both fail to meet 
legitimacy’s requirements” (Vollmann 453). It is perhaps worth noting that he qualifies 
these definitions extensively. One particularly salient qualification is the following: “A 
just end may be served by a just or unjust means. Either way, the end itself has not been 
compromised in and of itself” (ibid). That is to say that even if we find violent action 
unethical in a given circumstance, we are not necessarily condemning the goals of those 
who enacted the violence, merely their means of achieving a just goal.  
And Vollmann, like Fanon and Sartre before him, concludes that there are in fact 
times when violence is the proper reaction of an oppressed group or threatened 
individual. Given that he has perhaps developed the most extensive manifesto on the 
subject in the history of theorizing violence, I propose to apply his system of thought to 
the question of anticolonial violence when the subject of the ethics of violence arises. I 
then apply Fanon’s, Sartre’s, and Vollmann’s thinking to the current situation in the 
United States. 
With the protests across the United States—from Ferguson to Baltimore to New 
York City—concerning racial violence on the part of police officers, along with the 
counter-violence enacted by some against police officers or in the form of property 
destruction, the questions of when violence is effective or ethically permissible remain 
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eminently salient, and theorizing how violence forms the identities of the oppressed 
and the oppressors alike also remains of paramount importance. 
 
ii. Identity and Violence 
Violence as formative of identity is so central to Fanon that he employs 
metaphors of “new men” and even “new species” many times throughout The Wretched 
of the Earth. Fanon goes so far as to claim that it is the settler who “has brought the 
native into existence and perpetuates his existence” (The Wretched of the Earth 36). In 
effect, the violence of colonization has created the native as a subjugated subject who 
has internalized this subjugation, and the violence of decolonization will re-create the 
native into a liberated subject. It is therefore violence and counter-violence that form the 
existence of the colonized. It is the violence of colonization that has brought the 
colonized into their current existence or identity as colonized, and it is counter-violence, 
Fanon tells us, that will convert them into a “new species” of liberated men (Fanon 
rarely mentions women). 
Fanon is a proponent of organized violent resistance first and foremost, but he is 
also a brilliant documenter and theoretician of the inchoate and directionless violence 
that surges up in the psyche of the oppressed. He instructs on the intense and unbidden 
desire to enact violence on the oppressor. 
The look that the native turns on the settler’s town is a look of lust, a look 
of envy; it expresses his dreams of possession: to sit at the settler’s table, to 
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sleep in the settler’s bed, with his wife if possible […] The violence which 
has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world, which has ceaselessly 
drummed the rhythm for the destruction of native social forms […] that 
same violence will be claimed and taken over by the native at the moment 
when, deciding to embody history in his own person, he surges into the 
forbidden quarters. (Wretched 39-40) 
And violence is the means by which the colonized dream of taking the place of the 
colonizer, Fanon instructs us. Norman Mailer likewise instructs us on the nature of such 
transgressive violence in his seminal essay “The White Negro,” wherein he claims that 
transgressive violence is almost always violence against the status quo, against the 
existing system of violence ossified in its place. He tells us that the criminal enters into a 
new relationship with authority and thus is transformed into an existentially different 
individual with a radically altered situation.4 And we can hear something similar in 
Fanon’s discussion of the native’s envious and violent wish to supplant the settler. 
In both Mailer’s more domestic example of two young, oppressed men robbing a 
store and killing its owner as a sort of localized rebellion against their oppressed state, 
and in Fanon’s larger, more political example, we find violent transgression of the 
existing order via violence—perhaps seemingly inchoate in its intentions—depicted at 
the most effective tool at one’s disposal. It would not be enough to write a strongly 
worded letter, Fanon and Mailer appear to be telling us; destructive and violent action 
                                                          
4 For more on Mailer’s engagement with violence and on this essay of his, see Chapter Five. 
 51 
 
must be taken. I will argue, however, that Fanon (and the early Mailer) have perhaps 
put too much faith in the efficacy of violence. 
 Sartre, in Critique of Dialectical Reason, explains how colonial violence is formative 
of the identities of both the colonizer and the colonized. 
The son of the colonialist and the son of the Muslim are both the children 
of the objective violence which defines the system itself as a practico-inert 
hell. But if this violence-object produces them, if they suffer it partly as 
their own inertia, this is because it used to be the violence-praxis when the 
system was in the process of being installed. It is man who inscribed his 
violence in things as the eternal unity of this passive mediation between 
men. (Critique 718) 
Via violent praxis, a system of practico-inert violence is put into place and creates a 
violent inertia that carries all actors along in its wake. As James Dodd describes it: 
Sartre’s idea of the practico-inert as the inscription of “violence in things” 
is important, since it points to an aspect […] which leads to a more 
fundamental appraisal of the constitutive nature of violence. For if we 
understand the praxis of violence in terms of the potential that violence 
can have a hold on us in the form of an embodiment in materiality, then 
we can begin to understand in what sense violence could be taken to be 
“constitutive.” (Dodd 72) 
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It is therefore everything from roadways to buildings to military supplies to fashionable 
or professionally acceptable clothing and so forth that constitutes the violent practico-
inert that produces the violent systemic inertia that forms and deforms the identities of 
the colonized and the colonizer. 
But, aside from the obvious ethical issues, what precisely makes this a problem? 
In the terminology of the Critique, this practico-inert violence forms an anti-dialectic, 
preventing the progress of the dialectical historical process. It becomes therefore 
necessary to enact a new dynamic violence, as opposed to the frozen practico-inert 
violence, in order to move forward again. As James Dodd offers a succinct summation 
of the problem in Sartrean terms: 
Following Sartre’s reflections, we have seen violence in the form of a 
distortion that flows immediately from the negating freedom of a subject 
encountering the world of things and other free consciousnesses […] in 
the form of the practico-inert, this distortion itself can shape the landscape 
of human action thanks to an inertia that no longer flows simply from the 
facticity of human freedom, but borrows a permanence and a force that 
lies on the side of things as such. (Dodd 73) 
And so, like a social tectonics, the practico-inert layers upon itself like a coastal shelf, 
reinforcing and reinforcing existing institutions and authorities. It clogs the dialectical 
movement of history. It stops progress and blocks freedom. Fanon and Sartre therefore 
condone a counter-violence to explode these blockages, a sort of revolutionary 
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demolition of the practico-inert. Fanon describes this new dynamic violence in Wretched 
of the Earth. 
But it so happens that for the colonized this violence is invested with 
positive, formative features because it constitutes their only work. This 
violent praxis is totalizing since each individual represents a violent link 
in the great chain, in the almighty body of violence rearing up in reaction 
to the primary violence of the colonizer. Factions recognize each other and 
the future nation is already indivisible. The armed struggle mobilizes the 
people, i.e., it pitches them in a single direction, from which there is no 
turning back. (Wretched 50) 
In effect, Fanon calls for a counter-violence that would dislodge the anti-dialectic, 
cracking the ossified reifications within the colonized society. This would allow for the 
flow of the historical dialectic to move to a place of liberation for the colonized. Fanon 
and Sartre obviously support this type of counter-violence, and, as we’ll see, Vollmann 
lends a tentative support to it as well, but there are problems that already arise at the 
level of conceptualization of such a counter-violence. The idea of a “future nation” that 
is “indivisible” belies Fanon’s monolithic thinking on the subject, and this “single 
direction” that Fanon describes is another aspect of his monolithic thinking with which 
we might want to take umbrage. Are there more complex and more accurate ways to 
conceive of counter-violence? Are there slippages that Fanon does not allow for here? 
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How would we assess the ethical permissibility of such a counter-violence? These are 
the questions I want to pose and for which I propose to offer tentative answers. 
 As Mary G. Dietz writes in the edited volume Feminist Interpretations of Hannah 
Arendt (1995), individuals are always “speakers of words and doers of deeds” (Dietz 
31). And as Bonnie Honig in that same volume points out, for Arendt these deeds are 
“action in concert that is also always a site of struggle […] with and against one’s peers” 
(Honig 159). In effect, Arendt’s theorizing of violence is an intellectual antipode to that 
of Fanon’s—and she famously criticized Sartre for abandoning the existentialist 
dialectic of society and self when he full-throatedly and unequivocally endorsed 
Fanon’s program of violent resistance.  
We will return to these criticisms from Arendt, criticisms which call for a more 
complex understanding of the effects and ethics of violence, largely via Vollmann’s 
Rising Up and Rising Down, later in this chapter. But before we can move to the 
criticisms of Fanon’s program, it is necessary to offer an analysis of it in fuller 
complexity. One of the most effective aspects of Fanon’s work is the way he brought 
existentialist thought forward by including different subject-positions, particularly 
those of black and colonized subjects. Here he makes admirable use of Sartrean 
philosophy while bringing it forward in notable and important ways. 
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iii. Correcting/Furthering Sartre 
 For a time, many marginalized figures who were influenced by Sartre were 
confined to a revered but particularly dark area under his massive shadow. Then there 
was a righteous backlash against this notion that they might be reduced to footnotes—
no matter how extensive—to a white European of notable privilege. I hope that we have 
reached a point in history where we can, via a bit of Hegelian three-step maneuvering, 
acknowledge how hugely influential Sartre was for many marginalized writers and 
activists, while allowing them their individual contributions and importance. In this 
section I intend to argue that a sizable portion of Fanon’s oeuvre is dedicated to acting 
as a corrective to and a furthering of Sartre’s work, though even when it serves to 
correct errors or fills gaps in Sartre’s work, it without a desire to supplant Sartrean 
thought in its entirety. Fanon often continues to assume Sartre’s basic premises, though 
he adroitly details the shortcomings and blind-spots in Sartre’s theories.  
In many ways, Fanon’s project is a corrective to Sartre’s, and in other ways it is 
an extension of it. Already in Being and Nothingness, Sartre theorizes the gaze of the 
Other and how it reifies us into beings-for-the-others—that is, we become objects when 
put under the always-oppositional gaze of the Other. In what way does Fanon further 
this notion? In what way does he offer a corrective to it in the case of the colonized? 
Sartre’s notion allows for both parties to be reifying forces, alternately objectifying each 
other. It also allows for an end to the reification for both parties. Fanon argues that the 
colonized are permanently reified because “the black man has no ontological resistance 
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in the eyes of the white man” (The Wretched of the Earth 90). In effect, there is no 
reciprocal reification in the inter-subjective transaction between a black person and 
white person—indeed, the term “intersubjective” could be contested, given that 
subjecthood is denied the colonized in this situation. Or as he writes later: “the white 
gaze, the only valid one, is dissecting me” (The Wretched of the Earth 95). 
Fanon likewise adds to Sartre’s theorizing by highlighting the differences in how 
the Sartrean gaze functions when one considers skin color. Of course visuality is a 
present factor in the gaze when a white man looks at another white man, but a new and 
more ubiquitous element enters the equation, Fanon argues, when one’s skin color 
causes one to stand out—and to stand out with a negative cultural valence—in nearly 
every public situation. Fanon points out that blackness is “dense and undeniable” in the 
visual field (The Wretched of the Earth 96). It is inescapable in a way that other 
differentiated groups’ qualities are not. To make his argument, Fanon takes Jewishness 
as his example, saying that Jewishness can be hidden in a way that blackness simply 
cannot.   
While it is undeniable that the immediate visual distinction of skin color adds to 
black oppression, and precisely in the immediacy of the gaze as Fanon suggests, here 
we find Fanon’s tendency toward monolithic thinking leads him to a disturbing 
conclusion, when he compares the oppression of Jews in Europe to the oppression of 
blacks. 
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The Jewishness of the Jew, however, can go unnoticed. He is not integrally 
what he is. We can but hope and wait. His acts and behaviors are the 
determining factor. He is a white man, and apart from some debatable 
features, he can pass undetected. He belongs to the race that has never 
practiced cannibalism […] Of course the Jews have been tormented—what 
am I saying? They have been hunted, exterminated, and cremated, but 
these are just minor episodes in the family history. (Black Skin, White Masks 
95). 
First off, Fanon ignores anti-Semitic claims that Jews drank the blood of Christian 
children, which is a form of cannibalism. Secondly, to call the Holocaust a “minor 
episode in the family history” is not only offensive and insensitive, it misses the point 
that many forms of otherizing can be just as devastating as racial otherizing. 
However, this is not to say that Fanon’s point about skin color doesn’t have   
validity; he does however, I would argue, take it too far in a monolithic-thinking 
direction. Fanon further argues that “ontology does not allow us to understand the 
being of the black man, since it ignores the lived experience” (The Wretched of the Earth 
90). Fanon retools Sartre’s notions and uses them against him; in other words Sartre 
developed the notion of lived experience to a great degree, but he failed to discuss how 
it could be differentiated along lines of gender and race. Here Fanon doesn’t so much 
refute Sartre’s theorizing, but rather points at a gap in his theorizing. We can find a 
corollary move in Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, where she develops many of her own 
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theories, but also takes certain Sartrean notions and shows how they may be retooled to 
be more inclusive and accurate.  
 
iv. Applying Fanon Today, in the United States and Elsewhere 
 With several recent race-related protests and riots in the United States, the 
question of when violence is politically practical or ethically permissible is more than a 
merely theoretical concern. It is in fact one of the most urgent questions concerning 
what our actions should be, considering the multifaceted and deeply interrelated and 
socially integrated problems facing us in this country today. As our media 
commentators have pointed out, much property damage has followed from some of 
these protests, and there are police officers injured or killed who have not, as far as we 
know, directly involved in any police brutality. But of course there have been many 
more cases of racially motivated violence against minorities by police in this country 
than have been reported in the media—less sensational perhaps, but no less devastating 
to the victims and to the communities in which they occur. It is therefore incumbent 
upon us to read Fanon and Sartre and Vollmann (and others) on the matter with our 
fullest attention and most discerning judgment. 
 Vollmann poses what is perhaps the most salient question for our efforts:  
More fundamentally, is poverty absolute, or relative? […] A statician informs 
me that technology has now put the labor power equivalent of nineteen 
slaves, or nineteen megawatt-hours per year, at the average human 
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being’s disposal […] In 1860, the comparable figure was less than one 
megawatt-hour per year. A sweatshop laborer in Los Angeles has access 
to food, clothing and entertainment that ancient kings could never have 
hoped for. (Vollmann 190) 
In effect, Vollmann is asking whether there is an absolute tipping-point where a person 
has enough caloric intake, healthcare, clothing, housing, and pleasurable distractions 
beyond which complaint is rendered invalid. It is true that even the impoverished in the 
United States today have longer lifespans, better dental health, greater travel options, 
and more venues for distraction than the wealthy in previous centuries would have 
enjoyed. But does this invalidate a claim to improved conditions? The question may 
seem odd in its basicness, but this is precisely why it must be asked, in order to help 
establish some base from which to make practical and ethical judgments. 
 Another strength of Vollmann’s massive work on the subject of violence is that 
he takes great pains to give every individual and every group their day in court, as it 
were. He shows equal respect for pro-gun members of the ad hoc citizen border patrol 
on the US-Mexico border as he does socialist resistance fighters in France under Nazi 
occupation. His methodology strongly suggests that we eschew preconceived notions to 
the best of our abilities and honestly analyze each individual’s or group’s claim to the 
right to use violence in defense of themselves or their cause(s). I intend to do the same 
here. In any discussion of violence today in the United States, we would have to 
address racialized violence and the recent protests against police brutality and the 
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murder of black Americans. There is much debate about the means one might ethically 
use to protest this state of affairs, such as mainstream media’s coverage of property 
damage in Baltimore. 
But there are also members of the Tea Party who likewise advocate violent 
means to achieve their goals of a libertarian or libertarian-Christian society. As much as 
it might be tempting to dismiss these individuals or subgroups out of hand, we would 
be remiss to do so. In a spirit of intellectual honesty and fairness, their claim to the right 
to use violent means ought to be met with the same practical and ethical investigations 
as other groups that we might immediately assume have a stronger claim to such 
political tactics. 
Firstly, it should be admitted that many of the pro-gun, anti-government 
members of the Tea Party are impoverished and uneducated; we do not see the 
billionaire backers of the Tea Party strolling around Wal-Mart parking lots with 
automatic rifles slung over their shoulders. These are, therefore, underprivileged 
members of American society grasping at an immediate form of power they can, quite 
literally, feel. In a society that bars the supermajority of opportunities for good 
education and good employment from the poor, to say nothing of public services and 
healthcare, these people have real grievances. The question is: does this inequality and 
wealth disparity warrant the use of violent means as a corrective to their situation? And 
a corollary question is: what would be the most effective and ethically permissible 
means, if not violence? 
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 Here we should consider another aspect of violent demonstrations, one that does 
not have as its final goal the overthrow of an unfair or oppressive government. The 
situation in the United States and other western countries is notably different than in 
the colonized world. Sometimes the goal is not and should not be the overthrow of the 
government, but rather a bid for recognition in the eyes of the society in which the 
oppressed or under-represented are often invisible casualties of racism or classism or 
sexism. 
The riots were simply a direct effort to gain visibility. A social group 
which, although part of France and composed of French citizens, saw 
itself as excluded from the political and social space proper wanted to 
render its presence palpable to the general public. Their actions spoke for 
them: like it or not, we’re here, no matter how much you pretend not to 
see us. Commentators failed to notice the crucial fact that the protesters 
did not claim any special status for themselves as members of a religious 
or ethnic group striving for its self-enclosed way of life. On the contrary, 
their main premise was that they wanted to be and were French citizens, 
but were not fully recognized as such. (Violence 77) 
The rioters in France were largely destroying their own neighborhoods, as occasionally 
has happened in protests in the United States, but even when the property is public 
property or businesses owned by the oppressing class, the point is not the destruction 
itself, but rather a bid for recognition. The protests in Baltimore and Ferguson and 
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elsewhere in the United States and Europe do not, as of yet, seem to have the overthrow 
of any government as their goal. Raising awareness of the issues is front and center, and 
the #BlackLivesMatter hashtag movement is a clear cry for recognition. Black humans 
are humans too, the movement is saying, and they should be treated as such. This is, 
therefore, one more complication to Fanon’s theorization of violence, its uses, its 
efficacy, and its ethical status.5 But even though the members of the Tea Party do not 
suffer the racism that black Americans suffer, they do, as enumerated above, have a 
lengthy list of real grievances against the structure of our society (even if they 
misunderstand what those grievances may be). They are therefore calling for a 
recognition of their situation as well, a situation that includes perennial poverty, lack of 
education opportunities for their children, a wage disparity that astounds, and a future 
that grows ever bleaker by the day. And we can find yet further corollaries in recent 
history of violent demonstrations, though in a different countries with a different 
groups calling for recognition. Here is Slavoj Žižek discussing the riots in France in 
2004: 
The message of the outbursts was not that the protesters found their 
ethnic-religious identity threatened by French republican universalism 
                                                          
5 It is worth noting that Fanon himself attempts to bring thinking on Hegelian recognition forward, such 
as when he writes: “I want to be recognized not as Black but as White. But—and this is the form of 
recognition that Hegel never described—who better than the white woman to bring this about? By loving 
me, she proves to me that I am worthy of white love […] Between these white breasts that my wandering 
hands fondle, white civilization and worthiness become mine” (Black Skin, White Masks 45).   
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but, on the contrary, that they were not included in it, that they found 
themselves on the other side of the wall which separates the visible from 
the invisible part of the republican social space […] This is why violence 
was necessary. Had they organized a non-violent march, all they would 
have got was a small note on the bottom of a page. (Violence 77) 
It is therefore a practical tactic, even if it is not consciously articulated as such, to bring 
attention to a disenfranchised group that is not receiving recognition (in the Hegelian 
sense) from its society. 
Following Hegel, Sartre’s ethics has recognition of the Other at its core. He does, 
however, spell out how and why this is the case in different terms—namely in terms of 
bad faith and authenticity. 
A person who has lived in bad faith who begins to assume his freedom is 
said to have undergone a radical conversion to authenticity. In his 
Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre suggests that in affirming his own 
freedom an authentic person would also respect and affirm the freedom of 
other people. Thus, he indicates a possible link between authenticity and 
ethics, suggesting that ethics is other-related authenticity. (Cox 85) 
And part of this recognition of others is a recognition that they do not merely have one 
determining attribute or play merely one role in life. Recall Sartre’s famous example 
from Being and Nothingness of the waiter is too eagerly playing his role as waiter, as 
though his-being-a-waiter were his essential nature and not merely a job he performs 
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for certain hours of the day; he becomes a caricature of a waiter by over-identifying 
with his role of waiter. In effect, he is exhibiting bad faith by not recognizing himself as 
a free agent who is only contingently a waiter and also much more than a waiter even 
while he is a waiter as well. An other-oriented authenticity would require that we admit 
the contingent nature of whatever role another person, even our oppressor, is playing 
and that we admit this is not the sole role she plays. It is, among other things, a call to 
admit the interior complexity, not merely the exterior role of others. Fanon’s model fails 
to admit such complexity, or at least grants it little importance in regard to the ethical 
considerations of violence even when acknowledging it. 
In effect, we ought not only ask when violence is an effective and ethically 
permissible form of protest; we should also ask what level that violence can reach 
before becoming a rising down. When is it effective and ethical to overthrow an unfair 
government and when is reform the proper response? How much property damage and 
how much violence against our fellow humans are permissible to achieve our goals of 
liberation? Here again I want to emphasize that there will not be a final, immutable 
answer to these questions. Following existentialist philosophy, particularly that of 
Sartre, these questions will have to be answered in situation and with the knowledge 
that our existential finitude forces us to forego the hope of perfect, monolithic answers. 
But as Sartre and Vollmann demand, recognition of the Other must be central to any 
such analysis, and our actions must be based on a good faith effort to limit violence, 
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reduce retaliation, and to find non-violent solutions when they are available, only 
resorting to violence when it is the last recourse and when it will truly be a rising up. 
 In Chapter Six, I discuss Vollmann’s Rising Up and Rising Down in terms of recent 
calls for a universalist ethics that nonetheless eschews essentialism. One element I put 
particular focus on is that of historical time—that is to say, I argue that an argument for 
a universalist ethics will necessarily have to include a caveat that at some given time “t” 
an action might be considered universally ethical whereas at another time “t2” it might 
not be. Hannah Arenndt, in her seminal work On Violence, likewise points to the ways 
historical time and conditions alter the way we perceive ethics, particularly in regard to 
violence. 
The pathos and the élan of the New Left, their credibility, as it were, are 
closely connected with the weird suicidal development of modern 
weapons; this is the first generation to grow up under the shadow of the 
atom bomb. They inherited from their parents’ generation the experience 
of a massive intrusion of criminal violence into politics: they learned in 
high school and in college about concentration and extermination camps, 
about genocide and torture, about the wholesale slaughter of civilians in 
war without which modern military operations are no longer possible 
even if restricted to “conventional” weapons. (Arendt 13-14) 
Arendt sees the historical conditions in which members of the New Left of the 1960s 
came to political consciousness as determinant of their relationship to violence. With 
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genocide and the killing of civilians on all sides of recent conflicts at the time, it was an 
uncritical acceptance of such tactics as the new norm of warfare that these members of 
the New Left were practicing.  
The strong Marxist rhetoric of the New Left coincides with the steady 
growth of the entirely non-Marxian conviction, proclaimed by Mao Tse-
tung, that “Power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” To be sure, Marx was 
aware of the role of violence in history, but this role was to him secondary; 
not violence but the contradictions inherent in the old society brought 
about its end. The emergence of a new society was preceded, but not 
caused, by violent outbreaks, which likened to labor pangs that precede, 
but of course do not cause, the event of organic birth. (Arendt 11) 
Arendt’s point is therefore about the historical process of violence and its place in the 
revolutionary consciousness of the time in which she was writing, as opposed to a 
strictly ethical analysis of violence as such. This adds another contingent-historical 
aspect to our considerations of the role of violence in politics, much as Vollmann’s 
analysis admits the contingent-historical into his consideration of the ethics of violence. 
What is key here is the eschewing of eternal, essentialist notions of the ethical and 
practical aspects of violence. It is therefore entirely fitting that Arendt should take her 
argument to Sartre, who was at the time of her writing the most prominent public 
intellectual in the West (and rather prominent in the East and in Africa as well). Fanon 
is likewise her chosen interlocutor in the debate about violence as a means of resistance, 
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leading her take both thinkers on in equal measure. She also has a third target for her 
critique of political violence: an amorphous group she associates with the New Left. She 
therefore has three targets: Sartre, Fanon, and the general mindset among leftists 
worldwide at the time of her writing. Among her key criticisms is that while Sartre and 
the New Left—and Fanon to a lesser degree—use Marxist theory, they have missed a 
central tenet of Marxism. 
Sartre, who in his preface to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth goes much 
farther in his glorification of violence than Sorel in his famous Reflections 
on Violence […] This shows to what extent Sartre is unaware of his basic 
disagreement with Marx on the question of violence, especially when he 
states that “irrepressible violence…is man recreating himself,” that it is 
through “mad fury” that “the wretched of the earth” can “become men.” 
(Arendt 12) 
Arendt admits that Marx is not unaware of the existence and effects of violence, but she 
maintains that for him it does not function as a direct catalyst in the ways that Sartre 
and Fanon propose. Furthermore, she argues that “it cannot be denied that a gulf 
separates the essentially peaceful activities of thinking and laboring from all deeds of 
violence” (Arendt 13). Arendt argues that Hegel put forth thinking as the primary 
means of effecting progress, whereas Marx made the praxis of thinking into the praxis 
of laboring, though ultimately this does not change much for Arendt in terms of 
considerations of violence. Both thinking and laboring are ultimately peaceful praxis, 
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and violence is merely a side-effect of the inherent contradictions of capitalist and 
exploitative societies. 
But even as she critiques Sartre and Fanon, she attempts to understand how their 
misstep in thought, to her mind anyway, came about. For her it is a subtle and non-
malicious error. As she writes: 
I quoted Sartre in order to show that this new shift toward violence in the 
thinking of revolutionaries can remain unnoticed even by one of their 
most representative and articulate spokesmen. (Arendt 13) 
In effect, Arendt seems to be saying, the revolutionary leftists of her time had lost sight 
of both Hegel’s and Marx’s views on the efficacy of violence without realizing the error. 
But what’s more, Arendt points out that this shift toward an aggrandizement of 
violence fails at the most basic level of function. Arendt not only critiques the 
fascination with violence but also its efficacy. It is not just that she finds the overzealous 
faith in violence disturbing; she finds violent revolution unlikely to succeed as a means 
for political change. She does not doubt that violence can in fact overthrow an existing 
government, but rather doubts that the change this overthrow effects will in fact 
improve the situation.  
In no case, as far as I know, was the force of these “volcanic” outbursts, in 
Sartre’s words, “equal to that of the pressure put on them.” To identify the 
national liberation movements with such outbursts is to prophesy their 
 69 
 
doom—quite apart from the fact that the unlikely victory would not result 
in changing the world (or the system), but only its personnel. (Arendt 21) 
We merely have to think of dozens of revolutions in the Middle East and Africa, as well 
as Asia and Russia, to see the accuracy of her complaint. Moreover, we don’t have to 
look too far in the past to see a striking example of violent revolution compared to 
peaceful political evolution. Let us take the example of Venezuela, where in 1992 Hugo 
Chavez attempted a violent revolution that failed and ended with him in prison. He 
went on, however, to be elected by democratic process to the position of president in 
1999. This is perhaps the strongest recent evidence that Hegelian political evolution can 
often succeed where violent revolution will fail. And, as Arendt points out, the results 
of revolution are often little more than a changing of the guard, not a changing of the 
system of oppression. 
And it is already at the level of language and conception that the error finds its 
origin, Arendt tells us.  
Sartre with his great felicity with words has given expression to the new 
faith. “Violence,” he now believes, on the strength of Fanon’s book, “like 
Achilles’ lance, can heal the wounds it has inflicted.” If this were true, 
revenge would be the cure-all for most of our ills. This myth is more 
abstract, farther removed from reality, than Sorel’s myth of a general 
strike ever was. It is on a par with Fanon’s worst rhetorical excesses. 
(Arendt 20) 
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Here Arendt critiques the concept that violence can have an equally ameliorating effect 
as it can a destructive one. This conception is from the start erroneous, given violence’s 
much greater capacity for destruction and given the greater ease with which destruction 
can be made manifest than positive creation can be. But it also the rhetorical excess of 
the believers in violence that she takes to task. It is too simplistic a way to express the 
realities and exigencies of resistance to simply praise violence and prescribe it as the 
cure for the ills caused by violence itself. The conceptualization of the effects and ethics 
of violence should be raised to the level of a calculus, not blunt arithmetic. And the 
language we use to discuss when violence is permissible or desirable should be equally 
complex and nuanced. 
 To return to the question how to apply these thinkers today in the United States 
and elsewhere, I would like to introduce one more element into consideration. The 
LGBTQ community has been marginalized and often brutalized in the United States 
and elsewhere. It is telling that over the past two decades, thirty-six states and the 
District of Columbia have legalized gay marriage, while according to a Pew Research 
Center poll from June 2015 shows that 57% of Americans support gay marriage 
compared with only 39% who oppose it, and these massive gains in civil liberties have 
been achieved without violence on the part of the LGBTQ community. This is not to say 
that every struggle can be won in the courtroom and in the arena of public discourse, 
but many can, and ultimately changing the laws that institutionalize oppression must 
be the final goal—whether one wants to achieve that goal by overthrowing the entire 
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government and putting in place a new legal constitution or whether one wants to work 
within the current system and change it via a political evolution process. Following 
Vollmann’s theorizing, I will add here that nonviolent political evolution seems to be 
the preferable model, when it can work. Arendt would agree with Vollmann, and she 
seems to go even further in advocating political evolution over political revolution. 
Minimally, ethics demands that one give a full nuanced reading of every situation and 
not eschew any means—violent or nonviolent—out of hand. We must be as sure as 
possible that we are in fact rising up when we use violence, and not actually rising 
down. 
  
v. Conclusion(s) 
It is too simplistic to claim violence has no place in the struggle against 
oppression. It is likewise too simplistic to see it as merely a destructive force. It can and 
has been a useful tool, and it forms identity as much as it deforms it. But to aggrandize 
violence as a means of struggle likewise simplifies the issue. As James Dodd writes: 
There are at least two ways to become the dupes of violence that should 
be of paramount concern. First, there is the tendency to expect too much 
from violence, to look to violence either to express a decisiveness of 
purpose, or to provide proof of authenticity that violence cannot in fact 
sustain […] Second, there is a tendency to come to expect too little from 
violence, to believe that violence will simply wither away, due either to 
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the weight of our moral vigilance or the effectiveness of the political, legal, 
social, or ethical instruments that we employ. (Dodd 1) 
We must therefore seek a careful balance in our expectations of violence. We must also 
be certain violence is the only option available before we endorse its deployment. 
William T. Vollmann’s treatise on human violence, Rising Up and Rising Down, offers us 
a Moral Calculus by which to determine when violence is justified—that is, when it 
allows us to rise up instead of rising down, as he phrases it.  
 There are also myriad dangers in the ways that identity is formed via violence, 
particularly when we’re talking about group identity. Too often the groups aim for a 
homogeneity that excludes more than it includes and attempts to erase or eradicate 
differences that would enrich the group. 
 Fanon’s position that violence is a constant in the lives of the oppressed and the 
oppressor alike and that it shapes the identities and social conditions of both seems at 
once accurate and useful in theorizing the place of violence in the identities of both 
groups. It seems likewise accurate, as he contends, that counter-violence is sometimes 
the only workable measure to take in the face of so much systemic and acute violence; 
the question is merely one of answering when counter-violence is ethically permissible 
and and practically applicable . As Vollmann discusses, when he investigates the limits 
of Gandhi’s principle of nonviolence, Hitler’s policy was one of “unremitting 
mercilessness” (Vollmann 74). Vollmann concludes that indeed, in the face of Hitler or 
another dictator with no regard at all for the lives of others, especially nonviolent 
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resistors, violence is morally permissible. But as with all of his calculations on the 
subject, there are limits to violence just as there are limits to nonviolence.  Fanon seems, 
however, to fall into Dodd’s category of expecting too much from violence, and his 
justifications for violence have not achieved the complexity level of a calculus, but 
rather seems more like a simple arithmetic. 
 As we will see in the following chapter, there are ways to blur the lines of 
identity fruitfully in order to avoid an overly rigid us-versus-them paradigm, which 
almost invariably leads—if history is any indicator—to entrenched violence that 
perpetuates itself like a virus, solving little while creating greater injustice and violence. 
By taking a more intersubjective approach, via a multidirectional approach to memory 
and history, as well as insisting on the permeability of identities, thus finding common 
ground instead of creating an anti-dialectic of ossified identities stuck in the violence of 
the practico-inert, we might be able to find, at least in some instances, a solution to 
violence that is not necessarily counter-violence.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TOWARD AN EXISTENTIALIST ANALYSIS OF KNOTS OF MEMORY 
 
i. Introduction 
In recent years, we have seen an explosion of renewed interest in 
existentialism—ranging from dozens of new translations or re-issues of works by 
Simone de Beauvoir, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre to a spate of scholarly 
monographs and articles on existentialist philosophy and literature. Likewise, we have 
seen a prodigious amount of work done in the field of memory studies. I propose to 
find common ground between these two trends; more specifically, I propose to 
undertake an existentialist analysis of les noeuds de mémoire (knots of memory), a concept 
inaugurated as a major new point of inquiry in a 2011 special issue of Yale French Studies 
dedicated to the topic. My primary goal is to establish a philosophical foundation for 
understanding how these knots of memory emerge. I also argue for existentialism’s 
privileged position in such a philosophical grounding. Employing Alain Badiou’s 
notion of the Event as described in Being and Event (1988), Martin Heidegger’s 
investigations from “Origin of the Work of Art” (1960) into how Being is gathered 
around public structures and how literary allegory dis-closes Being, and Sartre’s 
concept of le groupe en fusion (the fused group) from his Critique of Dialectical Reason 
(1960), I explicate how these knots of memory form. Sartrean fused groups are formed 
under duress from a third party or other external pressure. In the dialectics of sociality 
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and the individuals who are thrown into and are co-constitutive of sociality, we will 
find part of the answer to our question of how knots of memory form, since these knots 
belong to the realm of the socio-historical and gather individuals as groups together 
against the horizon of sociality. 
Sartre’s under-discussed play, The Condemned of Altona (1959), and John Edgar 
Wideman’s Fanon (2008), a novel that at once exemplifies a knot of memory and 
presages the formal concept itself, serve as the primary literary texts throughout my 
investigations here. These works serve as examples of knots of memory and will aid in 
establishing the philosophical foundations that allow for an emergence of knots of 
memory. In situating these works in relation to the discourse surrounding knots of 
memory, we will thread through multiple Events, demonstrating how Events, literary 
testimony, and allegory build on and entangle with each other, thereby forming the 
conditions of possibility for the emergence of knots of memory. 
  
ii. Events, Testimony, and the Gathering (Knotting) of Being around Institutions 
How do knots of memory emerge? This is the central question of our current 
investigation. There are, of course, several corollary questions: For whom do these 
knots emerge? Is it meaningful to attribute a spatiality or a locus to these knots? What is 
the dialectical relationship between the socio-historical and the individual in these 
knots? Do they require an Event in order to emerge? Are they Events in themselves? 
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To begin to sketch possible answers to this series of interrelated questions, we 
should first ask after the conditions of possibility for the emergence of these knots of 
memory. And we should distinguish between necessary conditions and supporting 
conditions here. I maintain there is no singularly sufficient condition for the emergence 
of a knot of memory, given that a knot of memory is, per force, the interweaving of 
various conditions and contingencies. A knot of memory therefore requires multiple 
necessary conditions and is aided by supporting conditions; a confluence of these two 
types of conditions forms a sufficient condition-set and allows a knot of memory to 
emerge.6 
Let us turn now to Badiou and his notion of the Event, which is perhaps the 
foremost necessary condition of possibility for a knot of memory. 
 While it would be somewhat inaccurate to categorize Badiou strictly as an 
existentialist, it would likewise be remiss to ignore his connections with the 
existentialist tradition. He announces himself as belonging to the existentialist lineage 
with the title of his magnum opus, Being and Event, placing himself as the third in an ad 
hoc trilogy of books on Being (Being and Time and Being and Nothingness being the first 
two). He likewise titled the intro to his 2010 book, The Century, “Search for a Method”—
an obvious homage to Sartre. But perhaps more important than his strategic self-
placement in the tradition by echoing the titles of major existentialist texts is his 
                                                          
6 I am using the language of formal logic here (necessary condition, sufficient condition), but since the socio-
historical eludes such a neat analytic formulation, I have added the term supporting condition. As in the 
analytic endeavors of logic, mathematics, and science, we are in the business of explaining occurrences 
after the fact and attempting to predict them beforehand. 
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(somewhat contentious) claim in Being and Event that “Heidegger is the last universally 
recognizable philosopher”(1). And his project in that book is primarily one of ontology, 
like Heidegger and Sartre before him. My purpose for suggesting that we treat Badiou 
as firmly within the existentialist tradition is that I want to establish the privileged 
status of existentialist philosophy (particularly that of Badiou, Heidegger, and Sartre) in 
theorizing knots of memory. All of which brings us to the first station in our 
investigation: how can we make use of Badiou’s notion of Events to elucidate the 
emergence of knots of memory? 
 As the metaphor of knots implies, these are not merely the regular flow of 
memory, but rather a gathering up of memory, or an entangling of memory. What 
causes such a gathering or entangling? I argue that multiple Events of the type Badiou 
describes are a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the emergence of a knot 
of memory—that is, there must be at least two Events, though no number of Events 
guarantees the emergence of a knot of memory. 
But we should pause to clarify our terminology. I have been using the term 
“Event” without having properly defined it. Here is Badiou explicating the French 
Revolution in terms of his notion of the Event: 
The historian ends up including in the event ‘the French Revolution’ 
everything delivered by the epoch as traces and facts. This approach, 
however—which is the inventory of all the elements of the site—may well 
lead to the one of the event being undone to the point of being no more 
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than the forever infinite numbering of the gestures, things and words that 
co-existed with it. The halting point for this dissemination is the mode in 
which the Revolution is a central term of the Revolution itself; that is, the 
manner in which the conscience of the times—and the retroactive 
intervention of our own—filters the entire site through the one of its 
evental qualification […] Of the French Revolution as event it must be said 
that it both presents the infinite multiple of the sequence of facts situated 
between 1789 and 1794, and, moreover, that it presents itself as an 
immanent résumé and one-mark of its own multiple. (Being and Event 180) 
[All italics in original.] 
For the sake of clarification, let us turn to Slavoj Žižek’s succinct and clear description of 
what a Badiouian Event is: 
The Event is the Truth of the situation that makes visible/legible what the 
‘official’ situation had to ‘repress’, but it is also always localized—that is to 
say, the Truth is always the Truth of a specific situation. The French 
Revolution, for example, is the Event which makes visible/legible the 
excesses and inconsistencies, the ‘lie’, of the ancient régime situation, 
localized, attached to it. (The Ticklish Subject 148-149) 
An Event is therefore a culmination of a set of socio-historical factors. But even as an 
Event is a culmination, it is also a hermeneutic. 
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An Event thus involves its own series of determinations: the Event itself; 
its naming (the designation ‘French Revolution’ is not an objective 
categorizing but part of the Event itself […]) […]; and, last but not least, its 
subject, the agent who, on behalf of the Truth-Event, intervenes in the 
historical multiple of the situation and discerns/identifies in it signs-
effects of the Event. What defines the subject is his fidelity to the Event: the 
subject comes after the Event and persists in discerning its traces within 
his situation. (ibid) [All italics in original.] 
By this reckoning, the Holocaust would be the culmination of the Truth of German anti-
Semitism (or to think more broadly, the culmination of European-Christian anti-
Semitism up to the point of the Holocaust); the Algerian Revolution would be the 
culmination of the Truth of French colonialism in Algeria (and throughout Africa); and 
September 11th would be the culmination of the Truth of the United States’ role in 
global politics and the Truth of radical Islam. 
 But the occurrence of multiple and potentially relatable Events does not by any 
means guarantee that a knot of memory will form. As Žižek reminds us, the naming of 
an Event is part of the Event itself. We should also note that, according to Žižek’s 
reading of Badiou’s conception of the Event, the subject only emerges out of the Event 
afterward, via fidelity to the Event. I argue that the primary mode of fidelity, vis-à-vis 
the concept of knots of memory, is that of testimony, in all its myriad forms—juridical 
testimony, literary production, public memorials, and so forth. 
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 The concept of knots of memory brings Nora’s notion of lieux de mémoire (sites of 
memory) forward by freeing it from a particular site (among other advances). By 
Badiou’s account, however, place is key to the originating Events which I argue make 
the emergence of knots of memory possible. We must therefore reference the places 
associated with these Events in order to properly understand a knot of memory, or the 
concept itself. The knot of memory is not, however, bound to any single place in the 
way an Event is. We might rightly say that the sites of Events condition the knot of 
memory that emerges, but they do not bind the knot there. 
 But there is another way in which place must be thought of as affecting the 
formation and valence of a knot of memory. In “Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger 
discusses the gathering of Being around such institutions/objects as temples. He also 
distinguishes the effect of a work of art (e.g., a painting or a poem) from that of a public-
architectural structure, while admitting the two share many traits. The work of art, as 
conceived by Heidegger, meshes well with Debarati Sanyal’s contribution concerning 
allegory and knots of memory in the aforementioned issue of Yale French Studies, as well 
as with my own contention that testimony is a necessary condition for the emergence of 
a knot of memory. As Heidegger writes: “The work makes public something other than 
itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory” (19).  It is this making-public that 
allows for a knot of memory to emerge in sociality, thus making it possible for 
individuals to find themselves entangled in it. But what role do physical institutions 
and architectural objects play in this drama? 
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 Heidegger tells us that they gather Being unto themselves, becoming centers of 
sociality and Being. They gather Being unto themselves, creating a locus of Being. In 
this way, they contribute loci for knots of memory, even though knots of memory do 
not, properly speaking, have a place (lieu). To rephrase Heidegger’s notion a bit, I 
propose that these memorial institutions knot Being around and in themselves, thus 
aiding in the formation of knots of memory. Here is Heidegger’s description of how this 
takes place: 
The temple and its precinct, however, do not fade into the indefinite. It is 
the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers 
around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and 
death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline 
acquire the shape of destiny for human being. (40-41) 
Heidegger seems to conceive of this gathering of Being predominantly (though not 
solely) in terms of architectural structures and works of art which perform a key 
cultural function.7 I would like to focus, for now, on this Heideggerian concept of 
cultural-architectural structures gathering Being. We will return to other forms of art 
shortly. 
 I invite you to think of memorial monuments to the Holocaust as our point of 
investigation into how such a locus of Being-gathering conditions the emergence of 
knots of memory. While there are certainly monuments and memorials at the historical 
                                                          
7 On my reading of Heidegger, a small shack would certainly gather Being unto itself, but not with 
anything like the magnitude of a church or courthouse or museum. 
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sites of Nazi concentration camps, frequently no concentration camps were located at 
the sites of these monuments. The same is true of other atrocities or wars (e.g., the 
Vietnam Memorial in Washington D.C.). The sites of these latter monuments and 
memorials therefore cannot be considered the site to which the Event of the Holocaust 
is bound, as Badiou tells us all Events must be bound to some site—yet I argue these 
distant sites are salient for a discussion of knots of memory that include memories of 
the Holocaust (as well as other memories of suffering and violence). Why should this be 
the case? 
 Since one of the interventions offered by the concept of knots of memory is the 
displacement of Nora’s sites of memory, we will focus solely on monuments located at 
sites other than the geographical location of the Event they memorialize. These 
monuments gather Being unto themselves and, to use Heideggerian language, they 
clear and illuminate Being. In effect, these memorial sites offer one mode of resistance to 
the natural tendency of forgetfulness and of world-withdrawal, though they cannot 
stave it off indefinitely. The memorial sites and their monument structures serve as a 
techne for dis-closing Being, in the way Heidegger discusses it in his essay “The 
Question Concerning Technology.” Heidegger also conceives of a process by which a 
work of art or architecture can experience a receding of Being, which is why such 
monuments can only hope to stave off forgetfulness, not to abolish it entirely. This 
seems salient to the discussion of knots of memory, not for a discussion of how they 
emerge but rather of how they might dissolve. As the institutions, located in sociality, 
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experience this recession of Being, once they no longer gather Being unto themselves, 
they lose their ability to help the process of memory-knotting, and this in turn is part of 
the unraveling and forgetting process. For now, I will abandon the discussion of this 
gathering of Being and of world-withdrawal, having merely established that there can 
be loci which serve as supporting conditions for the emergence of knots of memory, 
even if they are not necessary conditions for that emergence. 
 We also must realize the dialectic between the individual and sociality in the 
formation of knots of memory. These knots must exist in sociality, but individuals get 
caught or entangled in these knots, and via fidelity to the Events which gave rise to the 
knots, they are interpolated by the knots into subjecthood—or, minimally, into one 
aspect of their subjecthood. A key site for this dialectic is that of testimony. 
Before moving on to literary allegory and its relationship to knots of memory, 
allow me to recapitulate the thread of our argument to this point. Here are the 
conditions of possibility for a knot memory to emerge, as we have established them 
thus far. At least two Badouian Events must occur, a Sartrean fused group must be 
formed, then testimony must occur for each of the Events in question, and finally, 
someone or some group of people must connect these testimonies together; and all the 
while, various memorial institutions can aid in the emergence of a knot of memory, 
though they are not, strictly speaking, necessary. 
 
 
 84 
 
iii. Crabwalking Through History 
“To search for beginnings, you turn into a crab. 
The historian looks backwards; in the end he 
even believes backwards.” 
—Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols 
 
 Debarati Sanyal writes: 
Allegory opens what I will call here a kind of crabwalk history, in which 
distinct yet proximate genealogies of state violence are evoked to 
constitute a noeud de mémoire that helps us better read the aims and effects 
of both as an embodied confrontation and as the outcome of a structure of 
relations. (Sanyal 53) 
Literary allegory is therefore seen as, if not quite a necessary condition for a knot of 
memory, then at least one of the primary modes of such an emergence, because it 
allows for this crabwalking through history which is a necessary condition for knots of 
memory to emerge. While there are perhaps other means by which a knot of memory 
can emerge, my current investigation focuses on the means by which knots of memory 
form and how allegory and, more broadly speaking, literary works of art participate in 
the formation of knots of memory. 
  The following passage is central to understanding what a knot of memory is, as 
well as the intellectual genealogy of the concept: 
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Thinkers such as Hannah Arendt, Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, and Jean-
Paul Sartre, among others, probed the affinities between Nazism and 
imperialism, as well those between the concentrationary and colonial 
experience, identifying analogies, continuities, and even intersections 
between these distinct legacies of racialized violence. (ibid) 
A knot of memory, therefore, should be understood as the affinities and intersections 
between distinct legacies of violence or oppression. But why do we need such a 
concept? What does the concept of a knot of memory add to already existing discourse, 
largely coming out of Nora’s groundbreaking work on lieux de mémoire (sites of 
memory)? There are several reasons we might want to shift our thinking on memory to 
the knots-of-memory model, perhaps foremost among them being that it expands the 
conceptualization of how memory works from the sites-of-memory model which has a 
“conception of the nation purged of many of its imperial adventures and minoritarian 
inflections—purged, in short, of phenomena that trouble the linear narrative of 
historical progress and the stark opposition between history and memory” (Rothberg 
4). The concept is therefore useful for its capacity to accommodate the multidirectional 
reality of memory. It likewise does not privilege history over memory, nor does it 
define these in opposition to each other, as Nora does. And, finally, it is a 
geographically movable concept. New knots may form at practically any site where the 
requisite conditions are met, and that site does not bind these new knots of memory. 
The concept therefore is considerably more flexible than its predecessor. 
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 Having established, in the previous section, the conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of a knot of memory, and having established in the previous paragraph why 
the concept is a productive intervention into memory studies, let us look at some of its 
specific features, as explicated by Sanyal.  
It is worth noting that Sanyal focuses on collective or state violence, and violence 
that is aimed at a collective. Here her choice of Sartre’s play The Condemned of Altona as 
her case study is perhaps even more fitting than she realizes. In 1961, just over a year 
after The Condemned of Altona enjoyed its first production, the first volume of Sartre’s 
The Critique of Dialectical Reason was published. Even though Sanyal does not reference 
it, Sartre’s Critique is particularly useful in clarifying for whom a knot of memory 
emerges, since it is not the case that all groups will share all knots of memory; one’s 
entanglement in and interpellation by a knot of memory depends on one’s membership 
or (af)filiation with a group whose sociality contains and conditions the knot. The 
Sartrean concept from his Critique that is salient for our purposes here is the fused 
group. Earlier I stated that fused groups are a necessary condition for the emergence of 
knots-of-memory. We should look more closely at the concept itself and how it 
functions vis-à-vis knots-of-memory. 
Sartre, using the French Revolution as his example, describes the situation prior 
to the formation of fused groups which eventuate the revolution. 
After 12 July 1789 the people of Paris were in a state of revolt. Their anger 
had deep causes, but as yet these had affected the people only in their 
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common impotence (cold, hunger, etc., were all suffered either in 
resignation—serial behavior falsely presenting itself as individual virtue—
or in unorganised outbursts, riots, etc.). On the basis of what exterior 
circumstances were groups to be constituted? (Critique 351) 
 
Dès le 12 juillet, le peuple de Paris est en état d’insurrection. Sa colère a des 
causes profondes mais qui jusqu’ici n’ont attaint les classes populaires que dans 
leur impuissance commune (le froid, la faim, etc., le tout subi dans la resignation, 
cette conduit sérielle qui se donne faussement pour une vertu individuelle, ou 
dans des explosions inorganisées, émeutes, etc.). A partir de quelles circonstances 
extérieures les groups vont-ils constituer? (Critique 386) 
Firstly, Sartre distinguishes between amorphous directionless revolt, which takes place 
in seriality, and an organized resistance, which can only happen when fused groups are 
formed. Secondly, Sartre tells us that a fused group forms under adversity at the hands 
of a third party (Critique 361-363). This adversity has the potential to change a series of 
subjects into a fused group. Our most common state in society, Sartre tells us, is that of 
seriality—an undifferentiated series of subjects treading socially pre-ordained paths. 
But when a third party threatens such an amorphous group, it becomes a fused group 
in response to the threat or violence, thus creating a group identity and perhaps going 
so far as to form a fraternity or pledged group (Critique 419). I propose that it is fused 
groups and their members who are interpellated by the knot, and it is fused groups and 
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their members who are called to Badouian fidelity to the Events which form the 
condition of possibility for a knot of memory. 
But how do literature and allegory fit into this process? Sanyal suggests that 
allegory can harken back, thus translating one Event back to a preceding Event. I 
propose that we combine Sanyal’s contention with two Heideggerian points: 1) Literary 
language discloses Being to us, thus allowing us to recognize Being—that is to say, 
without this process of disclosure, we would be unable to recognize the truth of an 
Event. 2) Works of art always refer us to something else in an allegorical fashion. They 
therefore aid in the formation of a knot of memory precisely because they aid in the 
referring-back-to a preceding Event. As Sanyal writes: 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the legacy of Nazi genocide 
was woven into other histories in the making, and formed memorial knots 
that bound together distinct legacies […] Jean-Paul Sartre, among others, 
probed the affinities between Nazism and imperialism, as well as those 
between the concentrationary and colonial experience, identifying 
analogies, continuities, and even intersections between these distinct 
legacies of racialized violence […] Allegory, or speaking otherwise, 
evoked one history through another and bound them into a noeud de 
mémoire. (Sanyal 54) 
According to Sanyal, Sartre’s play The Condemned of Altona represents a knot of memory 
in itself. Literature can therefore, via allegory, form a knot of memory, and the space of 
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this knot is moveable—wherever the play is read or produced, the knot has the capacity 
to emerge, since the audience has the potential to be transposed back through the 
Events and subject positions of those who experienced them. 
 
iv. Historical Threads, Knots of Memory, and Blurring the Subject-Subject Divide 
National Book Award finalist John Edgar Wideman’s novel, Fanon (2008), is a 
brazenly “experimental” novel that approaches its titular subject from nontraditional 
angles. Using metafictional techniques, Wideman tells the story of Thomas, who 
receives a severed head in a box after 9/11. The identity of the author, the narrator,   
several characters, and even the reader blur, thus undermining rigidly distinct 
identities. This is a standard postmodern trope, but particularly useful for the concept 
of knots of memory, though other blurrings are perhaps even more useful, such as 
when Wideman uses the texture of his prose to intermix the struggles of Fanon in Africa 
and the struggles of Africa.  
It’s 1961. Fanon’s last year on earth, the year in whose first month, 
January, Fanon’s new acquaintance Patrice Lumumba, first prime minister 
of a brand-spanking-new Republic of Congo, will be kidnapped, tortured, 
executed by Belgians and Congolese, his body burned in an oil drum, the 
year in whose last month, December, Fanon will succumb to leukemia in a 
hospital in Bethesda, Maryland, 1961 the of this journey we’re shadowing 
that begins in a Guinean town, Kankan, crosses the border to Bamako in 
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Mali, then goes to Ségou to Mopti to Gao and north, always pushing north 
toward Algeria’s war of independence from France, following the North 
Star or whichever star’s luminosity and lustrosity beams hope, a beacon 
and benediction, Uh-huh, oh yeah, don’t yeh hear me talkin to yeh, 
chillen, don’t youall just adore that star shinin bright, oh, oh, oh, you are 
my shining star, the old, the new star leading Frantz and his crew in SUVs 
humping north across Mali. Good golly, Miss Mali, you sure love to ball. 
Blasts from the past in my earphones, not Fanon’s. (Wideman 38-39)  
Via the use of free indirect discourse, Wideman weaves together Fanon’s story and the 
larger story of African independence in the 1950s and 1960s with the story of black 
resistance in the United States at the same time, along the “we” of the present 
“shadowing” Fanon on his revolutionary journey and the narrator of the narrator of the 
novel itself. It is also worth noting that this weaving seamlessly blurs the decriptions of 
each of these subject positions, thus refusing neat distinctions between groups, thus 
continuing Wideman’s project of blurring the subject-subject divide. 
 One last note about Wideman’s prose tactics: notice that he writes in the present 
tense, even when he discusses events of the past. He is therefore present-ing the past, 
suggesting that it is always with us, woven into the fabric of our current events (and 
current Events). 
And it is precisely these literary tactics that allow Wideman to make what must 
be considered a substantial contribution to our possibilities of thinking of and through 
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knots of memory. Likewise, Fanon is an ideal example of Sanyal’s discussion of allegory 
or “speaking otherwise.” It interesting for our discussion for another reason as well. The 
novel takes up the knot of memory formed by Sartre’s play The Condemned of Altona in 
that it links Nazi Germany and French colonialism in Algeria, but it weaves a further 
Event-thread into the knot (thus forming a new knot) by including the Event of 9/11 to 
the bundle. It should also be noted that not only does Fanon lend itself to an analysis via 
the knots of memory concept, it presages the notion by thematizing threads, unraveling, 
and interwovenness in regard to multiple Events of suffering/violence three years 
before the formal concept was inaugurated.  
Always too late too late to change what you struggle to learn. What you 
don’t learn no help either. Crazy old crones haggling over your fate, then 
forgetting you as soon as they dispense your portion. So what if you 
believe that myth or some other myth. Yes, all threads connect […] The 
same step leads everywhere, nowhere. To France. Back home to his island. 
Hitler’s fatherland. The motherland. War. Peace. The bottom of the sea. 
(149) 
This passage indicates that both the things we are conscious of (those things we struggle 
to learn) and those things of which we are not conscious (those things we don’t learn) 
are subject to and condition our social and historical fate in equal measure. To put this 
in Heideggerian terms, we are thrown into a historically conditioned sociality and our 
lives are determined to great degree by that historical sociality. And to put it in Sartre’s 
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terms from Being and Nothingness, which echo and alter Marx, we are free to choose, but 
we are not free to choose the conditions in which we choose. And, of course, the ending 
of Wideman’s paragraph insists that we end in the abyss, in death, no matter how the 
threads of history and our personal fates interweave. In effect, its depiction of life is 
fundamentally existentialist, as is its view of death. 
 To move from how this passage is steeped in existentialist thought to the insight 
it lends to our investigation into the notion of knots of memory, we can start with the 
metaphor of connected threads. These knots formed by the threads of one’s fate are 
historical in Wideman’s writing. But it would be facile to stop merely at the level of 
metaphor here. What is most striking is that he explicitly connects France, Martinique, 
and Hitler’s Germany, suggesting, as both Sartre and Sanyal do, that these histories of 
violence are neither distinct nor disconnected. 
Moreover, Wideman’s prose style is steeped in postmodern wordplay, and in his 
linguistic playfulness, Wideman continues to make the point of our interconnectedness 
and continues to blur subject positions as they knot together in memory. Here is the 
aforementioned dialogue between the novel’s John Edgar Wideman and Godard, which 
Wideman gives us in the form of a screenplay: 
JLG: (whose English is excellent) Very good grit. 
JEW: (whose English is heavily accented) Blah-blah-blah. 
JLG: Bien sûr. 
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JEW: There are some advantages to balance the disadvantages of being 
from the hood. Especially when I’m in the hood. Like a seat at the closest 
thing to a table in this joint, for instance. Or like the way these reporters, 
your fans, Mr. G., fawn over me, hang on my every word. Clingy as 
starlets. They desire more than anything access to the top, and for a 
minute, while here in the hood, I’m the top. Observing behavior you’d 
assume, if you didn’t know better, each of them is my best friend. They all 
want to eat and drink and rap with me. (Fanon 108-109) 
Do we see a variation on Levinas’s point about inter-subjective substitution here? 
Levinas, in a move typical of his overall project, attempts to outdo Heidegger’s blurring 
of the subject-object divide; Levinas wants to blur the subject-subject divide as well. To 
return to my earlier terminology, this would not be a necessary condition for the 
emergence of a knot of memory, but it is a strongly supporting condition. The ethical-
imaginative effort of substituting oneself for an other is perhaps one of the key 
supporting conditions for the emergence of a knot of memory, and in this case, this 
subject-substitution is what allows for the “crabwalking through history” which Sanyal 
argues is necessary for a knot of memory to form. 
 And, as Sanyal explains, the use of allegory allows us some degree of this 
subject-substitution as well as Event-substitution. Literature blurs the lines between 
subjects and Events by disclosing their Being and thereby inviting and making possible 
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an imagining or translation across the divisions between them. Sanyal isolates two 
moments in The Condemns of Altona that salient to the topic of subject-substitution. 
Frantz finds the mad and frightened rabbi wandering about the property 
and hides him in his room, in a gesture that prefigures his own mad 
sequestration. (Sanyal 58) 
And later she quotes the following passage from Sartre’s play: “I have supreme power. 
Hitler has made me an Other, implacable and sacred: himself” (ibid). Frantz is therefore 
intersubjectively transposed with a Jewish victim at one moment in the play and with 
the leader of the Nazi regime at another moment. This mirrors the French transposition 
from victim during the Occupation to perpetrator during the Algerian War. It is 
precisely this literary language and allegorical crabwalking that makes possible the knot 
of memory that The Condemned of Altona represents. And Wideman crabwalks his way 
back from the position of an African-American in post-9/11 America through the 
Algerian War to the position of Jewishness during WWII. 
There is, on the one hand, something utopian about this ability to transpose 
Events and subject positions, since it allows for larger opportunities for solidarity 
among disparate groups (as Jim House explains in his article “Memory and the 
Creation of Solidarity During the Decolonization of Algeria” in the aforementioned 
special issue of Yale French Studies on the concept of knots of memory). Sanyal warns us 
that there is, however, also a danger inherent in the use of allegory. 
 95 
 
Throughout Sartre’s writings, the colonized subject and the Jew are 
evacuated of their historical, religious, or racial specificity […] Yet as 
Walter Benjamin has observed, this hollowing out of bodies and histories 
is a feature of allegory itself, a rhetorical figure that unmoors image and 
meaning and whose structure of substitution turns its objects of 
representation into so many ghosts or “phantom proxies” that can be 
pressed in service of other times, bodies, and places. (68) 
The specificity of each Event is often lost in the allegorical crabwalking process that 
allows for a knot of memory to form, so what at first seemed like a utopian melding 
suddenly shows elements of erasure in regard to atrocities. “The allegorical registers of 
Sartre’s play erase the particularity of the Final Solution […] Yet it is this betrayal of 
testimonial specificity that opens up a politics of memory in the play” (68). In effect, as 
we will explore further in Chapter Five, we must admit our existential finitude and 
admit there is no perfect solution here. There will be gains and losses in the process of 
allegory; we must simply do everything in our (finite) power to amplify the gains and 
mitigate the losses. We must also admit, as Sanyal tells us, that “the traumatic nature of 
experiences such as detainment, torture, and extermination often prompt the 
displacements of allegorical inscription in order to become legible and transmissible” 
(52). Allegory is sometimes the primary way such experiences can be transmitted. Will 
something be lost in translation? Yes; there always is. But there is also much gained. 
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The spatial figure of the crabwalk invites us to read time allegorically, 
such that Nazism and imperialism, genocide and colonialism, the 
Holocaust and decolonization are addressed side by side by side in 
relations of proximity and mutual illumination rather than of petrified 
equivalence and identity. The crabwalk suggests a circuit of 
communication that travels forward and backward in time […] it offers a 
mode of reading that brings different histories into proximity and 
adjacency without reducing one to the other. (Sanyal 70-71) 
Various histories and Events overlap and intertwine, and despite whatever dangers 
allegory presents, encouraging knots of memory to emerge is one of our best hopes of 
learning from these disparate histories and Events. And, as Jim House argues, knots of 
memory can facilitate solidarity among disparate groups, such as white French citizens 
and black Algerian revolutionaries. 
 
v. Conclusion(s) 
 Throughout this chapter, I have attempted to deploy an existentialist problematic 
to describe knots of memory, and to explicate the conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of thereof. To summarize the key points of my investigation, I will recount 
briefly the order of operations, as I see them, for the emergence of a knot of memory. I 
will then summarize the application of my thinking on the novel Fanon by John Edgar 
Wideman, as well as summarizing how his fictional exploration of such 
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interconnectedness across time and events presaged and can inform the theoretical 
investigation inaugurated by the 2012 special issue of Yale French Studies on the topic. 
 We should review the conditions of possibility for the emergence of a knot of 
memory. First, at least two Badiouian Events must occur, but this is not enough to 
ensure that a knot of memory will emerge between them. The nature of the Events must 
be that Sartrean fused groups emerge by virtue of each Event. This means that the 
Events must be violent or oppositional, thus limiting the types of Events that can lead to 
a knot of memory. But since Sartre instructs us that fused groups do not necessarily stay 
fused, that they in fact often dissolve back into mere seriality, something more is 
needed. What is this something? Testimony of some sort is the next necessary condition 
of possibility for the emergence of a knot of memory, since it allows for what Sanyal 
calls “crabwalking through history.” 
And here I would like to take a brief detour and move to the effects of 
monumentalizing in the public-architectural sphere. I do not consider these monuments 
(be they literal monuments or museums) necessary conditions for the emergence of a 
knot of memory, but they are supporting conditions for such emergence. How does this 
work? By what means do such monuments support the emergence of a knot of 
memory? Here, I turn to Heidegger’s notion of the gathering of Being around such 
culturally salient structures and restage his gathering of Being as a knotting of Being. By 
this gathering/knotting of Being by such monuments, attention is drawn to the Events 
they monumentalize—they are an allegory of sorts for the Events—and thus the 
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monuments and the events they monumentalize begin to condition the historicity of a 
given epoch. One effect of this is that they ease the process of the formation of a knot of 
memory. 
Something that has been left undiscussed is the causal process by which various 
Events share sufficient affinity to allow or even encourage such memorial knotting to 
occur. Sanyal nicely points out that in the case of Sartre’s play The Condemned of Altona: 
Postwar French cultural production abounds with figures that put the 
traumatic legacy of the Holocaust in dialogue with other bodies and 
histories. Figures such as the victim-turned-executioner or the enemy 
whose is one’s own sought to shore up anticolonial dissent by 
underscoring France’s paradoxical turn from victim of Nazi occupation to 
perpetrator of internment and torture in service of colonial occupations. 
(53) 
Here we see a nearly perfect historical contiguity between the Events which serve as the 
basis for the particular knot of memory Sanyal discusses, but this direct historical 
contiguity is not present in Wideman’s novel. The paths of history’s garden have forked 
many times between Fanon’s revolutionary efforts in the 1950s and the neo-imperialist 
wars waged in the wake of 9/11. There are, of course, connections and perhaps even 
certain threads of contiguity we could find here, but the historical and geographic 
distances in this case are considerably greater and more tenuous than in the case Sanyal 
investigates via Sartre. 
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My hope has been to offer a philosophical-theoretical grounding for the 
emergence of knots of memory and to prove existentialist philosophy holds a privileged 
position in the formation of such a grounding. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE 10,000 EVIL VISIONS: TRANSGRESSION, VIOLENCE, AND IDENTITY 
FORMATION IN THE WORK OF JOYCE CAROL OATES 
 
i. Introduction 
    “Why is your writing so violent?” Since it is   
    commonly understood that serious writers, as   
    distinct from entertainers or propagandists,   
    take for their natural subjects the complexity of the  
    world, its evils as well as its goods, it is always an  
    insulting question; and it is always sexist. 
—Joyce Carol Oates, “Why Is Your Writing So 
Violent?” 
 
It seems that I write about things that are violent and 
extreme, but it is always against a background of something 
deep and imperishable. I feel I can wade in blood, I can 
endure the 10,000 evil visions. 
—Joyce Carol Oates, from the 1972 Newsweek feature 
on her and her work, “Love and Violence: A Vision of 
America” 
 
 101 
 
Joyce Carol Oates is widely known for her dark themes and violent subject 
matter. As Margot Livesey wrote in the March 7, 1999 edition of The New York Times, “In 
Oates’s fluent grasp, the grotesque becomes a map of the mind’s dark places.” And 
Mary Kathryn Grant puts it even more forcefully: 
Joyce Carol Oates’s fictive world is violent, replete with nightmare, 
destruction, and futility, with a catalogue of horrors […] Any 
understanding of her fiction is contingent upon an understanding of the 
place violence has in her tragic vision. For Oates, life, conceived in terms 
of a brutal struggle for survival against the world and against one’s fellow 
human beings, can only be conquered through violence. The one recourse 
man has to achieve a sense of self-affirmation in the “cheap, flashy 
wasteland of modern America” is violence. (Grant 31) 
We should notice not only Grant’s interpretation of violence in Oates’s literary vision, 
but also its kinship to Jean-Paul Sartre’s notions of our relations with others and the 
place of violence in human interaction. In Being and Nothingness, Sartre conceives of the 
primordial interaction between individuals as antagonistic and offers violence and 
hatred as possible forms of self-affirmation.  German philosopher Willi Maier 
summarizes Sartre’s position on the inherent and ubiquitous conflict of human 
existence thus: 
But insofar that it is, on the other hand, an absolute necessity, that 
consciousness “has” a body (la nécessité «d’avoir» un corps pour le pour-
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soi…), man finds himself, as a result of this “necessary” body, in a 
constant threat from other men: Man, coming to consciousness, finds 
himself, according to Sartre, in a situation characterized by a primordial 
conflict.8 
 
Aber indem es somit auch umgekehrt eine absolute Notwendigkeit ist, daß das 
Bewußtsein einen Leib „hat” (la nécessité «d’avoir» un corps pour le pour-soi…), 
befindet sich der Mensch infolge dieses „notwendigen” Leibes in einer ständigen 
Bedrohung durch die anderen Menschen: Der zum Bewußtsein kommende 
Mensch findet sich nach Sartre in einer Situation vor, die durch einen 
ursprünglichen Konflikt gekennzeichnet ist. (Maier 11) 
Notice here Sartre’s focus on the body as central to this primordial conflict. Oates’s 
engagement with the body, particularly the female body, is likewise primordially 
oppositional and violent. 
As the quotes I have offered (and the many more one could offer) prove, violence 
is perhaps the central theme of Oates’s work. I am therefore introducing nothing new in 
terms of proving that her prodigious literary output has violence at its center. 
Additionally, I am introducing nothing new when I claim that she is particularly 
(though by no means solely) interested in the way violence affects women’s lives. My 
intervention here is to suggest that we read these well-documented aspects of Oates’s 
                                                          
8 All translations from the Maier text are my own, since there is no English translation. 
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work through the prism of existentialism. My goal is twofold. Firstly, I will establish the 
influence of existentialism on Oates’s literary production and show her lasting 
intellectual interest in the questions raised by existentialism. Secondly, I will argue the 
corollary point that existentialism is not only a major influence on Oates’s work but 
likewise the most fruitful means of interpreting it. 
 There are, however, several obstacles to my efforts here, obstacles I hope to turn 
into helpmates. First among them is Oates’s massive output. She has published nearly 
one hundred books, ranging across all genres and often enormous in size. There are 
years in which she produces four or five books. To keep track of all this production 
proves difficult. As Erica Jong phrases it, “Her gift is so large, her fluency in different 
genres—poems, short stories, novels, essays—so great, that at times she seems to 
challenge the ability of readers to keep up with her” (Expensive People, x). This also 
means, however, that a scholar of Oates’s work has massive amounts of data to work 
with. And, I hasten to point out, this outsized productivity fits with Sartre’s dictum that 
action and doing are the sole means of bringing one’s self into existence. While it is 
perhaps a superficial connection, Simone de Beauvoir, Albert Camus, Martin 
Heidegger, Norman Mailer, Jean-Paul Sartre, and William T. Vollmann—all of the 
subjects of my investigation in Being and Suffering—are likewise massively productive 
and also have works in many genres. This is what a court of law might call mere 
circumstantial evidence, insufficient to establish beyond a doubt a salient connection 
between all of these writers in terms of the volume and genre(s) of their output, but 
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circumstantial evidence can be useful in shoring up the more substantive evidence. We 
should also note here that both the prodigious output and the range of genres fits 
perfectly with an existentialist worldview. We are constituted by our actions, 
existentialism tells us; we are not essentially any single thing—essayist, novelist, 
philosopher, playwright, or poet—but rather whatever we make ourselves via our 
actions, our daily doing. It should therefore come as no surprise that these existentialist 
writers would produce so prodigiously, and it should come as no surprise that they 
should reinvent their writerly projects so freely. 
 Finally, I will discuss Oates’s contributions to an understanding of how human 
identity is formed through and by violence and in conflict with the Other. Sartre, in 
Being and Nothingness, explicates how the primary relationship with the Other is one of 
conflict. He likewise explicates how we form our identities via our relationship with the 
Other. In his Critique of Dialectical Reason, he describes how fused groups form under 
external duress of either a direct and personal or indirect and systemic nature. I will 
argue that, for Oates, conflict with the Other and violence (both personal and systemic) 
are central to the formation of the subject’s identity as well as of the identity of the 
group, collective, or community. 
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ii. Is Joyce Carol Oates an Existentialist? 
 One need look no further than the first entry in The Journals of Joyce Carol Oates: 
1973-1982 (2007) to see how central existentialist thought is for Oates: “Query: Does the 
individual exist? What is the essential, necessary quality of (sheer) existence….” (The 
Journals 2, emphasis in the original). And her interest in existentialism continues 
throughout her career, ranging from her 1973 article in The Journal of Existential 
Psychology & Psychiatry to several references to Sartre in her 1978 novel Expensive People 
to an epigraph from Sartre for her 2001 novel Blonde. Her engagement with 
existentialism extends into her role as teacher as well. As she writes in an entry dated 
November 22, 1974: “Had taught my freshman class at 11 o’clock—dealing with the 
subtleties of ‘existentialism’ in Kafka’s writing—if indeed he is an ‘existentialist’—yet 
who isn’t?” (The Journals 39). And later, in an entry dated January 26, 1977: “…and 
weren’t we studying Dostoyevsky and Sartre and Camus and Céline and Nietzsche in 
my course?” (The Journals 170). And even beyond her professional and public endeavors 
of writing and teaching, she seems to have considered her own identity in existentialist 
terms. 
…On one side of the looking-glass one tries to create himself. An almost 
Sartrean project. (“I choose to be a hero. I choose to be an Olympic diver. I 
choose to be a novelist. I choose to be a high-wire artist.” Etc., forever.) 
Then life, day by day, is an attempt to answer the terms of that project; an 
attempt on the individual’s part to grow into it. Very sensibly. However—
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one can look at it from another angle, or from the other side of the 
looking-glass. I am Joyce Carol Oates and this, this, and this are 
happening to me; innumerable things have happened; my own 
(strenuous?) activities are in a sense things that have happened to me; so if 
I observe carefully (and this journal stimulates careful, relentless 
observation) all this…this galaxy of bits…I will come to some idea of who 
I am, after all. Not as a project, a willed phenomenon…but as a creation of 
some sort (a creation impersonal as anything in Nature). The one exalts 
the will, the other undervalues it. (The Journals 268-269) 
While Oates sees the one side of the looking-glass as Sartrean and the other as opposed 
to the Sartrean model, the combination of the two is in fact a fuller description of 
Sartre’s position. In effect, she unknowingly recreates a near-duplicate of Sartre’s 
position on the matter, where we are individuals with individual wills, yet we are also 
historically and culturally and biologically conditioned by our facticity. Sartre’s 
description of the individual includes both sides of Oates’s looking-glass, as she seems 
to want as well in her notion of the individual. And perhaps just as importantly, 
Sartrean philosophy is the starting point of her inquiry into the nature of the individual 
and how she understands herself. 
 But like Norman Mailer, Oates is not an existentialist in the sense that she has 
adopted wholesale any philosopher’s system. Following philosopher Richard Schacht’s 
genealogy of existentialism, I consider Arthur Schopenhauer (as opposed to Friedrich 
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Nietzsche or Søren Kierkegaard) the progenitor of modern existentialism. The only 
philosopher mentioned more often than Sartre in Oates’s work is Schopenhauer—and, 
here again, references to him span her entire career, from her earliest journal entries to 
her 2007 novel The Gravedigger’s Daughter. I find this is entirely fitting, given 
Schopenhauer’s preoccupation with pain and suffering. Oates is therefore not only 
consistently interested in existentialism in general but also Schopenhauer himself, the 
progenitor of modern existentialist thought and the philosopher of suffering par 
excellence. 
 And I am not the first reader to notice Oates’s existentialist engagement. Mary 
Kathryn Grant, in The Tragic Vision of Joyce Carol Oates (1978), likewise engages Sartre 
and Heidegger to explicate Oates’s theme(s) of violence. 
Jean-Paul Sartre maintains in his highly controversial introduction to 
Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth that “this irrepressible violence is 
neither sound and fury, nor the resurrection of savage instincts, nor even 
the effect of resentment: it is man re-creating himself.” 
This twofold aspect of violence, the ability to destroy the “enemy” 
and the ability to transcend the trivial, Joyce Carol Oates continually 
explores in her writings. Throughout her works, however, she insists on 
the ability of violence to help the individual achieve a sense of identity 
and wholeness. (Grant 34-35) 
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Notice here that the violent act is the act that can most define the individual. In order to 
find one’s identity as a marginalized group, some form of violence—physical, 
psychological, or metaphorical—must occur against the dominating force(s). Grant goes 
on to outline the similarity with Heidegger’s view on violence in regard to the world. 
(Recall here, of course, that the world for Heidegger is not solely the world of physical 
objects but also the social world.) 
Violence is also part of man’s efforts to exercise some control over his 
world. “‘To be safe from violence you have to be violent yourself,’”—
Lowry explains to Clara [in Oates’s novel Garden of Earthly Delights]. One 
is violent first, before he becomes a victim. Violence is an escape from 
passivity; even if one is destroyed in the end, it is better to have taken the 
first step of being violent oneself. Martin Heidegger in his Introduction to 
Metaphysics elaborates on this principle. Violence is the direct result of 
violated being, he philosophizes. “Man is the violent one…He uses power 
against the overpowering.” (Grant 38) 
Grant has singled out an important aspect of Oates’s thinking as well as its salient 
complement in Heideggerian philosophy, though I do want to take issue with her 
interpretation that Oates’s characters “[are] violent first.” In nearly all of her works, 
they have already suffered structural trauma (in the sense Dominique LaCapra uses the 
term) as well as personal or systemic violence—be it economic, familial, racial, or 
random. And in many cases, they have already been victims of direct violence in the 
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form of rape or other physical assault, or they have been systemically downtrodden via 
economic, gender, or racial disadvantage(s). I would therefore merely rephrase Grant’s 
contention to state that they use violence to transform themselves from passive victims 
to active agents, even when, as Grant points out, this does not necessarily improve their 
material conditions. In effect, I argue, “the overpowering” that Heidegger speaks of 
must be present first before a counter-violence on the part of Oates’s characters comes 
into play. 
And, as Oates tells us, personally enacted violence “is always an affirmation” 
(The Edge of Impossibility 11). For the majority of her works, I would argue violence is the 
affirmation of the self in particular, but sometimes it can be the affirmation of a 
worldview (religious, political, etc.), though that too has much to do with one’s identity, 
and affirming one’s religious or political views is affirming some aspect of the self as 
well. 
 Oates can therefore not only be considered an existentialist in general terms, but 
also in how she deals with violence and identity specifically. Throughout the rest of this 
chapter, I will explore how an existentially understood violence and sense of identity 
plays out across several of Oates’s works. This dialectic of violence and counter-
violence not only plays a key role in the identity formation of individual characters but 
also entire communities, and, Oates hints at times, the entirety of the United States; 
violence and counter-violence therefore determine both individual identity and the 
sociality into which individuals are thrown (in the Heideggerian sense). 
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iii. Limit-Experiences and Transgression 
“I want to write about people in extremis.” 
—Joyce Carol Oates, in discussion session at Kelly 
Writers House, University of Pennsylvania 
 
The title of Oates’s short fiction collection, Faithless: Tales of Transgression (2001), already 
admits to her interest in the transgressive in human existence and literature, though this 
collection is by no means the only or even the primary example of her efforts at 
exploring transgressive behavior. Oates, I argue, is much like Norman Mailer in that 
violence is central to both authors’ work, as is transgression in general, with violence 
being a special case of transgression that carries extra import. (For further discussion of 
Mailer’s relationship with transgression and violence, see Chapter Six.) 
 It will therefore prove fruitful to look at Oates’s engagement with transgression 
before focusing on her special interest in violence per se. I will trace the theme of 
transgression through several key works in multiple genres that span several decades of 
Oates’s work, thereby establishing a long-term pattern of engagement with the subject 
and showing several modes by which Oates depicts and meditates upon transgression. 
 
 § Expensive People 
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Expensive People (1968) tells the story of the Everett family, which consists of a father 
who is a conservative businessman, a mother who is a literary author, and a son who is 
a child genius (and murderer). The Everetts are upper-middle class and utterly 
alienated from their lives and the lives of others. In somewhat unreal terms, the family 
moves from city to city, always meeting nearly identical or literally identical neighbors 
whose names they forget or mix up horribly due to their total lack of human connection 
with these perennially returning people. 
 Richard, the son in the family and the narrator of the novel, acquires a rifle, 
though at first he has no concrete plans as to what he might do with it. On the first 
outing with his rifle, he shoots at Mr. Body, a banker who lives in his neighborhood and 
who is a friend of his parents. (Mr. Body often attends the bourgeois dinner parties 
Richard’s mother organizes.) Richard raises the rifle and shoots at Mr. Body reading his 
newspaper in his living room. The window shatters, a window which had previously 
“shielded Mr. Body against the night air,” and Mr. Body drops to the floor in fear 
(Expensive People 198). Richard does not end up killing Mr. Body. Instead, he keeps him 
pinned down by shooting at the wall just above his head. Finally, his transgressive 
game over, Richard runs home in a kind of existential ecstasy. 
If you want to guess at my feelings, run along and pretend that all of 
Cedar Grove and Pools Morgan are pursuing you. Though you know no 
one is there (as I knew), run faster all the same, delirious with joy, until 
your legs are carrying you faster than any skeptical gym teacher of your 
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youth would have believed—and you will have some idea of what you 
are! Why hadn’t I guessed at myself before this? What had I done to Mr. 
Body, what had I committed? I ran, and through my mind thoughts ran 
also, new, alarming, refreshing thoughts. But legs carried me on without 
error, without any lapse in rhythm, carrying me forward, back to Broad 
Road and across into the darkness of Cedar Grove, and in five minutes I 
was back home again […] I slept well that night; it seemed to me that at 
last I had discovered myself. (199) 
It is worth remembering that Richard has described himself as an unhealthy child 
plagued by asthma and other ailments. In fact, the offhanded reference to school gym 
class is doubly worth noting, since earlier in the novel, he describes his inability to 
participate in certain school sports due to his physical frailty. Notice how none of these 
appear in this passage of extreme physical exertion. It is as if his ecstasy in transgression 
has overcome his usual physical shortcomings. 
And what’s more, the action of shooting at Mr. Body seemed real in a way the 
flimsy quotidian goings-on in Richard’s life did not. As Richard writes: “This was real! 
This was reality!” (198). The similarity to Sartre’s novels in the Roads to Freedom series, 
discussed in Chapter Three, should not go unremarked.  
The protagonist in Sartre’s The Age of Reason, Mathieu, longs for the realness of 
war, the authenticity of suffering. His middle-class life, his unimportant daily activities, 
the flimsiness of his convictions—all of this and more conspire to make him detest the 
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quotidian routines and the bloodless symbolic order in which he conducts his affairs. 
And as also discussed in Chapter Three, Gomez from Troubled Sleep misses the realness 
and authenticity he experienced during the violence of the Spanish Civil War when he 
is exiled to the safely distant New York City. We therefore see Oates incorporating a 
similar notion of violence as a pathway to a sense of authenticity—though, as I will 
argue later in this chapter and pick up again in Chapter Six, where I discuss Norman 
Mailer’s brand of existentialism, it is perhaps more about transgression of social norms 
than violence as such for the American existentialists. I will also address the ethical 
dimensions of transgression in Chapter Six. 
At the culminating moment of Expensive People, Richard finally commits the act 
of murder he confesses to in the opening line of the novel. But unlike his previous 
outings, this one does not exhilarate him, nor does it allow him greater self-knowledge. 
I suppose there is no need for me to say that when I pulled the trigger that 
time the world cracked in pieces around me? I did not come alive as I had 
in the past. No great heaving clots of blood rushed to my heart, to stir it to 
activity. I felt no surge of strength. What had been the innermost hollow 
of my being dimmed to a spark, pinpoint, and very slowly went out. 
(Expensive People 211-212) 
This might at first seem to contradict the earlier exhilaration of committing a 
transgressive act, given that the murder of one’s mother must rank among the most 
transgressive of acts, but in fact Oates offers us here further insight into the nature of 
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such transgression. Let us compare this act of murder to two other famous murders in 
the annals of existentialist literature—Meursault’s murder of an anonymous Arab in 
Camus’s The Stranger (1942) and Mathieu’s killing of an anonymous German soldier in 
Sartre’s Troubled Sleep (1949). Richard kills his mother whom he adores to the point of 
distraction, whereas Meursault and Mathieu kill people unknown to them. There are 
also the further distancing effects of the victims in Camus’s and Sartre’s novels being 
members of a different race or a different nationality, respectively. That Richard knows 
his mother so closely and cares for her so deeply explains the difference in his reaction. 
 In effect, the exhilaration that comes from enacting violence upon another has to 
come from a sort of bad faith position whereby the perpetrator must dehumanize the 
victim, must fail to recognize (in the Hegelian sense) the victim as fully human. This 
bad faith is at the core of such dehumanization, Sartre teaches us. Perpetrators know 
that the other person has a full interior life with rich wants and needs similar to ours, 
yet they look away from that fact in order to allow themselves to enact violence upon 
their victim. Oates’s depiction of Richard killing his mother, taken side-by-side with the 
killings described by Camus and Sartre, seems to suggest that if we do in fact recognize 
the Other in a Hegelian sense, then enacting violence upon them becomes more 
difficult. 
 Interestingly, in this case, Richard failed to recognize his mother until after he 
had killed her. Only once his deed was complete did he realize he had killed an actual 
human being. Previous to that moment, his mother was an abstraction to him, an 
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abstraction he adored and which held considerable sway over him, but an abstraction 
nonetheless. 
Richard’s final act of violence in the novel is to be his own suicide. 
Here is my problem: I am afraid to die, and when I finish this memoir I 
will be faced with suicide. I have made up my mind. There’s turning back. 
But still I am terribly afraid, which is why my memoir keeps going on, 
going on. But no matter. I had several other digressions in which I will not 
indulge; I will be concise […] Though my criminal act was committed 
with all freedom, still it might have been influenced by one or two things 
in my environment. (It is difficult to analyze yourelf.) I know I am 
completely to blame for what I did; I was free then and I am free right 
now. As Nada said, “I want you to be so free, Richard, that you stink of 
it.” Well, yes, I do stink. And I am free also. (Expensive People 178) 
Notice here the emphasis on freedom, along with its ambivalent nature. In Sartre, one 
feels anguish or nausea in the face of the abyssal freedom that is human fate; here, 
Oates uses the verb to stink to qualify how Richard experiences or exhibits his freedom. 
Oates’s ambivalent depiction of freedom here is therefore resonant with Sartre’s, as is 
her focus on freedom in the first place. 
As previously mentioned, I maintain that for Oates in some cases (and for Mailer 
in nearly all cases) violence is merely a subset of transgression, which can take many 
forms. And Oates’s interest in transgression as an invigorating experience is not limited 
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to her narrative prose. She also explores this theme in her lyric poetry. Here is her short 
poem, “The Forbidden,” in its entirety. 
The relief not to be uttered, 
the syllables not mouthed. 
The mirrored door that flies open so swiftly 
you see yourself in flight. 
How alive, how alive, 
how unexpected. (Invisible Woman 23) 
 
This poem can fruitfully be read alongside the passage of Richard running from the site 
of his transgressive act in Expensive People. In both instances, something forbidden is 
done, some transgression enacted, and in both instances a flight occurs, and in that 
flight one feels more alive than usual. While the narrative description of Richard fleeing 
the scene of his transgression might be seen as limited to his case specifically, the lyric 
mode of “The Forbidden” gestures toward a more universal claim about transgression 
in general. As Barbara Hardy writes in The Advantage of Lyric: 
Lyric poetry attaches personal experience to the world outside, colouring 
events and ideas with individual passion, or transmuting particulars into 
symbol and metaphor.  Most lyric writing involves some shift from the 
particular to the general, from the bed of sleeping love to the meditation 
on Love’s aspiration and weakness, from a crowd on London Bridge to 
the sense of modern devastation (Hardy, 112). 
I maintain that Oates is after precisely this sort of general claim about transgression and 
crossing the boundaries of the forbidden. Even as she constructs specific situations for 
her specific characters to illustrate the ways in which transgression and violence 
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function psychologically, she also seems to want to make gestures toward a larger 
claim—perhaps not exactly a universalist claim, but something that transcends the 
particular individual experience she describes.  
 
iv. Transgenerational Trauma and Identity Formation 
 Another area where Oates adds to the literature of existentialism and suffering is 
her investigation, via narrative, into issues of traumatic memory and transgenerational 
trauma. In Chapter Three I argued that the existentialist problematic is the most fruitful 
for theorizing knots of memory, which are larger cultural convergences of memory; 
here I will argue that the existentialist problematic, particularly Oates’s version of it, is 
likewise useful for understanding the more personalized memory of trauma 
experienced by the individual. 
   
§Son of the Morning 
The main plot of Son of Morning (1978) is set in motion by the brutal rape of Elsa Vickery 
by a group of anonymous men. As a result of this rape, Elsa becomes pregnant and 
gives birth to Nathanael Vickery, who ultimately becomes an Evangelical preacher and 
emerges as the protagonist among the ensemble cast of the novel. Elsa’s father, who is 
an atheist and a medical doctor, attempts to find a fellow doctor who will perform an 
abortion for his daughter, thinking it unwise for a fifteen-year-old to bring to term a 
fetus which resulted from rape. He is, however, unsuccessful, given the laws at the time 
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and the religious ideology surrounding him. It is a group of anonymous men who enact 
personalized violence on Elsa; it is the more diffuse societal oppression of women via 
constrictive laws and religious dogmatism that prevents her from being able to (at least 
somewhat) ameliorate her situation. We therefore see the existentialist dialectic between 
individuals and sociality, personal experience and historicity. 
 Elsa grows deeply depressed in the months following her rape, but the 
anonymity of her assailants and the depersonalized nature of societal constrictiveness 
wreak a fracturing havoc on her personality. 
Of course someone did weep, often. Curled beneath the bedclothes; 
brushing the tangles out of her hair; trying to shake herself out her numb, 
bruising sleep. Sometimes in the early morning there was the simple 
excitement of Elsa, an Elsa-as-always, who broke away from her and 
dressed quickly and eagerly for school, paying no heed to her tears, and 
this Elsa rushed about like the cat foolishly frantic for his supper and took 
hardly any time to eat and hurried outside […] But most of the time there 
was just the person pretending to be Elsa, who lay in bed stubborn and 
cold and fixed and hard, who didn’t give a damn about Sarah Grace or 
Gina or anyone else. (Son of the Morning 58-59) 
Her trauma causes her to bifurcate her identity and to alienate herself from her self in 
various ways. Notice that “someone did weep.” That someone depersonalizes Elsa’s 
experience. And there is a person pretending to be Elsa, the old Elsa, whereas the new 
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Elsa, whose identity has been formed in various ways by the violence she suffers and 
the burden of pregnancy she suffers and the pain of childbirth she suffers, is not fully 
present either. And this new Elsa is alienated not only from herself but from others, as 
she imagines they cannot recognize her, not the real her anyway. As we will see in our 
analysis of Oates’s award-winning and best-selling novel We Were the Mulvaneys (1996), 
as well as her less-well-known novel Carthage (2014), violence is not only a force that 
forms identities; it also deforms or erases them before re-forming them. Elsa is in the 
throes of this annihilation of self that precedes the new self which emerges in the wake 
of violence in Oates’s universe. I will bracket this aspect of Son of the Morning for now, 
and take it up again later in this chapter when I discuss these other two works. 
Elsa’s depression continues after her baby is born, and what’s more, there is a 
direct transferal of the violence she experienced at the hands of her rapists. 
Why was the baby’s food so slow in heating up?—ah, she saw that she’d 
forgotten to turn on the burner. Damn it, she thought. 
 “Damn it and damn you,” she said aloud. (Son of the Morning 59) 
Elsa blames her son Nathanael for destroying her life. He is a symbol and constant 
reminder of the violence she experienced. She eventually abandons him and moves to 
New York City, changing her entire demeanor and lifestyle from the rural New York 
State farm life she was accustomed to. Her mother takes over Nathanael’s upbringing, 
attempting to some degree to regain the child she has lost in Elsa, but she is more 
domineering with this child, fearing the risk of violence that Elsa experienced—yet 
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another way violence shapes the family and all its members in various ways, 
reverberating forward and backward generationally. 
  
 § Community (De)formation via Violence in Carthage (2014) 
As earlier mentioned, in Oates’s universe, the process of identity formation is often a 
process of deformation via violence followed by a re-formation of identity in the wake 
of that violence, conditioned by the nature of the violence experienced and enacted, as 
well as the (re)actions taken after the initial deforming violence. But one thing that is 
constant in Oates’s work is how new versions of ourselves emerge through and after 
violent experiences. 
 Juliet, the fiancée of Corporal Brett Kincaid, an Iraq War veteran who has 
returned with severe injuries, notices a different person residing in the body of her 
beloved. She pleads with him at one point: 
I love you and so sometimes this other—it’s like this other—is staring at me 
out your eyes… 
It is very frightening to me. For I don’t know what I can do, to 
placate this other. (Carthage 17) 
Even before Corporal Kincaid confesses to the murder of Juliet’s sister Cressida, this 
other person he has become causes the ruination of their engagement, despite Juliet’s 
heartfelt efforts to save it. He at one point strikes her, something that had never 
happened before his traumatic war experiences, and in her desperation to save their 
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future together and to cling to the person he once was, she lies to the ER nurses, saying 
that she had an accident. Here we see the confluence of two of Oates’s themes in 
Carthage: 1) Kincaid is so changed by the violence and trauma he has experienced that 
he has been transformed (and literally deformed) into another person, one more 
possessed by violence, so much so that he would abuse his fiancée, something the old 
Kincaid would never have done. 2) This violence he has experienced reverberates out 
into his community, ruining family connections and friendships—that is, the violence 
and trauma he has experienced and perpetrated during the Iraq War have not only 
altered his identity but also that of those around him. 
 Juliet’s father, Zeno Mayfield, notices what is going in his daughter’s life, though 
lacks the appropriate words to protect her from the sea change that has occurred in her 
relationship: 
The shock to Juliet had been so great, Zeno thought, she hadn’t altogether 
absorbed the fact that her fiancé was a terribly changed man—and the 
changes weren’t likely to be exclusively physical. (43) 
This passage does more than merely reiterate Oates’s point about how Kincaid’s 
identity has been changed; it thematizes the alienation those around him feel in the face 
of each other due to the transformation violence and suffering have wrought upon him 
and his community. But it is not simply the individual who experiences violence 
directly who is affected; rather the entire community is altered by the violence suffered 
by the individual. 
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Cressida’s mother, Arlette, while looking through Cressida’s room after her 
disappearance, finds a drawing her missing daughter has done. The image could stand 
as a visual microcosm for Oates’s notion of how the members of her family are re-
formed by the violence they have experienced. 
White humanoid figures that evolved by degrees into abstract shapes and 
became “black”—then evolved back to their original shapes, and their 
original “whiteness”—but profoundly altered. (115) 
Notice the similarity to Elsa’s depersonalized state, her transformation into a 
“someone.” Cressida’s family is metaphorically turned in vague and abstract white 
figures via the drawing. (Even though the drawing was done before the violent event, 
the mother is interpreting it after the fact, and so it is still reflective of this bleaching of 
individuality, this annihilating phase in the violent re-formation of subjects Oates 
repeatedly depicts.) 
But it is not that people are utterly and totally changed by such events, Oates 
seems to be telling us, but rather sent through a stage of precarious mutability on their 
way to becoming new versions of themselves, which do resemble the old selves, though 
profoundly altered. Kincaid himself thinks about the atrocities he witnessed and was a 
part of in Iraq and concludes: “Better to die. To have died […] He’d been killed but 
hadn’t died—exactly” (145). His old self was not totally erased, had not exactly died, 
but rather been sent through a crucible of violence and deformation, emerging on the 
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other side profoundly altered. Though again, Oates zooms her investigative lens out to 
take in the larger community. 
It came to her then: the wars were monstrous, and made monsters of those 
who waged them. 
The Iraq War, the Afghanistan War. 
In time, civilians too would be monstrous, for this is the nature of 
war. 
Even before Brett Kincaid had returned from Iraq disfigured and 
broken, Cressida had believed this. (369) 
And so, before Kincaid is physically and mentally disfigured, Cressida is already 
cognizant of the ways war can change soldiers and even the civilian community for the 
worse. 
 What’s more, collective culpability in violence is depicted. Kincaid’s confession 
seems to indict his fellow officers, even as it depicts the lasting effects of war trauma. 
It was said that no other suspect in the history of the Beechum County 
Sheriff’s Department had given such a long disjointed candid and self-
incriminating confession as Brett Kincaid. He’d seemed to be speaking of 
numerous murders, and not just the murder of Cressida Mayfield. 
He’d given the names of his platoon leaders. He’d given the names 
of his fellow soldiers. He’d had to be reminded he was no longer a soldier 
in Iraq but a civilian in Carthage. (459) 
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The threads of trauma and the guilt-threads of war entangle everyone, Oates seems to 
be telling us. One is immediately reminded of theoretical notions of postmemory and 
transgenerational trauma when the collective and reverberating damage of trauma and 
violence are mentioned, and Oates does not leave these areas of investigation by the 
wayside, but instead dedicates several full novels to the effects of postmemory and 
transgenerational trauma, both focused on the most common subject matter for such 
investigations: the Holocaust. 
 
§ The Gravedigger’s Daughter (2007) 
The novel by Oates that deals most directly with transgenerational trauma is The 
Gravedigger’s Daughter. Rebecca Tignor (née Schwart), the titular character of The 
Gravedigger’s Daughter, is a high-school dropout whose father was forced to take the 
demeaning job of gravedigger when he and his family arrived in the United States, 
despite having been an educator in Germany before the Nazis came to power. 
Rebecca has inherited some of the violence her father was steeped in during his 
life in Nazi Germany: “The meanness in her, taking after her gravedigger father” (36). 
And she transfers the violence he transferred onto her. 
Don’t touch the child. The terrible rage in you, let it stay in you. What 
most scared her, she might hurt Niley [her son]. Shake shake shake the 
obstinate little brat until his teeth rattled, eyes rolled back in his head. For 
so she’d been disciplined, as a child. She wanted to recall that it had been 
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her father who had disciplined her but in fact it had been both her mother 
and her father. She wanted to recall that the discipline had been deserved, 
necessary, and just but she wasn’t so certain that this was so. (45) 
Here we see the transference pattern of violence through the generations. Rebecca’s 
parents suffered during their time in Nazi Germany, which led to their unwarranted 
“disciplining” of her as a child, and now she feels a similar urge to “discipline” her own 
child. Oates does, however, construct the narrative such that Rebecca has a choice; she 
prevents herself from throttling Niley despite her urge to do so. This passage therefore 
thematizes transgenerational trauma while holding to an existentialist model of 
individual choice. Part of Rebecca’s facticity is her family history, which conditions the 
moment of her choice to continue the pattern of violence, but does not determine it 
utterly. 
There is another way in which her childhood punishments return to her—in the 
form of domestic abuse after she is married. 
She would not try to elude him. Vividly she recalled her father needing to 
discipline her. Not once but many times. And Tignor [her husband] had 
been sparing with her, until now. Pa’s way had not been to slap but to 
grab her by the upper arm and shake-shake-shake until her teeth rattled. 
(288) 
Here Tignor beats her severely enough for her to miscarry, yet she “knew she’d 
deserved it, her punishment. You always know” (289). It is telling that she immediately 
 126 
 
thinks of her childhood punishment when confronted with this new domestic abuse. It 
is likewise worth noting that Oates uses the same language (“shake-shake-shake”) in 
this passage as she does in the much earlier one in which Rebecca considers 
“disciplining” her own child. The transference and repetition of violence emanates in 
multiple directions. 
Oates therefore explores the various ways transgenerational trauma might 
present itself based on the class, gender, and education level of the subject suffering 
from it. It is also worth noting how in each case, the violence in the characters’ past 
shapes their current identities. In fact, it might rightfully be argued that violence—be it 
personal or systemic—is the largest factor in identity formation in Oates’s writing. 
 
v. Collective Identity and Violence 
 Thus far, I have largely focused on individual identity de- and re-formation by 
and through violence, but Oates’s work often takes up collective identity formation by 
and through violence. Oates’s work dramatizes the existentialist dialectic between the 
individual and society, or the communal collective. As Gavin Cologne-Brooks writes: 
Oates’s world is a world of paradox […] But as several critics have 
stressed, it is above all communal […] Her ongoing preoccupation with 
identity, with her “self,” personal though it may have been at the outset, 
ends up being a profoundly insightful analysis of just about every area of 
her nation’s and culture’s life. (Cologne-Brooks 228) 
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Given her engagement with existentialism and identity, politics and literature, Oates 
should be ranked with Norman Mailer as a uniquely American existentialist. In both 
cases, they do not merely repeat the European philosophy, but rather alter it by sending 
it through the prism of American intellectual, literary, and quotidian life. Many of her 
works focus more on the individual and how external and internal forces collide, but 
she also has a body of work that privileges the communal aspects of human existence, 
while never losing sight of the individual and the personalized aspects of trauma and 
violence. In effect, she always considers the existentialist dialectic between individual 
and collective identity, sometimes emphasizing this node in that theoretical dyad, 
sometimes emphasizing that one, but never forgetting that both exist. 
Her lauded 1990 short story, “Heat,” recounts the murder of young twins Rhea 
and Rhoda Kunkel at the hands of a mentally challenged man and the effects their 
deaths have on their community. The story is narrated by a seemingly omniscient first-
person plural narrator, the we of the townspeople in the small Florida city where the 
double-murder occurs. We are given facts that could be known and others that could 
not be known by the townspeople. This epistemic impossibility should not, however, be 
read as merely an indictment of how the townspeople tell the story of the twins’ deaths; 
it should be seen as integral to the story they tell themselves about themselves, a story 
that is partially accurate and partially fictionalized. It does not, however, matter for the 
purposes of identity formation which “facts” are accurate and which are confabulations 
 128 
 
or outright fabrications; what matters is the story they tell themselves about themselves, 
thereby constructing their identity. 
As Oates’s fiction often does, the story weaves several types of violence together. 
Across her many works, Oates frequently depicts children as particularly vulnerable to 
adult violence, female characters as vulnerable to male violence, and the 
disenfranchised as vulnerable to the violence of the privileged. She also insists on the 
complexity and multi-directionality of violence—that is, there are no simple victims or 
simple perpetrators in Oates’s universe; all of her characters enact some form of 
violence at certain times of their lives, and everyone’s life is shaped to some degree by 
violence, both the violence they enact and that which is enacted upon them. “Heat” 
incorporates all of these Oatesian themes, adding to them the way violence alters the 
collective identity of a community. 
 There is, however, a different way the collective can be shaped by violence, one 
in which they ostracize and blame the victim of violence. In her novella Rape: A Love 
Story (2004), Oates employs the collective narrative point of view as well, but this time 
in order to “explain” why Teena Maguire is raped and to condemn her character and 
her actions. 
Provoked them. Bad judgment. Must’ve been drinking. The way she was 
dressed. The way Teena Maguire often dressed. Summer nights, 
especially. Partying all over Depew Street. Party spilling out onto the 
street. Loud rock music. That kind of behavior, she had it coming. Where’s 
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her husband? Doesn’t that woman have a husband? What the hell is she 
doing out alone with her twelve-year-old daughter? Endangering the 
safety of a minor? Endangering the morals of a minor? Look: Teena 
Maguire probably was having a few beers with the guys. Smoking dope 
with the guys. Maybe she was hinting at something she’d like to be paid 
for? In cash, or in dope. A woman like that, thirty-five years old and 
dressed like a teenager. Tank top, denim cutoffs, shaggy bleached-blond 
hair frizzed around her face. Bare legs, high-heeled sandals? Tight sexy 
clothes showing her breasts, her ass, what’s she expect? […] One of her 
boyfriends […] He’s married and has four kids. Separated from his wife, 
must be Teena Maguire’s doing. That woman! What kind of a mother 
would drag her young daughter with her to a drunken party and then on 
foot through Rocky Point Park at that hour, what kind of poor judgment, 
she’s lucky it wasn’t worse what happened to her. (Rape, 5-6) 
It is worth noting that the collective narrator in “Heat” is a fused collective—or, to used 
Sartrean language, a fused group—brought together by the shared trauma of losing two 
if its young community members. The collective narrator speaks as a unified and even 
quasi-omniscient consciousness. The townspeople, while horrified by the violent 
goings-on in their community, are brought together by the violence, are formed into a 
fused group by it. 
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The collective narrative voice at the opening of Rape: A Love Story, on the other 
hand, is fractured and polyvocal, casting about for explanations or rationales for such a 
violent event. We see this reflected at the level of content but also in the texture of the 
style. The collective voices are jaggedly fragmented just as the community is. Oates 
explicitly signals that the various utterances by the collective are separate and that her 
technique was to create a kind of gossip-pastiche to express what these various people 
said. Oates even gives us an italicized warning of sorts that there will be an intrusion on 
the unity of the omniscient narrative voice by this fragmented community of speakers. 
Some of the things that would be said of your mother Teena Maguire after she was 
gang-raped, kicked and beaten and left to die on the floor of the filthy boathouse at 
Rocky Point Park in the early minutes of July 5, 1996. (Rape, 6) 
Oates therefore depicts the collective’s reactions to individual suffering, though in a 
way that excludes the victim and fragments the community. 
 There is another way in which violence can bring a group together, via Sartrean 
fused groups. It is hard to imagine a more complete literary dramatization of Sartre’s 
notion of the fused group, from Critique of Dialectical Reason, than Oates’s 1993 novel 
Foxfire: Confessions of a Girl Gang. It is likewise perhaps an ideal depiction of the 
Heideggerian notion, mentioned earlier in this chapter, that humans enact counter-
violence to combat external violence and thereby assert themselves in their world. The 
novel details the lives of five teenage girls in upstate New York in the mid-1950s. Each 
member of the gang has been put under duress of one or several varieties—bullying, 
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economic destitution, systemic gendered oppression, parental neglect, physical violence 
(including but not limited to sexual assault), and a more diffuse alienation in a society 
to which “[they] didn’t belong and never would” (Foxfire 7). 
 The gang of girls therefore meets the definition of a fused group almost perfectly. 
Due to the external duress under which they suffer, they have formed a Sartrean fused 
group in order to combat these external factors. And there is yet another way that 
Foxfire follows Sartrean thought on violence and the Other. One of the most vulnerable 
and abused members of the gang, Rita, is described thusly: “[…] she had a tendency to 
squint and blink  in her sweetly cowering way as if the fact of another’s intimate gaze, 
another’s consciousness, were daunting” (Foxfire 25). Here, Oates directly channels the 
Sartre of Being and Nothingness, even using his language. When we experience the gaze 
(le régard) of the another for-itself (pour-soi)—that is, another consciousness—we are 
shrunk to our bodies and feel confrontationally put-upon, according to Sartre. Oates’s 
description of Rita’s experience fits perfectly with the Sartrean theoretical model, but 
she goes a step further. The following sentence reads: “Rita was not truly fat but only 
plump and even delicately boned inside her plumpness” (25). Rita therefore feels the 
confrontational nature of the gaze of an Other’s consciousness, as Sartre suggests we do 
under such circumstances, and she is immediately reduced to her physical form by the 
description that follows. The passage is therefore practically an exercise in translating 
Sartrean philosophy into literary prose. 
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Sartre likewise theorizes that the external violence and the counter-violence that 
opposes the initial external violence are not the only violences to be contended with. 
There is also an internal violence, usually the constant threat of violence if a member of 
the fused group betrays the groups, that works as a cohesive binding agent, thus 
forming a fraternity (fraternité). This is true of the Foxfire gang. 
 At one point, the narrator of the story, Maddy, speaks “in a vague and rambling 
and wondering” way about wishing she could be someone else, anyone else at all, trade 
her life for another and leave the less-than-pleasant existence she leads behind (21). She 
is with the two other members of the gang at the time, including Legs, the leader. The 
three girls continue walking for a short time before Legs explodes, attacking Maddy. 
“Maddy, you’d trade places with anybody?—just anybody? Is that what 
you said?” advancing upon me as if we’d been quarreling, as if I’d 
challenged her […] “You’d betray your friends, huh, not giving a shit 
about anybody who knows you and is your true friend not some fucking 
stranger, huh?” her voice rising, I couldn’t follow her words, she was 
shoving me backward with the flat of her hand, I couldn’t believe this 
quicksilver change of mood […] I stumbled backward into the gutter, 
“Legs don’t, hey Legs that hurts,” but she kept on […] “Traitor!—you love 
them so much, go suck to them, get out of my sight and away from me!” 
and I didn’t see her arm swinging, her fist cracking me in the face, my 
nose began to bleed, icy-eyed and furious Legs would not relent even 
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when I burst into tears, just pulled Lana [the other gang member present] 
away with her. (21-22) [all italics in the original] 
Notice here the innocent pondering way Maddy’s musing about being someone else is 
described. She is no actual traitor, but even the hint that she would be happier in 
another group, that she would leave the fused group of the Foxfire gang, is enough to 
warrant a violent response from Legs. This constant threat of internal violence fits 
Sartre’s model to the letter. 
 As Sartre writes in Critique of Dialectical Reason: 
But this Terror, as long as unity has not been destroyed by circumstances, 
is a terror which unites rather than a terror which separates. Indeed, in so 
far as these men have constituted themselves by their pledges as common 
individuals, they find their own Terror, in one another, as the same; here and 
everywhere they live their grounded (that is to say, limited) freedom as their 
being-in-the-group, and their being-in-the-group as the being of their 
freedom. In this sense, Terror is their primary unity. (Critique 434) 
The group is therefore formed by an external duress, then held together by both this 
external violence and an internal one. Both the external and internal violence are 
constitutive of the identity of the members of the group.  
 Despite there being no direct mention of Sartre, nor any direct reference to 
existentialism in general—references that appear in many other works by Oates—Foxfire 
can be safely named the most Sartrean-existentialist novel by Oates. 
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vi. Conclusion(s) 
 My goal here has not been to shrink Oates and fit her neatly within the 
intellectual parameters of existentialism, but rather to expand our understanding of her 
work and thought by explicating her engagement with suffering, transgression, and 
violence using an existentialist problematic. And Oates’s idiosyncratic deployment of 
existentialist thought helps us to further existentialist thought with regard to suffering 
and violence and their attendant roles in identity formation. 
In the dialectic of violence and counter-violence, identity is formed—but this 
process includes reforming and deforming of identity, which existentialist philosophy 
does not see as an immutable essence but rather an ever-changing existence. Or, to use 
the words of Sabbath McSwain from Oates’s novel Carthage, “I am just what I—what I 
do. I move from one habitation to another like one of those—is it hermit crabs? Taking 
up residence in others’ shells” (209). The notion that we are what we do is one of the 
most central tenets of Sartrean existentialism, and the notion that we can wear alias 
shells is thematized in Carthage—in fact, Sabbath McSwain’s real name is Cressida 
Mayfield. 
 I have argued that identity formation via suffering and violence is a central 
theme across the entirety of Oates’s career, as is her engagement with existentialist 
philosophy. In Oates’s universe, violence shapes individual and collective identities in 
myriad ways. In her story “Heat,” the community is brought together in a way 
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reminiscent of a Sartrean fused group by the murder of two young girls; in Rape: A Love 
Story, the community is torn apart by a gang rape of one its members, leading to a 
police officer taking vigilante justice on the perpetrators and causing the victim and her 
daughter to end up leaving the community permanently; in We Were the Mulvaneys, the 
Mulvaney family is no longer but rather were that family before the rape of the youngest 
daughter destroyed their previous identity and replaced it with a new one; in The 
Gravedigger’s Daughter, postmemory and the Holocaust emerge as the violence that 
shapes the identities of Oates’s characters, thus moving her engagement with violence 
beyond the merely individual toward the historical; likewise, in them and The Falls, 
systemic violence as formative of both individual and collective identity emerge; and so 
forth throughout all of the works discussed in this chapter—as well as many not 
discussed here. Suffering and violence are perhaps the two most important themes 
central for Oates, if we take her works in the aggregate. 
It will take many years and the work of many scholars to properly mine the 
wealth of material Oates has produced in her long and distinguished career. There have 
been and certainly will be other fruitful veins of exploration than the one I have 
suggested here, but I argue that without considering the influence of existentialism on 
Oates’s work and without considering how she adds to the existentialist tradition in 
literature, we would fail to grasp a central aspect of her work and a large part of her 
contribution to American letters.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
EXISTENTIAL COURAGE: VIOLENCE, LIMIT-EXPERIENCES, AND ETHICS 
IN THE WORK OF NORMAN MAILER 
 
i. Introduction 
Norman Mailer’s central theme, from his first book to his last, is violence and its 
attendant philosophical and psychological concerns. He broke onto the literary scene 
with his novel The Naked and the Dead (1948), a graphically described account of the 
Pacific Front during the Second World War. The novel became a run-away bestseller 
and elevated Mailer to the first tier of American novelists. He went on to win a Pulitzer 
Prize and National Book Award for Armies of the Night (1968), his account of the 1967 
protests against the Vietnam Conflict; he won his second Pulitzer Prize for The 
Executioner’s Song (1979), his account of Gary Gilmore, who murdered two people and 
then demanded his own execution; his classic essay “The White Negro” (1957) describes 
the type of courage required to commit transgressive and violent acts; his novel An 
American Dream (1965) is a tale of Nietzschean excess in which the protagonist, an 
existential psychologist, kills his wife and goes on a spree including alcohol, drugs, and 
indiscriminate sexual adventures; and the list goes on, with nearly every work by 
Mailer having violence specifically, or limit-experiences more broadly, as a central 
theme. And, as I will argue, these themes are treated by Mailer with an idiosyncratically 
existentialist problematic. 
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It would be easy enough to categorize Mailer as an existentialist author, given his 
own proclamation that he was the first existentialist novelist in America and given that 
he refers to himself as The Existentialist in Armies of the Night—to say nothing of the fact 
that Jean-Paul Sartre’s foremost translator Hazel E. Barnes declares, in An Existentialist 
Ethics (1967), that Mailer is the foremost American existentialist. But my goals here 
extend beyond literary and intellectual taxonomy. 
I will argue three main points: 1) Norman Mailer was an existentialist, though 
not in the sense that he adhered to some preexisting notion of existentialism, but rather 
in the sense that he took up the mantle of the movement in America and brought it 
forward in his own way, altering it to suit his violent vision of living to excess in a 
world slowly losing its vitality. As George Cotkin writes in Existential America (2003): 
“An existential consciousness, for Mailer, betokened a new reality for postwar America, 
a reality untainted by conformity and complacency” (Cotkin 185). 2) In a kind of 
interpretive feedback loop, existentialism is the best means of explicating Mailer’s 
engagement with violence and limit-experiences, and Mailer’s work helps us to 
understand existentialism’s fascination with violence, the limit-experience, and the 
gratuitous act (André Gide’s l’acte gratuit). 3) We can, by tracing the development of 
Mailer’s existentialist problematic of violence and limit-experiences, come to a more 
ethical means of achieving the existential authenticity sought by the thrill-seeker and 
the agent of violence. This last contention will prove the most important, because it is 
not merely descriptive of trends in Mailer’s work, which might be of interest only to 
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Mailer fans and scholars; it is, instead, a prescriptive claim about how we might better 
live our lives and experience existential authenticity without transgressing ethical 
boundaries. 
 
ii. Existential Courage 
    “The secret for harvesting from existence the   
    greatest fruitfulness and the greatest enjoyment  
    is—to live dangerously!” 
—Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (283) 
 
A soldier, a boxer, and a compulsive risk-taker, Norman Mailer was obsessed 
with what I will call existential courage—that is, the confrontation with one’s fears and 
with the constraints of quotidian social norms, as well as confrontation with laws and 
conventional morality. Here he is, writing about the hipster movement of the 1950s in 
his classic essay “The White Negro”: 
…for the heart of Hip is its emphasis upon courage at the moment of 
crisis, and it is pleasant to think that courage contains within itself (as the 
explanation of its existence) some glimpse of the necessity of life to 
become more than it has been. (Advertisements for Myself 355) 
In effect, Mailer has responded to J. Alfred Prufrock’s question of whether he dares to 
bring the moment to its crisis by suggesting that, yes, one must do so in order to 
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improve one’s existential status. “We must, in other words, resist the world of cowardly 
compromise and limitations known as society.” (Fuchs 8) 
Notice also the future-oriented nature of courage for Mailer. Courage entails life 
“becom[ing] more than it has been.” This recalls the future-oriented nature of Sartrean 
projects as well as Heidegger’s notion that Dasein and its concern/care (Sorge) are 
necessarily future-oriented. Existential courage contains, therefore, elements of Sartrean 
and Heideggerian thought. Though well-versed in Sartre’s writings, Mailer admits at 
various points of his career that he is not well-versed in Heideggerian philosophy, 
having read only small amounts of Heidegger’s work. We should not, therefore, see this 
affinity as Mailer working through Heideggerian thought, but rather as a synchronicity 
of ideas born from Mailer’s engagement with existential thought in general and his own 
philosophical inquiries into the subject. 
What sorts of crises might one encounter that require existential courage? In the 
same essay, Mailer speculates about the act of murder in these terms: 
The strength of the psychopath is that he knows (where most of us can 
only guess) what is good for him and what is bad for him at exactly those 
instants when an old crippling habit has become so attacked by experience 
that the potentiality exists to change it, to replace negative and empty fear 
with an outward action, even if—and here I obey the logic of the extreme 
psychopath—even if the fear is of himself, and the action is murder. The 
psychopath murders—if he has the courage—out of the necessity to purge 
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his violence […] Still, courage of a sort is necessary, for one murders not 
only a weak fifty-year-old man but an institution as well, one violates 
private property, one enters into a new relation with the police and 
introduces a dangerous element into one’s life. The hoodlum is therefore 
daring the unknown, and so no matter how brutal the act, it is not 
altogether cowardly. (Advertisements 347) 
Notice again his focus on action, which resonates with Sartrean existentialism, but 
notice as well his focus on courage in the face of these acts. There is also risk involved 
here. This “new relation with the police” radically changes the life of the perpetrator 
and “introduces a dangerous element into one’s life.” Though it is not frequently 
discussed, this introduction of risk or danger into one’s life is entirely in line with the 
existentialist thought which traces its genealogy back to Nietzsche, insofar as it is 
concerned with confrontation and triumph and other existential intensities. 
For the existentialist […] the commanding value in life is intensity, as 
manifested in acts of free work. And according to him these various forms 
of intensely lived experience are impossible without anguish, suffering, 
and risk. (Olson 19) 
At this juncture, I want to emphasize the element of risk that Olson has identified as 
central to the existentialist value system. This notion of intensity and intensely lived 
experience will prove necessary in our discussion of Mailer’s particular brand of 
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existentialism, which thematizes limit-experiences perhaps more than any other 
variation on existentialist thought. 
I want to be clear here that Mailer does not aggrandize murder as such, but 
rather transgressive intensities and limit-experiences more broadly, and his point about 
courage plays out over and over in his work in various forms. And what’s more, his 
interest in the story of Gary Gilmore is without a doubt informed by his long-running 
interest in existential courage. As Mailer phrases it: “[Gary Gilmore] appealed to me 
because he embodied many of the themes I’ve been living with all my life long” 
(Conversations with Norman Mailer 228). 
His fascination with existential courage also explains his love of boxing and rock-
climbing, both of which repeatedly appear in his work, fictional and nonfictional, 
spanning several decades. Mailer’s interest in boxing is well known, as are his writings 
on the subject—e.g., his nonfiction book The Fight (1975), about Muhammad Ali and 
George Foreman’s famous 1974 match in Zaïre, and his essay “King of the Hill,” on 
Muhammad Ali’s loss to Joe Frazier in 1971, included in his collection of essays 
Existential Errands (1972). 
From the latter essay, we get one of Mailer’s most direct depictions of existential 
courage. 
There was one way in which boxing was still like a street fight and that in 
the need to be confident you would win. A man walking out of a bar to 
fight with another man is seeking to compromise his head into the 
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confidence that he will certainly triumph—it is the most mysterious 
faculty of the ego. For that confidence is a sedative against the pain of 
punches and yet is the sanction to punch your own best. The logic of the 
spirit would suggest that you win only if you deserve to win: the logic of 
ego lays down the axiom that if you don’t think you will win, you don’t 
deserve to. And in fact, usually don’t; it is as if not believing you will win 
opens you to the guilt that perhaps you don’t have the right, you are too 
guilty. (Existential Errands 22) 
Here, in particular, we can see the Nietzschean strain of existentialism that Mailer 
develops. Existential courage for Mailer is the courage to act, which parallels Sartre’s 
concern with action, though it is not merely a rephrasing of the Sartrean position. 
Mailer adds psychoanalytic and Nietzschean valences to the Sartrean notion. It is not 
just that one must act in order to assert one’s freedom; it is that one must have a will-to-
courage which ultimately allows one to act—that is, Mailer is concerned with action and 
the underlying psychological conditions of possibility for action in equal measure. He is 
also concerned with a particular sort of action, that sort which transgresses acceptable 
social boundaries, which is steeped in violence and the potential for physical and 
psychological harm or death—in short, that sort of action which exists at the limits of 
human experience. 
 143 
 
 I would like to turn now to The Fight, specifically to Mailer’s own experiences, 
which he meditates on vis-à-vis the fight between Ali and Foreman he was in Zaïre to 
cover. Here is his description of jogging with Ali one morning: 
Jogging was an act of balance. You had to get to the point where your lefts 
and your lungs worked together in some equal state of exertion […] if no 
hills were there to squander one’s small reserve, and one did not lose 
stride or have to stop, if one did not stumble and one did not speak, that 
steady progressive churning could continue, thorough-going, raw to one’s 
middle-aged insides, but virtuous. (87-88) 
This passage is more about pushing oneself to a physical brink—“to be close to 
overexertion”—than it is about violence; it is therefore more akin to the existential 
status of rock-climbing, which we will investigate later as the culmination of Mailer’s 
thought on limit-experiences and existential authenticity. 
Later in The Fight, Mailer describes a risk-taking antic he engaged in that is 
particularly salient for the notion of existential courage. 
That night, after drinking with [Don] King, Norman found himself on the 
balcony of his room. Maybe it was in the original design or perhaps the 
railings had gone up in price before the Inter-Continental [hotel] was 
done, but every room had an architectural conceit—its balcony was 
without railing. Call it not a balcony but a shelf […] From the unprotected 
lip, you look down into a fall of seven stories. (The Fight 123) 
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Mailer goes on to describe that by holding onto the partition, one could swing from one 
un-railed balcony to the neighboring one. 
On this Saturday night, long after the weigh-in, not dead drunk, but good 
and drunk, his mind clear, his limbs functioning [Norman] came back into 
his room, opened his window without ado, stepped out on the balcony—it 
was 4 A.M. Sunday morning—put his hands on each side of the partition, 
worked around to the next balcony, nodded, swung back to his own 
balcony, performed much same crossing to the balcony on the other side, 
nodded again, came back, climbed through the window, got into bed, and 
before falling asleep, had time to say to himself, “It was so fucking easy.” 
(125) 
It is worth noting that the task of swinging himself back and forth from terrace to 
terrace is not physically demanding. What makes the feat one that demands existential 
courage is that there is a real possibility of dying. The act requires confronting death 
head-on, thus resonating with Heidegger’s contention that the only way to achieve 
authenticity is to face the fact of one’s ultimate death, though Heidegger suggests a 
more passive, meditative admission of one’s eventual demise, whereas Mailer, ever 
concerned with aggressive action, demands that we must confront death more actively. 
Despite this difference in valence, here Mailer and Heidegger are more in agreement 
than Mailer and Sartre, since Sartre is considerably less interested in the moment of 
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death as such, though in instances of extreme physical exertion or pain, Mailer’s and 
Sartre’s thinking resonate more. 
 And the above passage describing his risk-taking balcony antics is not the only 
instance of Mailer living his philosophy. Of course volunteering to fight in the Second 
World War as an infantryman, instead of at a safer distance as an officer which his 
Harvard degree in engineering could have earned him, speaks to his eagerness to take 
risks, but he continued to push himself throughout his life. 
Carol Stevens, Mailer’s fifth wife, describes Mailer always testing himself, 
walking for instance on the narrow railing outside the living room of their 
summer home in Maine, high above the rocks and sand below. Mailer 
himself cites walking the dangerous ten inch catwalk outside his third 
floor Brooklyn apartment, and earlier walking narrow ledges in San 
Francisco as the source for Stephen Rojack’s negotiation of the parapet in 
An American Dream. (Broer 138) 
It is through facing fear that we gain existential courage. Let us look briefly at existential 
psychologist Rollo May’s succinct summation of courage’s place in the tradition of 
existentialism in The Courage to Create: 
[C]ourage will not be the opposite of despair. We shall often be faced with 
despair […] Hence Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and Camus and Sartre 
have proclaimed that courage is not the absence of despair; it is, rather, 
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the capacity to move ahead in spite of despair. (May 12, italics in the 
original) 
And here is how Mailer defines courage in The Spooky Art (2003): 
You can’t speak of true bravery in combat for such a good soldier until he 
has exhausted his code to that point where he feels, Yes, I may lose—I 
may lose my heart, my dignity, my honor. I’m scared. I’m terrified. I can’t 
move. If, at this point, he still proceeds to press forward, then his behavior 
is courageous. (The Spooky Art 132) 
The similarities between Mailer’s definition of courage and what May outlines as the 
existentialist definition are immediately apparent. And what’s more, Mailer’s depiction 
of existential courage remains almost perfectly constant across his entire career. This 
theme begins in his first novel, The Naked and the Dead, about soldiers in the Second 
World War, and continues in his fiction, nonfiction, and poetry throughout his career. 
But Mailer’s work on courage and its philosophical and psychological attributes are not 
a simple restatement of those existentialists who came before him. He certainly agrees 
with them that courage is not the opposite of fear or despair, but he goes further into 
the aspects of how existential courage works, which situations call for it, and its 
necessity for the improvement of one’s state of existence. 
If there is one contribution to existentialist thought that is quintessentially 
Mailer’s, it is that of existential courage, which is inextricably bound with violence or 
other limit-experiences. Existential courage is a trait he sees in Gilmore at times (though 
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not at others), especially in his willingness to die with dignity and of his own choice as 
opposed to with humiliation and after long years of incarceration. 
 But what is perhaps most worth noting here is that this begins the transition for 
Mailer from violence as the primary limit-experience that can lead to authenticity to 
limit-experiences as such that can lead to existential authenticity, therefore allowing for 
non-violent limit-experiences as vehicles for authentic existence. As will become 
increasingly important in my analysis of Mailer’s engagement with existentialism and 
limit-experiences, rock-climbing appears as a courage-requiring and quasi-mystical 
undertaking in Harlot’s Ghost (1991), The Executioner’s Song (1979), and Why Are We In 
Vietnam? (1967). 
 With this particular, nonviolent version of a limit-experience in mind, we will 
now move on to the question of ethics more centrally. 
 
iii. Limit-Experiences and Mailerian Existentialism 
Existentialism, with its grounding in the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl 
and Martin Heidegger, places conscious experience as one of its central concerns. The 
way in which human experience is treated, however, changes notably between various 
authors within the existentialist movement. This is no less true in regard to the specific 
experience(s) of pain, suffering, and violence. As I discuss in Chapter Three, Sartre 
largely focuses on the experience of suffering and its connections to authenticity; and, 
famously, Camus’s character Mersault in The Stranger shoots a man for seemingly no 
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reason, giving us at least one sort of existentialist murder, that of an absurd act. Camus 
is also concerned with the issue of suicide and the base absurdity of existence in several 
of his works. Sartre’s focus on the immediate phenomenological experience and 
Camus’s focus on the absurd barrier of death itself (either via murder or suicide) are but 
two approaches Mailer adapts or recreates in his own work, though his affinities with 
Sartre certainly outweigh those with Camus. 
Mailer is interested in the psychological underpinnings of pain, suffering, and 
violence. This parallel between Sartre and Mailer comes as no surprise when one notices 
how frequently Mailer references Sartre in his nonfiction writings—from as early as 
1957 in Advertisements for Myself to his 2001 The Big Empty. That said, it is not a perfectly 
neat parallel; when I say that Mailer reflects the concerns of Sartre (and, to a lesser 
degree, Camus), we should imagine that he reflects these concerns in the way a fun-
house mirror reflects—by reshaping the object of reflection based on the mirror’s own 
shape and constitution. Likewise, it must be remembered that Mailer does not limit 
himself to any single existentialist model and enjoys a combative relationship with 
Sartre, the existentialist whose work he was most familiar with and whom he most 
admired. As Cotkin observes: “Norman Mailer liked to spar with Jean-Paul Sartre in the 
boxing ring of his mind. Mailer considered Sartre a worthy adversary, perhaps the only 
thinker in the world who could match him as a novelist, essayist, and public 
intellectual” (Cotkin 184). And Mailer would pay a kind of left-handed homage to 
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Sartre in Le Monde on the occasion of Sartre’s death, offering both praise and an analysis 
of the limitations of Sartrean existentialism. However: 
Despite his protestations, Mailer shared much with Sartre in terms of 
intellectual range and artistic reach, as well as politics. And both of them 
were fascinated with the underbelly of polite society, raging against the 
bourgeois culture that had spawned them. Moreover, Mailer’s image of 
the hipster closely mirrored Sartre’s presentation of the thief, sexual 
predator, and writer Jean Genet. (Cotkin 193). 
And even in their basic understanding of existentialist notions, Mailer and Sartre share 
much in common, particularly on the way authenticity functions. In a television 
appearance in the 1960s, which is reprinted in The Time of Our Time (1998), Mailer claims 
that the greatest moment of existentialist authenticity one could ever feel would be 
falling out of a building but being caught safely in a net. In that moment of falling, 
Mailer claims, one would be in a state of utter authenticity. He has captured an essential 
element of Sartrean authenticity here—namely, the fleeting nature of it. It is sometimes 
wrongly assumed that authenticity is a state like Buddhist enlightenment, whereby one 
achieves it and then remains in a state of existential grace from that point forward. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Sartrean authenticity requires an alignment of 
one’s facticity and one’s transcendence, which is a rare and fleeting state of affairs. 
Mailer has therefore grasped an essential part of Sartrean authenticity, and he has done 
so not merely by apprehending the fleeting nature of authenticity, but also by realizing 
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what sort of situations practically force authenticity upon a person. Throughout Sartre’s 
fiction, from “The Wall” to Troubled Sleep, we see depictions of pain or suffering leading 
to a state of authenticity. The intensity of that experience aligns one’s facticity and one’s 
transcendence such that authenticity is achieved (not that this is a pleasant process or 
even a pleasant state of being). 
For Mailer, it is the limit-experience that leads to authenticity, not pain or 
suffering per se (though, since these are often parts of limit-experiences, they also fit his 
schema). This is why we see extremity of drug use, sexual intensities, and physical 
exertion as ways to authenticity in Mailer’s writings. In his 1991 novel, Harlot’s Ghost, 
rock-climbing is the activity of authenticity. Its mixture of physical exertion and 
awareness of one’s possible death makes for authenticity. In many ways, this shows a 
sort of ethical growth for Mailer, whose earlier works depict violence as the primary 
way to existential authenticity. 
Mailer’s most overtly existentialist novel is perhaps An American Dream. Our 
protagonist, Rojack, is an existential psychoanalyst who ponders existentialist themes 
throughout the book. It is a novel predicated on violence. But it is also predicated on 
more than this violent act; trespass, transgression, and limit-experiences are also 
thematized—even the murder ought to be considered the sort of transgression that 
Mailer theorized in “The White Negro.” Early in the novel, Rojack murders his wife in a 
fit of drunken rage, an act not judged as completely wrong, since he was fully in the 
moment and acting on the emotions of the moment. Throughout the rest of the novel, 
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Rojack goes on a spree of transgression and violence, yet the novel seems only to judge 
those faked or bad-faith acts as wrong, while a fully owned act of depravity is often 
shown in a positive light. This fits excellently with Sartre’s play The Flies, wherein 
Orestes owns his ghastly murder of his mother in a way Electra will not. As numerous 
critics have pointed out, Sartre’s claim here is that we must acknowledge our freedom 
to act and must take responsibility and not regret our actions if we are to achieve 
existential authenticity vis-à-vis those actions, even when they are horrifying or 
violent—in fact, particularly when they are transgressive. 
This also fits with Mailer’s work throughout his career, which is concerned with 
breaking with conformity and unsettling the norm. His term “the Hipster” spoke 
directly to this. Hip is existentialist, Mailer tells us. Hip is also willing to enact violence, 
thereby sacrificing bourgeois safety in order to prevent the total ossification of society 
into neat and tidy roles which serve as prisons for the self. To put this in Sartrean terms 
(from The Critique of Dialectical Reason), bourgeois roles form an anti-dialectic which 
prevents dialectical progress, and revolutionary (or to use Mailer’s language, hip-
existentialist) destruction must take place to rid ourselves of this anti-dialectic, 
otherwise stagnation will occur. 
Rojack is a former US Congressman, a successful author, and TV personality 
with a prestigious university appointment. He is also married to a woman from one of 
the wealthiest families in New York. In short, he has achieved what can only be viewed 
as the pinnacle of the American Dream, and this is precisely the problem. The trappings 
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of success are just that, a trap, and one he must violently break free from. Mailer 
certainly makes use of pain and suffering in his work to show the achievement of 
authenticity, but he takes a slightly different approach to experience and authenticity 
than Sartre does. Mailer writes with inspired vitality in An American Dream, attempting 
to make the reader experience the extremes Rojack does, whereas Camus takes pains to 
create an almost total psychological opacity during scenes of depravity or murder. The 
reader hits the absurd wall of these actions in the works of Camus, whereas we 
experience a deluge of phenomenological minutiae in Mailer’s scenes of this nature, 
showing yet again his greater affinity with the Sartrean literary model. 
Switching gears somewhat, I want to turn to another way in which Mailer fits 
into the world of existentialist thought. As I state in the Introduction, my contention is 
that existentialism was born out of the triple violence of the First World War, the 
Second World War, and the more diffuse violence of modern alienation, thus making it 
the philosophy of suffering and violence par excellence. Mailer fought in the Second 
World War, and he took aim at modern alienation in nearly all of his works, particularly 
technology’s role in this alienation, putting him squarely in line with Heideggerian 
thought on the matter. It is also telling that existentialist thinkers use the very 
philosophy that emerged from these world calamities to theorize violence and 
suffering. This is a portion of my overall argument for reintroducing existentialist 
thought into current discussions on memory, suffering, and violence. The philosophy 
that emerged from these events enjoys a unique position to theorize them. 
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The Naked and the Dead is often seen as too graphic in its depictions of the 
experience of suffering and killing. Bracketing the literary tactics, this book serves my 
overall project in that it shows the existentialist problematic as applicable to the Pacific 
front in addition to the European front during the Second World War. In effect, this is 
yet further proof that existentialism emerged out of a worldwide calamity as both a 
literary and philosophical movement on a worldwide scale. 
It is worth noting that existentialism is a philosophy that judges its adherents 
based on how they live their lives. Sartre and Beauvoir lived in an open relationship for 
decades, at least in part out of a conviction about the nature of human freedom and out 
of dedication to their philosophy. Mailer likewise lived according to his brand of 
existentialism, seeking out limit-experiences in nearly every form he could. In one of the 
darkest moments in his life, at a raging party where Mailer and his wife were hopped-
up on various drugs and alcohol, the two played a mock game in which they simulated 
bullfighting, as they often did, but this time Mailer stabbed his wife and nearly killed 
her. He also had outbursts of violence against various people, most famously Gore 
Vidal. And this attraction to violence stretches back to his choice to enter the war as an 
infantryman despite his Harvard degree which could have kept him safely in an office 
somewhere. He said that he assumed fighting in the war would give him something he 
needed to become a great writer. Here I would like to reiterate my point that in Mailer’s 
later work, extreme physical exertion is privileged over violence as a means to 
existential authenticity. 
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In summary, Mailer’s work fits into two of the main strains of the existentialist 
movement in the ways he depicts and theorizes violence and suffering. Mailer is 
interested in a Sartrean style of depicting the phenomenological details of these 
subjects. He brings the literature forward in that he focuses on a wide range of limit-
experiences as possible alternatives for violence, even as they include violence and 
suffering among the possible paths to authenticity. He also brings the existentialist 
problematic into the American sphere, which means applying it to the hyper-
consumerist society that is the United States. And, even though existentialism was 
always connected with counter-culture and alternative lifestyles, Mailer introduced it to 
the particular counter-cultures of the American 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s. 
Mailer adds one further aspect to the existentialist literature. He attempts to 
violate the reader and upend genre expectations with his writing. Mailer depicts limit-
experiences as a way to break free from the They (das Man) that Heidegger warns us 
against. Without the radical jarring of our sensibilities, we’ll simply fall into 
inaunthenticity, into the They. Foucault once said that reading Bataille could be 
considered a form of limit-experience in itself. It seems as if Mailer attempt to achieve 
this effect as well, a tactic none of the French existentialists used. Even when they 
depicted violence or sexual activity, they didn’t do so with such pornographic zeal. 
I have shown how Mailer fits variously in the existentialist tradition. I have also 
argued that he brought the literature forward by further embedding it in counter-
cultural movements and by further theorizing and making use of the notion of the limit-
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experience in the larger canon of existentialist thought. The range of experiences he 
brings to the table, as well as the range of literary techniques, expand the repertoire of 
existentialist literature and thinking as a whole. 
 
iv. (Transgressive) Language and Existential Courage 
Thus far, I have focused primarily on physical acts of courage in relation to 
Mailer’s engagement with existentialism, but it would be a mistake to imagine his 
engagement with existential courage as confined to physical acts in the world. He also 
conceived of existential courage as the courage to think in new ways, not to conform to 
ideological norms, and, especially, to write as ambitiously and ecstatically as possible. 
Here we find an interesting parallel between Martin Heidegger and Mailer. Heidegger 
writes in the introduction to Being and Time that 
With regard to the awkwardness and ‘inelegance’ of expression in the 
analyses to come, we may remark that it is one thing to give a report in 
which we tell about entities, but another to grasp entities in their Being. For 
the latter task we lack not only most of the words but, above all, the 
‘grammar’. If we may allude to some earlier researches on the analysis of 
Being, incomparable on their own level, we may compare the ontological 
sections of Plato’s Parmenides or the fourth chapter of the seventh book of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics with a narrative section from Thucydides; we can 
then see the altogether unprecedented character of those formulations 
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which were imposed on the Greeks by their philosophers. (Being and Time 
63) 
 
Mit Rücksicht auf das Ungefüge und »Unschöne«  des Ausdrucks 
innerhalb der folgenden Analysen darf die Bemerkung angefügt warden: 
ein anderes ist es, über Seiendes erzählend zu berichten, ein anderes, 
Seiendes in seinem Sein zu fassen. Für die letztgenannte Aufgabe fehlen 
nicht nur meist die Worte, sondern vor allem die »Grammatik«. Wenn 
nein Hinsweis auf frühere und in ihrem Niveau unvergleichlichte 
seinsanalytische Forschungen erlaubt ist, dann verglieche man 
ontologische Aschnitte in Platons »Parmenides« oder das vierte Kapitel 
des siebenten Buches der »Metaphysik« des Aristoteles mit einem 
erzähelenden Abscnitt aus Thykidides, und man wird das Unerhörte der 
Formulierungen sehen, die den Griechen von ihren Philosophen 
zugemutet wurden. (Sein und Zeit 38-39) 
Mailer would agree with Heidegger that new language is necessary to a new 
philosophical task. He writes: “It is impossible to conceive a new philosophy until one 
creates a new language” (Mind of an Outlaw 59). While there is no evidence that Mailer 
received this notion from Heidegger directly, it is an position that fits elegantly in the 
existentialist worldview. 
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We find another point of consonance between Heidegger’s thought and Mailer’s, 
this time regarding the relationship between literary efforts and philosophical ones. 
Both Heidegger and Mailer see literature as ultimately the greater form of philosophical 
inquiry. To use Heideggerian terminology from his post-Kehre period—that is, after his 
“turn” to language—literary language discloses the world more generously than does 
formal philosophy. As Mailer writes: 
[…] the novelist is the only philosopher who works with emotions which 
are at the very edge of the word system, and so is out beyond the 
scientists, doctors, psychologists, even—if he is good enough—the best of 
his contemporaries who work at philosophy itself. (The Prisoner of Sex 124) 
But what is the purpose of working “at the very edge of the word system”? American 
existentialist psychologist Rollo May describes the role of the artist in The Courage to 
Create thus: 
Dogmatism of all kinds—scientific, economic, moral, as well as political—
are threatened by the creative freedom of the artist. This is necessarily and 
inevitably so. We cannot escape our anxiety over the fact that the artists 
together with creative persons of all sorts, are the possible destroyer of our 
nicely ordered systems. (76) 
Mailer’s own view of the role of the artist could not be more resonant with that of 
May’s. Mailer insists on being “the possible destroyer of our nicely ordered systems.” 
As Daniel Fuchs writes: “[it is] Mailer’s view that through obscenity a man can 
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discriminate between himself and society” (Fuchs 8). Obscenity, which transgresses 
agreed-upon social norms of verbal conduct, can work as an antidote to Heideggerian 
fallenness into the They. I would argue that Mailer thematizes this belief that 
transgressive language can have this effect, and on both reader and writer. One Mailer’s 
central concerns is “obscenity as it relates to literary art, an issue that many of his novels 
confront in one way or another” (Ryan 18). 
Additionally, as is the case with Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre, Mailer 
also uses literary language in order to conduct philosophical investigations, a trait that 
might be the foremost hallmark of the existentialist movement. In this way, they are all 
transgressing the boundaries between genres in addition to whatever transgressions 
exist at the level of content or the aesthetic texture of their literary language. And, of 
course, Mailer’s groundbreaking forays into New Journalism and creative nonfiction 
are another example of his dedication to transgressing genre boundaries. 
 
v. Conclusion(s) 
 I have attempted here to establish that Norman Mailer is not only among the 
foremost American existentialist writers, but that his idiosyncratic version of 
existentialism brings the overall movement forward in cultural and ethical terms. I have 
also outlined how he is indicative of the existentialist movement in America. But what 
ought readers to take away from all this? I would propose that three key theses 
comprise my intervention here. 
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 Firstly, Mailer is well known for his involvement with the counter-cultural 
movements of the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s (e.g., hipsters, hippies, anti-war activists, etc). I 
contend that these counter-cultural movements served as the vehicle(s) of Mailer’s 
shepherding-in of existentialist thought to American literary and popular culture. They 
also conditioned his version of existentialism to include transgressions of any sort, 
ranging from drug use to non-traditional sexuality to violence to transgressive modes of 
literature. Speaking to this last point, Cotkin writes: “He wanted to be, through his 
fiction and essays, a voice in the wilderness, a writer shaking the foundations of his era” 
(Cotkin 185). 
Secondly, I argue that Mailer’s main interventions in the history of existentialist 
thought are concerned with the existential status of violence and limit-experiences in 
light of what I have dubbed existential courage. This will-to-courage locates Mailer in a 
particularly Nietzschean and vitalist vein of existentialism. 
Thirdly, there is an ethically prescriptive aspect to my investigations into 
Mailer’s existentialist thought. By blurring the lines between various types of limit-
experiences, which I have shown that Mailer does throughout his career, moving slowly 
away from violent transgressions toward non-violent ones, Mailer’s work gives us 
insight into how we might seek out these limit-experiences, which many so desperately 
crave, without crossing ethical boundaries. His shift from boxing to rock-climbing 
shows a shift from a sport which requires enacting violence upon another to one that 
pits the individual against nature in an intense physical exertion. Mailer’s later work 
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shows a healthy progression away from violence toward other kinds of limit-
experiences. If we can achieve the existential authenticity we so frequently seek as 
readily by engaging in a bit of extreme sports (e.g., rock climbing) as we can by enacting 
violence, then the choice is clear. And his interest in intense sexual experiences stayed 
constant throughout his entire career. In effect, what we can learn from the trajectory of 
Mailer’s thought on limit-experiences and existential authenticity is that we should 
retain those extreme physical exertions that test our physical integrity and existential 
courage, and we should retain intense sexual pleasure, but we should jettison violent 
acts against others as a means of achieving existential authenticity. This is not to say 
that such acts would not lead to such a state; indeed, they could, but the ethical cost is 
too high, and given that there are myriad ethically permissible limit-experiences 
available to us, we ought to simply select those in our pursuit of existential authenticity. 
It is worth noting that this ethical dimension is fraught with masculine 
overtones, given the fact that Mailer—a famously hyper-masculine figure—is the source 
of the ethical theorizing and given that historically roles of the adventurer, the presser-
of-boundaries, the athlete, the soldier, and so forth have been largely occupied by men 
and the discourse has largely privileged masculinity. I do not deny this historical aspect 
of the ethical theory I have put forth, but as someone making use of existentialist 
philosophy, I eschew the idea that any such ethics would necessarily be masculinist and 
further eschew the idea that limit-experiences or transgression are essentially masculine 
activities. I maintain, rather, that they have contingently-historically been such, but that 
 161 
 
they are not permanently or essentially masculine or feminine or any other gender type. 
They are, as all human activities, what we make of them. I would therefore call for an 
effort to create more gender parity within these activities as opposed to jettisoning them 
as essentially masculinist and therefore not worthy of our engagement. 
Mailer’s place in American letters has long been solidified, and with the recently 
renewed interest in his work, there are many opportunities for investigation. Given his 
career-spanning interest in existentialism and limit-experiences of various sorts, I argue 
that finding an intersection between these topics ought to be of central concern to 
scholars of Mailer, existentialism, and the place of violence and limit-experiences in 
American literature and thought. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE NEW UNIVERSALISM AND WILLIAM T. VOLLMANN’S RISING UP 
AND RISING DOWN 
  
“No one engaged in thought about history and 
politics can remain unaware of the enormous role 
violence has always played in human affairs, and it is 
at first glance rather surprising that violence has been 
singled out so seldom for special consideration.” 
  —Hannah Arendt, On Violence 
 
i. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been, in the words of Malini Johar Schueller, “a major 
intellectual impetus in Europe and the US: to produce paradigms of […] global theory, 
based on the assumption that the contemporary moment calls for a resurgence of some 
form of universal theorizing” (Schueller 236). Her list of contemporary thinkers 
partaking in this trend includes Giorgio Agamben, Judith Butler, Antonio Negri, and 
Slavoj Žižek. I would add Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, and Ernesto Laclau to that list. 
Another author she does not include, in this instance probably because he is off the 
academic radar, is William T. Vollmann. His Rising Up and Rising Down (2003) fairly 
begs to be situated among recent discussions on universalism and ethics—though the 
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book has, like its author, largely escaped discussion in the academy. Rising Up and 
Rising Down has not, however, gone unnoticed. It was a finalist for the National Critics 
Circle Award, and a 750-page abridgement of the 3,200-page original was published by 
Ecco in 2004. It has also received accolades from The New York Times, The New York 
Review of Books, and Rolling Stone Magazine. Steven Moore, writing in the 17 December 
2003 edition of Washington Post Book World, praises the book as 
a monumental achievement on several levels: as hair-raising survey of 
mankind’s propensity for violence, as a one-man attempt to construct a 
system of ethics, as a successful exercise in objective analysis (almost non-
existent in today’s partisan, ideological, politicized, spin-doctored, theory-
muddled public discourse), and a demonstration of the importance of 
empathy […] beyond the realm of mere mortals. (Moore) 
 But despite literary awards, accolades in the popular press, and Vollmann’s nearly 
fanatical followers who have made him into something of a cult figure, his work has 
been mostly ignored by academic scholars. I will make the case that not only is his work 
worthy of scholarly attention, but that he makes a significant contribution to one of the 
most important theoretical debates of the past decade. 
The task of developing a universal ethics is Himalayan in size and incalculable in 
importance from economic, philosophical, and political perspectives. It is therefore 
incumbent upon us to make use of every intellectual tool available in service of this 
(likely impossible) task. Vollmann, perhaps more than any thinker I name above, has 
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employed a nearly exhaustive multiplicity of methods in his effort to solve the insoluble 
problems of violence and ethics. Rising Up and Rising Down is at once an example of 
anthropological field research, cultural criticism, literary theory, memoir, political 
science, travel writing, war reportage, and, finally, ethical philosophy. In Rising Up and 
Rising Down, Vollmann attempts nothing less than to understand the nature of human 
violence, in a historical-descriptive sense, and to outline the speculative-descriptive 
circumstances under which violence is justified (or not). I will argue that his 
methodology of exhaustiveness is an effective tactic for bridging the philosophical and 
political gaps between relativism/nominalism and universalism/essentialism. 
Furthermore, situating Vollmann’s Moral Calculus, which he develops 
throughout Rising Up and Rising Down, within the recent discussions of universalism 
will be mutually beneficial in that Vollmann’s methodology of exhaustiveness will 
bolster these academic discussions, while the application of certain professional 
philosophers’ and theorists’ work to Rising Up and Rising Down will advance our 
understanding and application of Vollmann’s efforts as well. 
“We do not fear being called meticulous,” Thomas Mann famously wrote in The 
Magic Mountain, “inclining as we do to the view that only the exhaustive can be truly 
interesting” (Mann vi). Vollmann’s tactics and overall enterprise strongly suggest that 
he not only agrees with the fictional narrators of The Magic Mountain, but that he also 
maintains that only the exhaustive can be truly ethical. In effect, Vollmann has found a 
proverbial third way between strict relativism and dogmatic universalism by insisting 
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on such a multitude of information and methodological approaches—and in doing so, 
he has offered a new approach to solving one of the longest running ethical debates in 
modern philosophy. 
 
ii. Terminological Landscapes and Clarity as a Universalist Notion 
“I am a total Enlightenment thinker.” 
—Slavoj Žižek, from the documentary Žižek! 
 
“The real philosopher will […] resemble a Swiss lake 
which by its calm combines great depth with great 
clarity, the depth revealing itself precisely by the 
clarity.” 
—Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Four-Fold Root 
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason 
 
 
            I want to clarify our terminology as best I can, but before I do, I want to discuss 
what such a move might mean—both for Vollmann’s Rising Up and Rising Down and for 
the discussion of universalism. Vollmann not only offers clear definitions of eighty-
three terms in his Moral Calculus but also gives abundant examples to illustrate or 
dramatize each definition he gives. This move is one readers of Žižek know well, since 
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he is famous for, among other things, qualifying his terms clearly and then illustrating 
them insightfully (and entertainingly). Let’s look at the above epigraph from Žižek, 
wherein he names himself an Enlightenment thinker. His larger claim in the interview 
from which I have extracted the quote is about terminology and the clarity of ideas. 
Discussing Lacan, Žižek calls Lacan’s style “a total fake” even though many of his 
underlying ideas are quite productive. Žižek says that he himself wants to express 
clearly those Lacanian notions which he finds useful, dispensing with the rhetorical 
flotsam that accrues in Lacan’s style. This commitment to clarity of idea and expression 
is, just as Žižek claims, an Enlightenment notion and one that is more than a mere 
accident. The impulse for universal comprehensibility is at the core of this style, and it is 
telling that Judith Butler, whose earlier work is composed in a difficult style akin to that 
of Jacques Derrida, writes her most lucid prose to date when discussing universalism 
and developing her version of universalist thought. As Noam Lupu put it in his review 
for Flak Magazine: 
Butler is not known for reaching out to wide audiences with a political 
message. A professor of comparative literature at Berkeley, she is best 
known for her work on queer theory and widely criticized for her obtuse 
language and academic stardom. In what is by far her most accessible 
book to date, however, Butler's message is clear: liberal criticism and 
theory must reemerge from their post-Sept. 11 hibernation. (Lupu) 
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Something similar could be said about Vollmann’s prose in Rising Up and Rising Down 
in comparison to the prose in most of his fiction, which is often compared to Thomas 
Pynchon in terms of its lyric difficulty and exulting density. Vollmann’s and Butler’s 
switch to a more accessible prose indicates an interest in a wider readership for their 
works in ethics, which is entirely appropriate, since not only academics and the elite 
literati are concerned in such matters. It is not, however, the focus of my essay, so I will 
bracket issues of clarity and (attempted) universal intelligibility, sufficing merely to 
suggest that they bear a strong relationship with universalist efforts in general. I will, 
however, honor Schopenhauer’s dictum about clarity and move on to defining the 
parameters of the terminology in this chapter. 
  
§RELATIVISM 
“…the skulls on the shelves, the skulls stinking and 
yellow (almost nine thousand of them at Choeung Ek 
Killing Field alone). If you are a moral relativist, I 
urge you to study these murderers’ example and then 
rethink your position. ‘The Skulls on the Shelves’ 
[from vol. V of Rising Up and Rising Down] proves that 
anybody who thinks and cares about the world bears 
an urgent necessity to construct a moral calculus.” 
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—William T. Vollmann, Rising Up and Rising 
Down 
  
The first and most ideologically dominant term, relativism, can be misleading in 
multiple ways. First off, outside of the realm of philosophy, we rarely distinguish 
between what is known as weak relativism and strong relativism. The latter term is much 
more radical in that it applies to every sort of knowledge and all truth-claims—
aesthetic, ethical, experiential, mathematical, scientific, and so on. This means that if one 
person claims that two plus two equals seventeen, that claim has the same purchase on 
truth as the claim that two plus two equals four. The same would hold true for the 
belief that objects fall when dropped, or any other scientifically verifiable events. And 
this applies to all ethical claims as well. Jeffrey Dahmer and the Dalai Lama have the 
same authority on whether murdering and eating people or treating them with 
compassion would be the ethically preferable action. 
Weak relativism pertains largely (though not exclusively) to what is generally 
dubbed cultural relativism (or sometimes moral relativism, as Vollmann has it), which 
posits a much less radical position about the nature of ethics, knowledge, and truth-
claims. Weak relativism states that certain beliefs carry identical truth value even when 
they are not identical in terms of content—or even, conceivably, when their content is 
diametrically opposite. Cultural relativism is a subcategory of weak relativism, and 
since it is most salient for our current discussion, I’ll limit myself to this form of weak 
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relativism. Cultural relativism states that ethical norms are culturally determined such 
that what is ethically permissible (or obligatory) in one culture may not be in another, 
and that neither culture can claim a greater ethical footing. This leads to the conclusion 
that no culture can judge another culture, since its ethics and means of determining 
truth values and ethics are different and perhaps incompatible. Since we cannot extract 
ourselves ideologically from our own culture, we cannot find that view-from-nowhere 
that would be necessary to form objective judgments about cultures, and thus all of our 
judgments will be, at least to some degree, determined by our own culture, thus 
invalidating those judgments vis-à-vis another culture. 
The obvious advantages of this system of belief are numerous. First and 
foremost, it precludes value judgments that arbitrarily belittle the cultural practices of 
others. It thereby demands a kind of tolerance which deserves admiration. This is 
among the top reasons it has been the dominant mode of thought in humanities 
departments for several decades and continues to enjoy large numbers of adherents. So, 
why would anyone want to supplant or supplement such a noble and popular theory? 
The short answer is that cultural relativism creates a host of problems for the political 
activist and the philosopher alike. Cultural relativism also contradicts its own noble 
goal(s) in a number of ways. 
Let’s take a move from Hegel’s playbook in Phenomenology of Spirit—testing to 
see if a philosophical doctrine can live up to its own standards—and begin with what 
will strike most readers as the least damning flaw of relativism, if only because it is the 
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most abstract and formal. Since relativism is a product of the Western cultural tradition, 
it is therefore limited in its scope to the culture that gave rise to it (by its own standards, 
that is), thus meaning it would not be applicable to other cultures. Yet this universal 
applicability is the very basis of the theory, without which it makes no claim at all. And 
so, formally-philosophically speaking, it is either self-contradictory or merely non-
applicable. 
There is a second, related paradox: if it is universally applicable and true, then its 
claim that there are no universally applicable theories or truths is necessarily false, since 
relativism itself achieves both universal applicability and truth. The central 
(philosophical) goal of relativism is to deny universal answers to ethical problems, yet it 
offers exactly this. The answer to every ethical quandary within the framework of 
relativism is precisely the same—namely, “Whatever the culture says is ethically correct 
is ethically correct.” It therefore offers a universal answer which is the very thing it is 
meant to deny. 
Perhaps more problematic for the theory is that relativism also fails to 
acknowledge differences within a given culture, thus treating cultures as monolithic 
entities—yet another (ironically) totalizing feature of relativism. Within a culture, 
certain laws or norms are controversial among a subset of the population. Many 
(perhaps all?) cultural norms are disputed within the culture that gave rise to them. A 
serious relativist would have to explain what percentage of the population believes a 
certain action to be ethical before it is admissible under the aegis of relativism. This 
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leads to some rather absurd possible outcomes—e.g.: “If 51 percent believe it, then it is 
acceptable within that culture”; or “It is necessary that 100 percent believe it before it is 
acceptable in that culture”; or “So long as one person alone believes it, then it is 
acceptable in that culture.” And so on. 
Etienne Balibar points indirectly to another problem with relativism in his 
homage to Jacques Derrida in Adieu Derrida (2007). 
…on the tracks of dialecticians, structuralists, and post-modernists such as 
Hegel, Benveniste, and Derrida, you realize that the alleged conflict, or 
incompatibility, between universalism and particularism […] is a 
smokescreen and a children’s game for logicians. (Adieu Derrida 79) 
I maintain that Balibar points to the problem indirectly because he points to the 
distinction or supposed incompatibility of the two modes of thinking. (Note: he uses the 
term “particularism” to mean what others have meant, which I will mean throughout 
this essay, by “nominalism.”) Vollmann, in my view, sets himself the task of bridging 
these supposedly incompatible sides of the philosophical chasm between 
relativism/nominalism and universalism. 
I cannot outline every philosophical problem with relativism here, but suffice it 
to say that it is ultimately unsatisfying, both in terms of its philosophical undergirding 
and in terms of satisfactorily giving us a model by which to conduct our affairs in a 
global society—enough so that we are now experiencing a return of interest in 
universalism. Vollmann offers us an excellent and elegant method for retaining the best 
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aspects of relativism/nominalism while likewise retaining those elements of 
universalism that will allow us to theorize in a globalized world and to make ethical 
decisions in that world. 
  
            §ESSENTIALISM AND UNIVERSALISM 
Reading Rising Up and Rising Down, one gets the sense that Vollmann treads 
dangerously close to essentialist claims, given his penchant for crossing cultures and 
centuries to formulate his examples and ethical maxims, yet he likewise makes many 
claims that sound relativist in nature, despite his explicit dismissal of moral relativism. 
What Vollmann is after in many instances where he seems to contradict himself, I 
would argue, is the distinction between essentialism and universalism. (In the next section 
of this essay, I will discuss Vollmann’s relationship with this theoretical terminology. 
For now, I will limit myself to discussing the terms themselves.) The terms essentialism 
and universalism are often conflated to mean the same thing and used interchangeably, 
but it is more than mere philosophical hairsplitting to insist on separating these two 
terms and their attendant conceptual bundles. 
In a similar move to the one I made above of teasing apart the terms weak 
relativism and strong relativism, I’d like to distinguish between group essentialism and 
global essentialism. Group essentialism claims that the members of some subcategory of 
humanity, such as women or Chinese and so on, share certain essential traits common 
to the entire group. This is the way we tend to use the term in the humanities today. 
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Global essentialism claims that there are certain traits common to all of humanity, 
regardless of race, gender, class, education, etc.  Put most simply, essentialism of either 
sort maintains that certain immutable traits obtain among the portion of the human 
species for which it makes its claims—whether that be a single group within the human 
species or the entire human species. And for both sorts of essentialism, these traits 
obtain immutably across time. Essentialist notions of, for example, Europeans do not 
allow for change across generations, and essentialist notions of what it means to be a 
human likewise do not allow for change across generations. For global essentialism, this 
means that human traits across all cultures and all centuries remain—at their 
fundament, in their essence—the same; whereas for group essentialism, this means that 
all members of a certain nationality or ethnicity have always and will always have the 
same traits. These notions of essentialism are well known, of course. So, how does 
universalism differ from essentialism? 
            Universalism—or again, to be precise, let me say the bundle of ideas that 
universalism contains—includes aspects of essentialism. It claims that certain facts of 
human behavior and certain rules of ethics cross national borders, cultural distinctions, 
and language differences. But the category that I suggest we put pressure on in order to 
understand the distinction between essentialism and universalism is that of 
temporality. The primary distinction between essentialism and universalism, is that 
essentialism insists that whatever characteristic or fact about humanity (or some group 
within humanity) is from its very essence true and therefore cannot change without 
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changing the essence itself. To change an essential fact about humanity would mean 
that, in very real terms, humanity would no longer exist (but instead would have 
become some other thing). 
Universalism today claims that there are facts that obtain for the entire 
population of humanity but only at a given time or across a limited window of time. In 
a different time frame and under different circumstances, the universals that obtain 
could very well be different. In effect, essentialism claims facts about humanity from 
within—that is, from the inner essence of humans themselves—whereas universalism 
makes claims from without, about the state of human affairs in the world at large. This 
jibes well with the Sartre of Critique of Dialectical Reason, when he argues that even 
though “the objective Culture” is historically determined, the individual is an 
interiorization of the object Culture and that “the Whole” permeates and mediates the 
individual, thereby allowing us access to a totalized Whole (Critique 54). “Thus, when 
we claim that anyone can carry out the critical investigation, this does not mean it could 
happen at any period. It means anyone today” (Critique 50). This means at any given 
historical moment, we can have access to a totalized Whole, to a universalism, but each 
era will have its own objective Culture, and therefore different universal claims will 
obtain in different eras; and insofar that the same cultural facts obtain across time, the 
same claims will be supportable, though the factor of temporality is the mutable 
element here. 
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In effect, I argue that, in adherence to the Enlightenment notion of continually 
perfecting an idea, today’s universalism takes on the notions of relativism and 
essentialism in so far that it wants to create universals yet allows for change in these 
universals instead of setting them as immutable metaphysical truths. The issue of 
course is how these universals are determined, who determines them, and how our 
definitions and discourses might differ, even when we are working in tandem. 
 
iii. Essentialism or Universalism in Rising Up and Rising Down 
“I don’t understand a lot of it [post-modernist 
theory]. I studied Comparative Literature at Cornell. 
Structuralism was real big then. The idea of reading 
and writing as being a language game. There’s a lot of 
appeal to that. It’s nice to think of it as this playful 
kind of thing. But I think that another way to look at 
it is, ‘Look, I just want to be sincere. I want to write 
something and make you feel something and maybe 
you will go out and do something.’ And it seems the 
world is in such bad shape now that we don’t have 
time to do nothing but language games.” 
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—William T. Vollmann, from an interview
 in William T. Vollmann: A Critical Study and
 Seven Interviews 
 
“I am not a theoretician.” 
  —William T. Vollmann, Rising Up and Rising 
  Down 
 
Vollmann is not a philosopher or literary scholar by profession, even though he 
is prodigiously well-read in many fields, and such thinkers as Freud, Hegel, Marx, and 
Wittgenstein, among many others, make appearances in Rising Up and Rising Down. He 
is also an incredibly sophisticated philosophical autodidact, and it could easily be 
argued that his freedom from professional constraints is precisely what allowed for his 
contributions discussed in this essay. But, nonetheless, his outsider status sometimes 
makes it difficult for a scholarly effort to pin him down on certain points, since he does 
not traffic in the discourse of Critical Theory or the generally agreed-upon terms of 
literary and philosophical scholarship. For example, the terms “essentialism” and 
“universalism” do not appear in Rising Up and Rising Down—while “relativism” makes 
several appearances, though only meaning cultural/moral relativism, never strong 
relativism. 
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Vollmann, therefore, does not make the above distinctions between these terms, 
nor any distinction at all, between the concepts of essentialism and universalism. At 
times, he seems to be asserting what we might call essentialist claims about humanity 
and ethics, and at other times, he seems to be making universalist claims about them. 
As we have already seen, Vollmann explicitly eschews moral relativism, but it is 
unclear in what ways and on what matters he is an essentialist, and in what ways a 
universalist. In order to arrive at Vollmann’s stance(s) on these matters, I propose we do 
close readings of several key passages and translate, so to speak, into the terminology I 
describe above.  
Let’s begin with a passage that places the ethical right to self-defense squarely 
within the biology of the human organism, thus making it an essentialist claim and thus 
putting him somewhat at odds with existentialist philosophy. 
Given the agreed-on right of the self to defense and preservation, it would 
seem clear that the legitimacy both actual and perceived of violent defense 
in the above situations would vary in proportion to the number and 
intensity of force-vectors in one’s path […] we could not blame the Nazi 
war criminals from exercising this right and using lethal force to escape, if 
they could; of course, it was the responsibility of the prison to make sure 
that they could not. They’d been outlawed and remanded to the 
executioner, like Robespierre; we had decided that they were not entitled 
to live, but the struggles of the body to live must be taken for granted just 
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as much as the need to defecate; that is why there are soldiers, walls and 
manacles. (326) 
But while this passage seems to mark Vollmann as an essentialist, not a universalist, 
since this biologically grounded right would obtain across all cultures and all eras, he 
does not always strike this note. In his section on “moral yellowness,” he insists on a 
decidedly non-essentialist position in regard to intrinsic evil within a group or an 
individual. 
Trotsky’s colleague Krestinsky once remarked that Stalin was “a bad man, 
with yellow eyes.” After that, Trotsky thought to perceive what he called 
the moral yellowness of Stalin […] Being able to spy out moral yellowness 
would certainly simplify our task of determining when violence is 
justified; for that very reason, a misperception of moral yellowness would 
be a very serious error. Stalin’s belief that he saw it in the class of kulaks 
or rich peasants—for the science of Marxism-Leninism proved that it must 
be there—gave him the confidence to direct the repression and outright 
extermination of millions. In my experience, there is almost never any moral 
yellowness. (I say “almost” because no one’s experience, including mine, is 
wide enough.) (416-417). [All italics are Vollmann’s.] 
There is much to unpack in this passage, but let’s begin with the notion of moral 
yellowness. Vollmann has kindly offered us a definition of the term (in a spirit of 
universal clarity, one might say). “MORAL YELLOWNESS is the outward appearance 
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of evil or violence in the attitude or expression of a human being” (418). He goes on to 
give examples of many of the world’s greatest atrocities and their perpetrators’ attempts 
to divine inner evil from their victims’ outer appearance. And, as he states it, “sooner or 
later, all of us who actually meet the morally yellow must experience the uneasy sense 
that they may be grey underneath” (419)—that is, they may have the same ethically 
ambiguous personality that all humans have, not the intrinsically evil one we might 
have supposed due to racism or nationalism or religious bigotry, etc. He also adds that 
violence against others based on a belief in moral yellowness is never justified (419). 
And so, while the above statement about the defense of the self as embedded in the 
very biology of the organism seems to take on an essentialist position, this passage 
about moral yellowness rejects the notion of intrinsic evil within an individual or group, 
thereby denying one of the most common (and dangerous) essentialist claims 
throughout history. It also reduces the conflict with an existentialist problematic, since 
existentialism eschews the notion of absolute essences in individuals. 
 We are therefore left either to make Vollmann into a universalist or an 
essentialist, and then square all the circles we find throughout his text to make them fit 
our categorization, or we can say he is an essentialist about some issues and a 
universalist about others. I propose that this latter approach is more accurate and more 
productive. We could even argue that despite his distaste for a certain subcategory of 
relativism, Vollmann even maintains certain notions which could be perceived as 
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relativist, though I would argue they are less about relativism and more about 
existential finitude, and that he holds these positions for a very specific reason. 
 Let’s look at that final sentence in the quoted passage on moral yellowness, 
where Vollmann mentions his own experience and its limits, leading him to admit that 
moral yellowness might indeed exist despite his having never seen it. Here we have to 
introduce one more element into Vollmann’s overall program of ethical investigation: 
the constant admission of human finitude and fallibility. This is central to Vollmann’s 
effort precisely because of the status he asks that we give the maxims in his Moral 
Calculus. They are all potentially flawed and all open to perpetual revision. He 
therefore seeks an ought but never an Ought, by which I mean that he certainly derives 
rules for how we ought to act, but they are mortal and fallible rules and do not pretend 
to be of divine origin or from a perfect Reason; they are built in the muck and mire of 
human events, derived by a fallible mind, and applied imperfectly and permeated with 
all the vicissitudes of finitude. 
And this focus on the individual creating or applying the Moral Calculus is not 
an isolated event. Upon closer inspection, the two above passages raise several 
theoretical questions that are left largely unexplored. Vollmann certainly attempts to 
place the self into a larger social context, in a spirit of something akin to Heideggerian 
thrownness into sociality and historicity—indeed the purpose of Rising Up and Rising 
Down is to determine how we may act socially—but Vollmann privileges the role of the 
individual in his ethical investigations. As he writes: “Trotsky and Lenin might not 
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value my own visualizations, since collective force interests me only insofar as it related 
to personalized ethical decisions about violence” (49). But this focus on the individual 
and the personalized, while anathema to many theorists today, need not remind us of 
some naïve individualism. It is, if anything, one of the strengths of Vollmann’s Moral 
Calculus, since it demands that he take all human interests and every individual’s place 
in the world into account (to the best of his ability) and even informs his dedication to 
exhaustiveness. It likewise takes into account the dialectic between interiorization and 
external factors, which is part and parcel of the existentialist problematic. Furthermore, 
Vollman seems to sugest, it is only by attempting a full consideration of every extant 
individual that one might derive a universal ethics such as his Moral Calculus. 
 I have written his Moral Calculus several times so far, but the following passage 
might give us reason to put pressure on that seemingly innocent possessive pronoun. 
For another instance, in “The Jealous Ones,” when poor people rob or 
harm people who are less poor, does the class-based aggression for which 
jealousy is a shorthand possess any legitimacy whatsoever? Trotsky 
would say yes; Burke would say no. What about you? It is your duty and 
prerogative to apply a moral calculus, mine or yours, as you see fit. (149) 
Here again, the individual agent is privileged, and we even have something akin to 
relativism offered in this passage. As I mentioned earlier, this is not an instance of 
Vollmann contradicting himself in his stance on relativism. He is not suggesting that all 
moral calculuses will be equal when he says it is our duty to apply either his or ours; he 
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is, rather, pointing to the individual’s ethical duty to construct a moral calculus or take 
up the one he has devised for us. In effect, he is saying that you cannot stand neutral 
and inactive in a world with so many atrocities (to refer to his statement about the 
Killing Fields being a moment of re-evaluation for a moral relativist).  
 
iv. Ought from Is 
“In every system of morality, which I have hitherto 
met with, I have always remarked, that the author 
proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or 
makes observations concerning human affairs; when 
all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of 
the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I 
meet with no proposition that is not connected with 
an ought, or an ought not. […] For as this ought, or 
ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 
'tis necessary that it should be observed and 
explained; and at the same time that a reason should 
be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, 
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, 
which are entirely different from it.” 
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  —David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 
 
To return for a moment to my earlier point about the ethical aspect of Vollmann’s 
methodology of exhaustiveness, I want to investigate the famous claim from David 
Hume which has become a tacit assumption of most ethical philosophy on both sides of 
the debate between relativism/nominalism and universalism/essentialism. Hume 
claims, in his A Treatise of Human Nature, that one can never derive an ought from an is, 
and to do so is generally dubbed among philosophers the naturalistic fallacy.9 The 
relativist grants this claim credence by claiming that one must merely observe all the 
ises there are yet never derive any universal ethical claims from them. The old 
universalists (essentialists) will tell us that we cannot look to the ises in the world to 
derive an ought—indeed, according to Kant, we don’t even have access to any real is out 
there. We must derive our ought from abstract Reason, the old universalists tell us. But 
Vollmann finds an interesting bridge between the two sides of the debate by eschewing 
their (tacitly or explicitly) agreed-upon adherence to Hume’s dictum. His methodology 
of exhaustiveness leads him to collect as much information about all the ises of the 
world, making use of texts of anthropology, economics, history, and politics. He then, in 
direct contradiction with Hume’s dictum, derives the maxims of his “Moral Calculus.” 
                                                          
9 There have, of course, been various philosophers who have tried to challenge this notion, most famously the 
analytic philosopher John Searle. But these challenges are generally conducted via various minor instances of 
philosophical hair-splitting, mostly because they have allowed “ought” to continue to mean an immutable ought. 
Vollmann joins their ranks but adds the further innovation of altering what “ought” might mean. It is also worth 
noting that no Continental philosopher or critical theorist, to my knowledge, has attempted to challenge the 
naturalistic fallacy (at least in part since they are not usually interested in universal “oughts”). 
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And then, we come to what he calls “Case Studies” in Rising Up and Rising Down. These 
“Case Studies” are his own experiences as a war journalist, traveler, and adventure-
seeker. Or, as he describes them: 
The second part of this book owes more to my own experience, and 
comprises a series of case studies in violence and perception of violence: 
Inuit seal hunting and animal rights, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and 
Cambodian gangs in the United States; the civil war in Bosnia, U.N. 
peacekeeping in Somalia, cattle rustlers and street robbers in Madagascar, 
child prostitution in Thailand (and how and why I kidnapped one girl 
engaged in that trade), teenage suicide on an Apache reservation in the 
U.S., opium politics and ethnic guerilla movements in Burma, the Libyan-
funded PULO terrorist organization in Thailand and Malaysia, the 
Guardian Angel movement in the U.S., the Christian Patriot movement in 
the U.S. (with some references to neo-Nazis and the Militia), the Baraku 
(“Untouchable”) class in Japan, and voodoo and folk religion in the 
American South as a means of “dealing with” violence. (47) 
And here again, we see the exhaustiveness of his effort—not only in the range of his 
archival research, but in the extremes he will go to gather experience and the invaluable 
knowledge he claims that comes with that experience. In effect, he argues for a kind of 
extreme field anthropology as a key element in our ethical investigations. 
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Vollmann ends his “Case Studies” with “applications of the Moral Calculus to 
strike at a brief ethical evaluation of each of the situations describes” (48). In sum: 
instead of refusing to derive any ethical maxims, as the relativist/nominalist would 
have him do, and instead of deriving them from pure abstractions as the old 
universalist/essentialist would have him do, Vollmann collects an massive amount of 
information, derives his maxims from that information, and then tests these maxims in 
the laboratory of his massive personal experience. And all the while, he admits that he 
cannot possibly gather enough information or have enough experience or be infallible 
in his understanding of either—in short, he (and his ethical system) admit the fact of 
human finitude and fallibility. Sartre tells us that we are free to choose but not free to 
choose the conditions of our choosing; I would add, channeling Vollmann, that one of 
those conditions is human finitude, and that we must take that into account when we 
attempt to outline a system of ethics or a series of moral maxims. In this, Vollmann 
follows Heideggerian thinking on finitude quite precisely. 
 But even if we admit human finitude and fallibility in our system, as I think we 
must, we have not solved all of our problems. Perhaps the most charged issue in 
deriving an ought from an is, however, is of course which is do we include and which do 
we exclude; which do we put as a paradigmatic example and which as a periphery case, 
worthy perhaps of no more than a footnote. As we’ll see in the next section, most 
attempts at universalizing have, paradoxically, been more about exclusion than 
inclusion. This is the point of greatest danger in constructing universals—we may fall 
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victim at every turn to ideological pitfalls and prejudicial pratfalls. Vollmann’s 
methodology of exhaustiveness is perhaps the best defense we have against these 
dangers, albeit an imperfect one. But for now, let’s move on to how we construct 
universality.  
   
v. Constructing Universality 
 
“On ne se demandera pas ce que sont les principes 
mais ce qu’ils font. [Don’t ask what the principles are, 
but rather what they do.]” 
—Gilles Deleuze, Philosophie Virtuelle 
 
“Experience alone, and theoretical grounding alone, 
are insufficient foundations for any moral calculus.” 
—William T. Vollmann, Rising Up and Rising 
Down 
  
            Here is where it gets difficult. At this point we’ve established that the old 
essentialist notions of morality were too metaphysically dogmatic and generally 
Eurocentric. But the alternative, relativism, is equally unsatisfying. So now we’ve 
moved to the need for a new sort of universalism that has learned the lessons of 
tolerance and inclusion from relativism. As Fredric Jameson, discussing Adorno and 
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somewhat channeling the Žižek of Looking Awry, describes one possible variation of the 
dialectic in Valences of the Dialectic (2009): 
The negative dialectic still seems to retain something of the Absolute that 
figured so powerfully in the Hegelian version, and even in the Marxian 
“absolute historisicism.” […] It is about this possibility that Žižek’s 
dialectic will have something to say. 
Jameson then shows the tripartite movement he has illustrated: 
stupid first impression as the appearance; ingenious correction in the 
name of some underlying reality or “essence”; but finally, after all, a 
return to the reality of the appearance (Jameson 57)  
In effect, we begin with a naïve notion, make an ingenious complicating antithesis, but 
then return to the first notion—though now it is no longer naïve, but rather informed by 
its dialectical journey through its antithesis. But how do we set about forming such a 
universalist vision of morality?  
            As Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek agree in their book 
Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (2011)—a book 
designed around their disagreements—the most common means (historically speaking) 
of creating a universal has been to exclude more than you include, usually beginning 
with an ideologically formed notion of what (and who) is right, and then excluding 
everything that does not fit these ideological preconditions. 
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Another point of agreement, which bears a certain relation to my earlier 
distinction between essentialism and universalism, is that they all 
maintain that universality is not a static presumption, not an a priori 
given, and that it ought instead to be understood as a process or condition 
irreducible to any of its determinate modes of appearance. (Butler, Laclau, 
Žižek 3)  
They go on to say: 
Whereas we sometimes differ on how the emphasis is to be made, we each 
offer accounts of universality which assume that the negative condition of 
all political articulation is ‘universal’ (Žižek), that the contestatory process 
determines forms of universality which are brought into a productive and 
ultimately irresolvable conflict with each other (Laclau), or that there is a 
process of translation by which the repudiated within universality is 
readmitted into the term in the process of remaking it (Butler). (ibid)  
Žižek is particularly interesting in this case, since his three main intellectual influences 
are Hegel, Lacan, and Marx. Hegel and Marx are clearly universalist and teleological 
thinkers, and psychoanalysis is always negotiating the back-and-forth of essentialism 
and cultural particularity. Žižek quotes Wendy Brown’s States of Injury (1995) on the 
question of Marxist critique in the age of identity politics. Brown asks 
to what extent a critique of capitalism is foreclosed by current 
configuration of oppositional politics, and not simply by the loss of ‘a 
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socialist alternative’ or the ostensible ‘triumph of liberalism’ in the global 
order. (Butler, Laclau, Žižek 96)  
Žižek and Brown seem to be warning us that the excessive fragmentation of our ethical 
vision causes us to miss the overarching structural issues of capitalism. We therefore 
need an equally overarching ethics with which to critique the global system of capital. 
But, as Deleuze invites us to do with his injunction to ask what principles do instead of 
what they are, we must ask what a universal ethics does (and how it is made) as much 
as we ask which contents would constitute such a system. We must be careful to notice 
unwanted side-effects or exclusions such a system might allow. It is also necessary to be 
able to make decisions in a world in motion and in which we are moving. Here is where 
Vollmann’s Moral Calculus enters the fray most usefully. 
  
vi. Vollmann’s Moral Calculus 
 
This is a tricky domain because, unlike simple 
arithmetic, to solve a calculus problem—and in 
particular to perform integration—you have to be 
smart about which integration technique should be 
used: integration by partial fractions, integration by 
parts, and so on. 
—Marvin Minsky, HAL’s Legacy 
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            The Moral Calculus is Vollmann’s seventy-six-page set of interrelated ethical 
maxims. As already stated, Vollmann derives his Moral Calculus from his exhaustively 
collected archive of anthropology, economics, history, and politics—thereby eschewing 
the long-running dictum that one cannot derive an ought from an is. He tells us that the 
idea first occurred to him when he read that Benjamin Franklin kept a Moral 
Arithmetic, whereby he would divide a sheet of paper into two columns and write out 
the reasons for and against a given action. About this method of decision-making, 
Franklin wrote (and Vollmann thought worth quoting) that 
tho’ the Weight of Reasons cannot be taken with the Precision of Algebraic 
Quantities, . . . I have found great Advantage from this kind of Equation, 
in what may be called Moral or Prudential Algebra. (Vollmann 445)  
Notice the first clause and its admission that in moral reckonings, we cannot expect the 
precision of the mathematical discipline from which either Franklin’s Moral Algebra or 
Vollmann’s Moral Calculus take their names. Vollmann does not offer us an explicit 
reason as to why he names his system a Moral Calculus, though we can assume, 
minimally, that given the increased complexity—seventy-six pages of interconnected 
and interdependent premises and conclusions as opposed two to columns, pro and 
con—that Vollmann thinks the formation of a universal system is more complex than 
one man’s decision process about a single action. In fact, though Vollmann may not 
have intended it, his choice is entirely accurate in regard to creating a universal system 
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that takes into account all the relative moving parts. Calculus itself was constructed to 
calculate change and objects in motion. This is perfectly fitting, to my mind anyway, for 
the task before universalist thinkers today. 
It is by use of a Moral Calculus that we can determine when violence is justified 
or not, according to Vollmann. It is how we decide if a person or group is, to use 
Vollmann’s titular concepts, rising up or rising down. Rising up is the justified use of 
violence to ameliorate one’s situation, and rising down is the unjustified use of violence 
to ameliorate one’s situation. But what does his calculus look like? A complete and 
thorough analysis of it would be an essay unto itself, but it is worthwhile to get even a 
brief sketch of his seventy-six-page Moral Calculus, along with a few examples from it. 
            Vollmann has constructed a series of maxims, each one derived from the rest of 
his massive book, which covers multiple national histories, his own exploits as a war 
journalist and adventurer, and so on. As examples, I offer a few maxims, each named 
after the person or idea that inspired Vollmann to construct them. 
Martin Luther King’s Maxim: A law is unjust which requires from the 
governed acts or allegiances not required from the legislators. 
The Whale-Hunter’s Maxim: What is forbidden, allowable, or compulsory in 
one group need not be in another. (476)  
Some of these maxims are, as Vollmann admits, incompatible under certain 
circumstances, and so he creates a system of hierarchy as to which ones take 
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precedence. He also includes, along with this hierarchized set of maxims, certain 
dilemmas, such as the following one: 
The Pelasgian Dilemma: Do I express who I am, and thereby cause harm to 
myself and others, or do I protect myself by becoming one of them? (477)  
He goes on to set limitations and qualifications, subrules that cancel other subrules, and 
so on. But what is most important about his achievement is its massive flexibility, which 
is in fact yet another part of his methodology of exhaustiveness. Some maxims seem 
rigid, whereas others are very flexible, and nearly every rule can be superseded by a 
series of other limitations or counter-rules. In effect, it is not a strict set of rules 
partaking of a metaphysical Ought. Schopenhauer’s critique of Kant’s ethical system 
was based precisely on his distaste for this Ought. In his On the Basis of Morality, 
Schopenhauer’s position is that 
Kant’s idea of an imperative, ‘you ought’, is a theological notion in 
disguise. The language in which Kant speaks here has biblical overtones, 
and, to the atheist Schopenhauer, the very idea of an absolute command 
either trades surreptitiously on the assumption of an absolute being who 
may issue it, or it is unfounded. (Janaway 54).  
For Schopenhauer, all ethics are derived from various subjects’ will to life (Wille zum 
Leben) and must be negotiated as the interplay, the confrontation, and the sympathy 
these subjects exhibit upon encountering one another. 
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            If we are going to have a universal ethics today, it must not consist of strict dicta 
based on a metaphysical Ought; it must be a calculus that takes into account the ever-
changing and movable parts of humanity. But it must also follow Deleuze’s injunction 
to be less concerned with what our principles are and more with what they do (faire). 
Vollmann’s Moral Calculus admirably avoids the strict Kantian Ought, as 
Schopenhauer would have him do, and he is ultimately concerned with the effects 
produced by one’s ethical maxims, as Deleuze instructs us we must be. For these 
reasons and for the massiveness of his research and personal experience, as well as his 
refreshingly curious investigations, we should make Rising Up and Rising Down a 
centerpiece in the discussions of universalism and ethics. 
 
vii. Conclusion(s) 
 I have argued that Vollmann’s methodology of exhaustiveness in Rising Up and 
Rising Down offers a merger of the philosophical demands of relativism/nominalism 
and universalism/essentialism. It likewise offers a solution to the long-running 
problem of deriving an ought from an is, which thinkers on both sides of the debate 
have either explicitly or tacitly assumed is impossible. He does not, however, derive the 
old universalist version of an Ought, insofar as he is not deriving immutable and 
infallible laws by which one must conduct one’s life. The necessary facts of any 
situation are always in motion and each situation will call for the application of any 
number of (potentially conflicting) maxims from the Moral Calculus (or indeed might 
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require adding more maxims to it). In effect, Vollmann has taken up the Heideggerian 
notion of Dasein’s existential finitude and applied it to the realm of ethics. 
My primary goal here has been to suggest Vollmann’s inclusion into one of the 
major critical-theoretical discussions of the past decade—that of a new universalism—
and to suggest how his efforts might further those of professional theorists and 
philosophers, while their efforts might help us to better understand and apply 
Vollmann’s work. The almost total lack of academic attention given to Vollmann’s work 
is not only disappointing but also quite surprising, given the nature of his enterprise 
and the sheer quantity of it. His exhaustive output is exhilarating and exhausting in 
equal measure; it merits our serious attention, and, what’s more, it might serve as one of 
the most profound ethical models available to us in the age of globalization. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Throughout this dissertation, I have argued for an existentialist intervention into 
Memory Studies and investigations into the effects and ethics of violence and counter-
violence at their various points of intersection. I have likewise argued for an approach 
that blends the methodologies of philosophy and literary studies, given that 
existentialist authors are often philosophers and literary authors in equal measure. 
Existentialism, I maintain, is best equipped to theorize the dialectic of the individual 
and sociality, and thus the dialectic between acute personal suffering and systemic 
violence, as well as collective suffering and violence. 
Existentialism also offers us a means of constructing an ethics, as well as the 
means of admitting the limits of such an ethics. And here again, the dialectic between 
the individual and the collective comes into play, since any ethics will necessarily 
include both. Sartre’s own attempt at developing an existentialist ethics is incomplete—
literally, since his book on the matter was never finished. It is my hope that by injecting 
Vollmann’s Himalayan study on violence/ethics and Mailer’s work on courage and 
limit-experiences into the Sartrean/existentialist discourse on the subject of ethics that 
we might make strides toward completing that incomplete Sartrean project. We must, 
however, admit our basic finitude in any given project of developing an ethics and not 
seek to set down a coda of immutable ethical Oughts; rather, any existentialist ethics 
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will perforce be a situational one, a mutable one, a fallible one. And this might represent 
the greatest contribution of existentialist thought to ethical philosophy: the jettisoning 
of lists of commandments and rigid philosophical dicta about how one ought to act—
always and unquestionably—and replacing it with a dynamic situation-oriented ethics. 
It is also worth noting that an existentialist ethics, as discussed in chapters two and six, 
must be other-oriented, via Sartre’s reworking of Hegelian recognition. 
 There are many directions the current swell of interest in existentialism can take, 
but given its unique position in theorizing memory, suffering, and violence, I argue that 
forays into those subjects should be first and foremost among the various directions 
scholars take. Of particular interest would be the intersections of these subjects and 
postcolonialism, since existentialism likewise holds a privileged position in postcolonial 
(and anti-colonial) thought. Given its stature as the only truly global philosophical 
movement, there are practically no limitations in terms of geography on which topics 
one could explore via the existentialist problematic. 
 There was a time when existentialism was utterly dominant in Western and even 
world thought. This dominance led to a backlash, an oedipal killing of sorts, to clear the 
field for other modes of theorizing to emerge. The current emergence of existentialism is 
not so outsized as to be threatening to other theoretical modes of thought. It can, 
therefore, be safely and thoroughly utilized in all the ways I suggest and many more 
without concern for academic fashion or avoidance. The slow, important work of 
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understanding the topics I have covered here and others can and should continue in 
earnest. 
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